Teaching ethics in public health programmes is not routine everywhere – at least not in most schools of public health in the European region. Yet empirical evidence shows that schools of public health are more and more interested in the integration of ethics in their curricula, since public health professionals often have to face difficult ethical decisions.

When, if ever, can healthcare provider's lay claim to knowing what is best for their patients? In this paper, I offer a taxonomy of clinical disagreements. The taxonomy, I argue, reveals that healthcare providers often can lay claim to knowing what is best for their patients, but that oftentimes, they cannot do so *as* healthcare providers.

Medical practitioners are duty-bound to tell their patients the truth about their medical conditions, along with the risks and benefits of proposed treatments. Some patients, however, would rather not receive medical information. A recent response to this tension has been to argue that that the disclosure of medical information is not optional. As such, patients do not have permission to refuse medical information. In this paper I argue that, depending on the context, the disclosure of medical information can undermine the (...) patient’s ability to exercise her autonomy or have therapeutically detrimental effects. In the light of these insights I go on to develop a context-sensitive approach to medical disclosure. The advantage of this account is that it addresses concerns on both sides of the debate; whilst it acknowledges that patients do not have an exercisable ‘right not to know,’ it allows that in some cases medical information ought to be withheld. (shrink)

In medical practice, the doctrine of informed consent is generally understood to have priority over the medical practitioner’s duty of care to her patient. A common consequentialist argument for the prioritisation of informed consent above the duty of care involves the claim that respect for a patient’s free choice is the best way of protecting that patient’s best interests; since the patient has a special expertise over her values and preferences regarding non-medical goods she is ideally placed to make a (...) decision that will protect her interests. In this paper I argue against two consequentialist justifications for a blanket prioritisation of informed consent over the duty of care by considering cases in which patients have imperfect access to their overall best interests. Furthermore, I argue that there are cases where the mere presentation of choice under the doctrine of informed consent is detrimental to patient best interests. I end the paper by considering more nuanced approaches to resolving the conflict between informed consent and the duty of care and consider the option of permitting patients to waive informed consent. (shrink)

It is plausible that what possible courses of action patients may legitimately expect their physicians to take is ultimately determined by what medicine as a profession is supposed to do and, consequently, that we can determine the moral acceptability of voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide on the basis of identifying the proper goals of medicine. This article examines the main ways of defining the proper goals of medicine found in the recent bioethics literature and argues that they cannot provide a (...) clear answer to the question of whether or not voluntary euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide are morally acceptable. It is suggested that to find a plausible answer to this question and to complete the task of defining the proper goals of medicine, we must determine what is the best philosophical theory about the nature of prudential value. (shrink)

The principle of beneficence directs healthcare practitioners to promote patients’ well-being, ensuring that the patients’ best interests guide treatment decisions. Because there are a number of distinct theories of well-being that could lead to different conclusions about the patient’s good, a careful consideration of which account is best suited for use in the medical context is needed. While there has been some discussion of the differences between subjective and objective theories of well-being within the bioethics literature, less attention has been (...) given to the questions of what work a theory of well-being needs to do in bioethics and which standards of success ought to be used in selecting a theory of well-being for use in medicine. In this article, I argue that traditional theories of well-being developed in philosophy are not well suited to meet the needs of the medical context. For the principle of beneficence to be most useful, the underlying account of well-being should satisfy two conditions: first, it needs to lead to a concrete, action-guiding determination of the patient’s good; and, second, any recommendations it offers need to be justifiable to patients. Standard accounts of well-being have difficulty satisfying both conditions. Exploring the limitations of these theories when applied to treatment dilemmas helps point the way toward the development of an account of well-being better suited to healthcare. (shrink)

Contesting that a debate on evidence-based health care has taken place, this article charts three paths to the future: continuing avoidance of debate by proponents of evidence-based medicine (EBM); conflict, which the EBM movement courts and critics have espoused, and dialogue. The last portal allows for integration, which would end the disagreement between EBM and its critics and make a debate unnecessary. In search of integration, I sketch a bridge whose construction requires not compromise but a win- win approach. The (...) bridge is a medicine of meaning (MOM). Consolidating multiple pillars of evidence to unify questions that are not necessarily the same for protagonists and critics of EBM, a MOM contends that the purpose or meaning of medicine is always healing and helping, and each party finds meaning in medicine by contributing to this common purpose in its own distinctive way. (shrink)

The celebration of thirty years of publication of The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy provides an opportunity to reflect on how medical ethics has evolved over that period. The reshaping of the field has occurred in no small part because of the impact of branches of philosophy other than ethics. These have included influences from Kantian theory of respect for persons, personal identity theory, philosophy of biology, linguistic analysis of the concepts of health and disease, personhood theory, epistemology, and political (...) philosophy. More critically, medicine itself has begun to be reshaped. The most fundamental restructuring of medicine is currently occurring - stemming, in part, from the application of contemporary philosophy of science to the medical field. There is no journal more central to these critical events of the past three decades than The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. (shrink)

The clinical relationship has been underexplored in dementia care. This is in part due to the way that the clinical relationship has been articulated and understood in bioethics. Robert Veatch’s social contract model is representative of a standard view of the clinical relationship in bioethics. But dementia presents formidable challenges to the standard clinical relationship, including ambiguity about when the clinical relationship begins, how it weathers changes in narrative identity of patients with dementia, and how the intimate involvement of family (...) fits alongside a paradigmatically dyadic relationship. Drawing on work in recent feminist theory, a critique is offered of the standard clinical relationship in bioethics as underwritten by an individualistic conception of autonomy. An alternative view of the clinical relationship in dementia, one that embraces a relational account of autonomy, is put forward. (shrink)

Edmund Pellegrino and David Thomasma’s writings have had a worldwide impact on discourse about the philosophy of medicine, professionalism, bioethics, healthcare ethics, and patients’ rights. Given their works’ importance, it is surprising that commentators have ignored their admission of an unresolved and troubling dilemma and inconsistency in their theory. The purpose of this article is to identify and state what problems worried them and to consider possible solutions. It is argued that their dilemma stems from their concerns about how to (...) justify professional rules restricting colleagues from performing acts they view as direct, active, and formal killings, such as physician-assisted suicide, mercy killing, and abortion. It is further argued that their inconsistency is that they both assert and deny that professional colleagues should not use their moral or theological values to impose professional restrictions on other colleagues without adequate philosophical grounds. At risk are their arguments about the nature of an internal morality for medicine, a secular and multicultural basis for medical ethics, and a nonarbitrary way to determine what acts fall outside the ends of medicine. These are arguments they claim also apply to other healthcare professions. The article begins with a brief overview of their key positions to provide the context in which they make their admission. (shrink)

A governing principle in medical ethics is respect for patient autonomy. This principle is commonly drawn upon in order to argue for the permissibility of assisted dying. In this paper I explore the proper role that respect for patient autonomy should play in this context. I argue that the role of autonomy is not to identify a patient’s best interests, but instead to act as a side-constraint on action. The surprising conclusion of the paper is that whether or not it (...) is in the best interests for the patient to die is a morally objective matter. This allows for the possibility that it can be in the best interests of the patient to die even if she autonomously considers it to be in her best interest to continue living. I argue that concerns about ‘mandatory’ euthanasia can be met when patient autonomy is respected as a side-constraint on action. Ultimately, this means that assisted dying is permissible, not because the autonomous patient views her suffering to be unbearable, but because it is in her objective best interests and she permitted it via her consent. (shrink)

This article provides an understanding and defence of ‘best interests’. The analysis is performed in the context of, and is informed by, English law. The understanding that develops allows for differences in values, and is thus argued to be appropriate in a pluralist liberal system. When understood properly, it is argued, best interests provides the best means of decision-making for people deemed incompetent to decide for themselves. It is accepted that some commentators are cynical of best interests in practice. Following (...) an assessment of some of their principal concerns, it is suggested that best interests in fact provides a construct that is both defensible and desirable. (shrink)

In this issue of the Hastings Center Report, Jason Wasserman and Mark Navin argue that patients without decisional capacity can still have relatively stable wishes or inclinations toward one treatment option over another and that these preferences are “not devoid of moral weight and might therefore guide or at least influence treatment decisions when they cannot be defeated by other considerations.” This position is not controversial among most bioethicists. The hard work comes in sussing out the details of this position. (...) How much moral weight do these preferences have? When should preferences be defeated by other considerations? How should we identify actual preferences, and how should preferences be differentiated and weighed against one another? (shrink)

On 27 September 2013, the Centre for the Humanities and Health (CHH) at King's College London hosted a 1-day workshop on ‘Medical knowledge, Medical Duties’. This workshop was the fifth in a series of five workshops whose aim is to provide a new model for high-quality, open interdisciplinary engagement between medical professionals and philosophers. This report identifies the key points of discussion raised throughout the day and the methodology employed.

A moral problem arises when a patient refuses a treatment that would save her life. Should the patient be treated against her will? According to an influential approach to questions of biomedical ethics, certain considerations pertaining to individual autonomy provide a solution to this problem. According to this approach, we should respect the patient’s autonomy and, since she has made an autonomous decision against accepting the treatment, she should not be treated. This article argues against the view that our answer (...) to the question of whether or not the refusing patient ought to be treated should be based on these kinds of considerations pertaining to individual autonomy and maintains that finding a plausible answer to this question presupposes that we resolve questions concerning subjectivity and objectivity of individual wellbeing. (shrink)

Euthanasia and the duty to die have both been thoroughly discussed in the field of bioethics as morally justifiable practices within medical healthcare contexts. The existence of a narrow connection between both could also be established, for people having a duty to die should be allowed to actively hasten their death by the active means offered by euthanasia. Choosing the right time to end one’s own life is a decisive factor to retain autonomy at the end of our lives. However, (...) there is no definitive consensus on why physicians should be the ones performing the medical procedure to end a person’s life. The moral problems arising from such assertion are not to be taken lightly, for medical tradition has long regarded the duty not to kill, not to actively end a patient’s life, as the core moral obligation that gives meaning to the medical profession. Our concern is to question the moral justifiability of the arguments offered by physicians not to actively help patients die. (shrink)

In this chapter, I consider the idea that physician-assisted death might come into question in the cases of psychiatric patients who are incapable of making autonomous choices about ending their lives. I maintain that the main arguments for physician-assisted death found in recent medical ethical literature support physician-assisted death in some of those cases. After assessing several possible criticisms of what I have argued, I conclude that the idea that physicianassisted death can be acceptable in some cases of psychiatric patients (...) who lack autonomy ought to be taken into account in assessing the moral and legal acceptability of physician-assisted death. (shrink)

Healthcare services should be provided according to contemporary ethical norms that require patients’ active engagement in all the relevant processes. However, authoritarian attitudes and behaviors in healthcare, one of which is paternalism, put patients in a passive role. But, as Avedis Donabedian emphasizes, patients are co-producers of care, reformers of healthcare, informants, and definers and evaluators of quality. Overlooking these significant functions and merely focusing on physicians’ benevolence due to their medical knowledge and skills in the production of healthcare services (...) would leave the fate of patients in the hands of clinicians and impose physicians’ hegemony on patients and their choices. Nevertheless, the concept of co-production is a practical and effective mechanism to redefine the language used in healthcare by recognizing patients as co-producers and equal partners. The application of co-production in healthcare would improve the therapeutic relationship, decrease ethical violations, and promote the patient’s dignity. (shrink)

Bioethics evolved from traditional physician ethics and theological ethics. It has become important in contemporary discussions of Medicine and ethics. But in contemporary secular societies the foundations of bioethics are minimal in their content and often rely on procedural ethics. The bioethics of particular communities, particularly religious communities, are richer than the procedural ethics of a secular society. Religious bioethics, situated within religious communities, are richer in content in general and in the lived reality.

It was in the course of one particular clinical encounter that I came to realize the power of narrative, especially for expressing clinically presented ethical matters. In Husserlian terms, the mode of evidence proper to the unique and the singular is the very indirection that is the genius of story-telling. Moreover, the clinical consultant is unavoidably changed by his or her clinical involvement. The individuals whose situation is at issue have their own stories that need telling. Clinical ethics is in (...) this sense a way of helping patients, families, and, yes, health providers to discover and give voice to those stories. In this way, clinical ethics is an evoking of meaning. Kierkegaard understood this well: Indirect communication is the language for the unique and the otherwise inexpressible. (shrink)

Informed consent honors the autonomous decisions of patients, and family consent places importance on decisions made by their families. However, there is little understanding of the relationship between these two medical decision-making approaches. Both approaches exist in Japan as part of its truth disclosure policy. What is the status of family consent in the United States, from which Japan introduced informed consent? This paper compares the situation in the United States with that in Japan, where family consent has been combined (...) with informed consent. It then explains the history of policy development through which family consent was added to informed consent in the United States. Based on this analysis, the paper suggests that the relationship between informed consent and family consent in the United States was established on the basis of a family model that places more importance on trust-based relationships than it does on blood ties. (shrink)

Patients’ trust in their physicians improves their health outcomes because of better compliance, more disclosure, stronger placebo effect, and more physicians’ trustworthy behaviors. Patients’ autonomy may also impact on health outcomes and is increasingly being emphasized in health care. However, despite the critical role of trust and autonomy, patients that naïvely trust their physicians may become overly dependent and lack the motivation to participate in medical care. In this article, we argue that increased trust does not necessarily imply decreased autonomy. (...) Furthermore, patients with high levels of trust and autonomy preferences are most likely to have the best health outcomes. We propose a framework for understanding simultaneous trust and autonomy preferences and for recognizing their interactive effects on health outcomes in the dynamic medical encounter. This framework argues that policy makers and health care providers should make efforts to foster not only patients’ trust but also their preferences for autonomy and thus gain the best position for achieving health-related goals. (shrink)

In this article, the authors attempt to build a bridge between economic theory and medical ethics to offer a new perspective to tackle ethical challenges in the physician–patient encounter. They apply elements of new institutional economics to the ethically relevant dimensions of the physician–patient relationship in a descriptive heuristic sense. The principal–agent theory can be used to analytically grasp existing action problems in the physician–patient relationship and as a basis for shaping recommendations at the institutional level. Furthermore, the patients’ increased (...) self-determination and modern opportunities for the medical laity to inform themselves lead to a less asymmetrical distribution of information between physician and patient and therefore require new interaction models. Based on the analysis presented here, the authors recommend that, apart from the physician’s necessary individual ethics, greater consideration should be given to approaches of institutional ethics and hence to incentive systems within medical ethics. (shrink)