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  1. Predictive Processing and Foundationalism About Perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1751-1769.
    Predictive processing accounts of perception assume that perception does not work in a purely bottom-up fashion but also uses acquired knowledge to make top-down predictions about the incoming sensory signals. This provides a challenge for foundationalist accounts of perception according to which perceptual beliefs are epistemically basic, that is, epistemically independent from other beliefs. If prior beliefs rationally influence which perceptual beliefs we come to accept, then foundationalism about perception appears untenable. I review several ways in which foundationalism might be (...)
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  • Everything is Clear: All Perceptual Experiences Are Transparent.Laura Gow - 2019 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):412-425.
    The idea that perceptual experience is transparent is generally used by naïve realists and externalist representationalists to promote an externalist account of the metaphysics of perceptual experience. It is claimed that the phenomenal character of our perceptual experience can be explained solely with reference to the externally located objects and properties which (for the representationalist) we represent, or which (for the naïve realist) partly constitute our experience. Internalist qualia theorists deny this, and claim that the phenomenal character of our perceptual (...)
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  • Toward a Perceptual Account of Mindreading.Somogy Varga - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):380-401.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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