An extensive work has been done on corporate social responsibly practices that mainly emphasized the larger firms within developed nations. Nonetheless, still work is needed to observe the importance of CSRPs’ and ethical cultural practices in terms of sustainable competitive performance that garnered far less attention by the existing literature. This study explores the impact of CSRPs on SACP with the mediating role of ECL from SMEs of two emerging nations, i.e., China and Pakistan based on stakeholders’ theory and practices. (...) The results using SEM affirmed the positive linkages of CSRPs—environment responsibility, community responsibility, customers' responsibility, suppliers responsibility, employee responsibility, and Govt. rules & regulations’ responsibility —on SACP. It found that CSRPs have positive relationships with ECL whereas ECL further positively correlated with SACP in the context of both countries. The findings revealed the positive mediating influence of ECL between CSRPs and SACP, respectively. This study furnishes insightful information for management on how firms may achieve sustainable performance by incorporating ethical cultural practices and corporate social responsibility practices as the strategic tools. The study reports numerous implications for management together with lines for future directions. (shrink)

Based on neo-institutional literature, this article aims to show the influence of organizational isomorphism on corruption. The focus is institutional explanations of corruption. Our model is based on empirical research in Russia at the end of the 1990s. A face-to-face questionnaire was conducted with 552 top executives in private firms across various economic sectors. We used the structural equation model Partial Least Squares, PLS, technique to test our hypotheses. The developed model provides an integrated approach to the study of the (...) relationship between corruption and organizational isomorphism. Our empirical data from firms in Russia allowed us to test various theoretical hypotheses concerning the influence of organizational isomorphism on corruption. Our emphasis is on the influence of competitive and institutional isomorphism on corruption. (shrink)

Our paper draws attention to a neglected channel of corruption—the bribe payments by state-owned enterprises. This is an important phenomenon as bribe payments by SOEs fruitlessly waste national resources, compromising public welfare and national prosperity. Using a large dataset of 30,249 firms from 50 countries, we show that, in general, SOEs are less likely to pay bribes for achieving organizational objectives owing to their political connectivity. However, in deteriorated institutional environments, SOEs may be subjected to potential managerial rent-seeking behaviors, which (...) disproportionately increase SOE bribe propensity relative to privately owned enterprises. Specifically, our findings highlight the importance of fostering democracy and rule of law, reducing prevalence of corruption and shortening power distance in reducing the incidence of SOE bribery. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that corruption research can benefit from studying corrupt transactions as a particular form of social interaction. We showcase the usefulness of a theoretical focus on social interaction by investigating online user reports on the website Frontdesktip.com. Through this focus, we can observe users sharing experiences and tips on the best ways of bribing hotel clerks in Las Vegas for attaining room upgrades and other complimentary extras. We employ a logistic regression analysis to examine what factors (...) influence the “successful” performance of this bribery practice. Our study makes a twofold contribution to existing research on corruption. First, on the theoretical level, we show that the typified and scripted character of social interactions can help explain the occurrence of corrupt transactions. Second, on a methodological level, our study showcases online self-reports as a useful data source to study corrupt transactions in an unobtrusive way. (shrink)

The effective implementation of regulation in organizations is an ongoing concern for both research and practice, in order to avoid deviant behavior and its consequences. However, the way compliance with regulations is actually enacted or “performed” within organizations instead of merely executed, remains largely under-characterized. Evidence from an ethnographic study in the compliance unit of a French investment bank allows us to develop a detailed practice approach to how regulation is actually implemented in firms. We characterize the work accomplished by (...) compliance analysts who are in fact, “curving” the script of regulation within what we conceptualize as a “comfort zone”. Beyond agency, ethics appears as a key element in linking the “letter of the law”, which serves as a referential anchor to guide action, with the complex nature of specific situations. We analyze the way individuals and compliance teams cope with, interpret, struggle and in fine, perform regulation within this comfort zone. A particular interest is thus given to the work of embedded ethics in this process, as an enabler to partly recouple compliance with the regulated activity. We find that blind execution is not only impossible, but also devoid of meaning both from regulatory, risk management, and business perspectives in organizations. We highlight and characterize a hermeneutic dimension to this work, essential to effectively perform regulation in complex environments, and we suggest some directions for further research. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that corruption by any firm is problematic. More importantly, its negative effects are compounded when corruption is present in large firms with global reach and corruption ceases to be a single instance but becomes a reoccurring or perpetuating phenomenon over time. Though the magnification of corruption over both time and size of operations creates scale effects that amplify its detrimental consequences, this context remains largely unexamined empirically. Thus, our research question is: What are the factors that (...) contribute to corruption by large global firms? Drawing on institutional theory, we examine the normative pressures that interact to create a vortex of corporate corruption that persisted over several years. We analyze a 9-year longitudinal dataset of 469 unique FT Global 500 companies representing 31 primary industries and 33 countries with over 3700 company year observations. Results help disentangle a complex interaction of firm-level and headquarters country-level factors that drive corruption and impact performance among top global firms. (shrink)

A number of high-profile mislabeling incidents have led to many studies exploring the decision-making processes that firms make around performing illegal acts. However, it remains unclear why the proportion of firms conducting these acts constantly fluctuates and never disappears. Therefore, this study investigated this by carrying out a longitudinal analysis of food labeling in the Taiwanese rice industry. Drawing on the institutional isomorphism theory, it was found that the degree of mislabeling is negatively correlated with both the level of control (...) of inspection regulations and public attention toward food regulations, and positively correlated with the previous proportion of firms mislabeling their products. Thus, there is a feedback loop between regulatory control, public attention, and the amount of mislabeling, with the amount of mislabeling not only being affected by the former degree of regulatory control, public attention, and mislabeling, but also modifying the future status of each of these. These findings further our understanding of the causal effects of illegal actions in the institutional agricultural environment. (shrink)

Since there are so few controls over detecting and preventing faculty misconduct, one of the most common ways in which it is discovered is through student reports. Given the importance of student reports in bringing to light faculty’s ethical lapses, this paper seeks to understand what factors influence students’ likelihood to report faculty misconduct. We develop an empirical model that integrates the decision process of the Prosocial Organizational Behavior Model with insights from the emotional perspective on whistleblowing. Specifically, we use (...) an experimental survey to examine how students’ perceived unfairness of the faculty misconduct, feelings of anger, and the students’ self-interest in the situation in conjunction with situational “cues for inaction” lead to the intention to blow the whistle. Overall, the results from our structural model partially support our theoretical model. Interestingly, these findings demonstrate that, in the case of faculty member misconduct, anger and perceptions of unfairness play a greater role than the more rational cost-benefit process of the POB model. These results could aid in development of ethics education for students and could also inform the development of university policies that encourage students to come forward when faced with faculty misconduct. (shrink)

This article examines whether (1) government intervention causes bribery (or corruption) as rent-seeking theory suggested; (2) a firm’s perceived benefit partially mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior, as rational choice/behavior theory suggested; and (3) other firms’ bribing behavior moderates the relationship between government intervention and a firm’s perceived benefit. Our study shows that government intervention causes bribery/corruption indeed, but it exerts its effect on bribery/corruption through the firm’s perceived benefit. In other words, a firm’s perceived benefit (...) fully mediates the relationship between government intervention and its bribing behavior. We also find that other firms’ bribery positively moderates the relationship between government intervention and a given firm’s bribery. This study partly proves that firms are rational actors. Potential benefit encourages them to practice bribery. Besides, this research also supports the rent-seeking view of bribery/corruption, which argues that government intervention is a source of bribery/corruption. However, we have also identified that only those government interventions that will create “rent” can cause bribery/corruption. (shrink)

This article explores the hypothesis that third parties are motivated to seek information about agents who have behaved unethically in the past, even if the agent and available information are irrelevant to the third parties’ goals and interests. We explored two possible motives for this information seeking behavior: deonance, or the motive to care about ethics and justice simply for the sake of ethics and justice, and distrust-based threat monitoring. Participants in a consumer decision task were found to seek out (...) information about an agent who had behaved unethically even when the agent was explicitly excluded from the task; there were no intentions to purchase from the agent; performance expectations for the agent’s product were low; the information that could be sought was non-diagnostic, redundant or irrelevant to an ethical judgment; and alternatives in the market offered as good or better value as the unethical agent. Critically, this information seeking took place even when the observer could disengage from and was not vulnerable to the agent. The findings are discussed in terms of third party information seeking and its effects on ethical behavior in the marketplace. (shrink)