Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability

European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):376-397 (2017)
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Abstract
This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low-level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties, ‘high-level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high-level properties, while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high-level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high-level view.
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Archival date: 2017-06-06
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The Modularity of Mind.Cummins, Robert & Fodor, Jerry

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