We conducted a four-part study to map out the conceptual space of a diverse set of immoral items, including those that are extreme and/or intergroup (e.g. child sex abuse, genocide, slavery), with the goal of identifying attributes spontaneously used in moral judgment. In Part 1, we identified 56 immoral items. In Part 2, participants completed a similarity-based card sort task of the 56 immoral items. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) indicated that three-dimensional space was needed to capture the perceived differences among the (...) items. In Part 3, regression analysis indicated that perceived similarity among the immoral items related to their commonness, objectivity, forgivability, and legality. In Part 4, regression analysis indicated that the configuration of immoral items corresponded to the amount of anger and disgust the items elicited and items’ perceived harmfulness. We attempt to synthesize these results and answer questions about the roles of anger, disgust, and harm in moral judgment. (shrink)

We argue that concepts from the social sciences can be as natural as those from physics and chemistry, thereby answering in the positive the question of whether social metaphysics is or can be substantive. The argument takes as a starting point Douven & Gärdenfors’ (Mind & Language, 35, 313–334 2020) optimality account of natural concepts, according to which natural concepts are represented by the cells of an optimally partitioned similarity space. While the account applies straightforwardly to perceptual concepts, it does (...) not apply as straightforwardly to more abstract concepts, such as many scientific concepts. We propose an extension of Douven and Gärdenfors’ optimality account that pertains to scientific concepts as well. The proposal reuses ideas from Lewis’ Best Systems Account of laws of nature, but rather than invoking natural concepts (as Lewis does) defines natural scientific concepts as those that figure in the or a best systematization of the totality of facts. On this proposal, there is nothing especially different between concepts from the natural sciences and those from the social sciences. (shrink)

This paper studies the learnability of natural concepts in the context of the conceptual spaces framework. Previous work proposed that natural concepts are represented by the cells of optimally partitioned similarity spaces, where optimality was defined in terms of a number of constraints. Among these is the constraint that optimally partitioned similarity spaces result in easily learnable concepts. While there is evidence that systems of concepts generally regarded as natural satisfy a number of the proposed optimality constraints, the connection between (...) naturalness and learnability has been less well studied. To fill this gap, we conduct a computational study employing two standard models of concept learning. Applying these models to the learning of color concepts, we examine whether natural color concepts are more readily learned than nonnatural ones. Our findings warrant a positive answer to this question for both models employed, thus lending empirical support to the notion that learnability is a distinctive characteristic of natural concepts. (shrink)