Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Cut-Offs and Their Neighbors.Achille C. Varzi - 2003 - In Jc Beall (ed.), Liars and Heaps: New Essays on Paradox. Clarendon Press. pp. 24–38.
    In ‘Towards a Solution to the Sorites Paradox’, Graham Priest gives us a new account of the sorites based on fuzzy logic. The novelty lies in the suggestion that truth-value assignments should themselves be treated as fuzzy objects, i.e., objects about which we can make fuzzy identity statements. I argue that Priest’s solution does not have the explanatory force that Priest advocates. That is, it does not explain why we find the existence of a cut-off point counter-intuitive. I also argue (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • I confini del Cervino.Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - In Vincenzo Fano, Gino Tarozzi & Massimo Stanzione (eds.), Prospettive della logica e della filosofia della scienza. Atti del convegno triennale della Società Italiana di Logica e Filosofia delle Scienze. Rubbettino Editore. pp. 431–445.
    Some philosophers have argued that the vagueness exhibited by names and descriptions such as ‘Mount Everest’, ‘Downtown Manhattan’, or ‘that cloud in the sky’ is ultimately ontological: they are vague because they refer to vague objects, objects with fuzzy boundaries. I take the opposite stand and argue for the view that all vagueness is semantic. There is no such thing as a vague mountain. Rather, there are many things where we conceive the mountain to be, each with its precise boundary, (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Vaghezza e ontologia.Achille C. Varzi - 2008 - In Maurizio Ferraris (ed.), Storia dell’ontologia. Bompiani. pp. 672–698.
    On the opposition between de re and de dicto conceptions of vagueness, with special reference to their bearing on the tasks of ontology.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Vagueness in Geography.Achille C. Varzi - 2001 - Philosophy and Geography 4 (1):49–65.
    Some have argued that the vagueness exhibited by geographic names and descriptions such as ‘Albuquerque’, ‘the Outback’, or ‘Mount Everest’ is ultimately ontological: these terms are vague because they refer to vague objects, objects with fuzzy boundaries. I take the opposite stand and hold the view that geographic vagueness is exclusively semantic, or conceptual at large. There is no such thing as a vague mountain. Rather, there are many things where we conceive a mountain to be, each with its precise (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Supervaluationism and Its Logics.Achille C. Varzi - 2007 - Mind 116 (463):633-676.
    What sort of logic do we get if we adopt a supervaluational semantics for vagueness? As it turns out, the answer depends crucially on how the standard notion of validity as truth preservation is recasted. There are several ways of doing that within a supervaluational framework, the main alternative being between “global” construals (e.g., an argument is valid iff it preserves truth-under-all-precisifications) and “local” construals (an argument is valid iff, under all precisifications, it preserves truth). The former alternative is by (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   39 citations  
  • Inconsistency Without Contradiction.Achille C. Varzi - 1997 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 38 (4):621-639.
    David Lewis has argued that impossible worlds are nonsense: if there were such worlds, one would have to distinguish between the truths about their contradictory goings-on and contradictory falsehoods about them; and this--Lewis argues--is preposterous. In this paper I examine a way of resisting this argument by giving up the assumption that ‘in so-and-so world’ is a restricting modifier which passes through the truth-functional connectives The outcome is a sort of subvaluational semantics which makes a contradiction ‘A & ~A’ false (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   17 citations  
  • The Soritical Centipede.Terry Horgan, Nathan Ballantyne & Brian Fiala - 2019 - Noûs 53 (2):491-510.
    Two philosophical questions arise about rationality in centipede games that are logically prior to attempts to apply the formal tools of game theory to this topic. First, given that the players have common knowledge of mutual rationality and common knowledge that they are each motivated solely to maximize their own profits, is there a backwards-induction argument that employs only familiar non-technical concepts about rationality, leads to the conclusion that the first player is rationally obligated to end the game at the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Vagueness, Logic, and Ontology.Achille C. Varzi - 2009 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing About Language. Routledge. pp. 135-154.
    Remember the story of the most-most? It’s the story of that club in New York where people are the most of every type. There is the hairiest bald man and the baldest hairy man; the shortest giant and the tallest dwarf; the smartest idiot and the stupidest wise man. They are all there, including honest thieves and crippled acrobats. On Saturday night they have a party, eat, drink, dance. Then they have a contest. “And if you can tell the hairiest (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations