Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. A new argument for ‘thinking-as-speaking’.Tom Frankfort - 2024 - Philosophical Explorations:1-11.
    Sometimes, thinking a thought and saying something to oneself are the same event. Call this the ‘thinking-as-speaking’ thesis. It stands in opposition to the idea that we think something first, and then say it. One way to argue for the thesis is to show that the content of a token thought cannot be fully represented by a token mental state before the production of the utterance which expresses it. I make an argument for that claim based on speech act theory. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why are you talking to yourself? The epistemic role of inner speech in reasoning.Wade Munroe - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):841-866.
    People frequently report that, at times, their thought has a vocal character. Thinking commonly appears to be accompanied or constituted by silently ‘talking’ to oneself in inner speech. In this paper, we explore the specifically epistemic role of inner speech in conscious reasoning. A plausible position—but one I argue is ultimately wrong—is that inner speech plays asolelyfacilitative role that is exhausted by (i) serving as the vehicle of representation for conscious reasoning, and/or (ii) allowing one to focus on certain types (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • On the rationality of thought-insertion judgments.Víctor M. Verdejo - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    Subjects experiencing thought insertion disown thoughts they are introspectively aware of. According to what I call “the rationality hypothesis”, thought-insertion reports are not merely intelligible, but also express, or potentially express, fully rational judgments in the light of highly disruptive experience. I argue that the hypothesis is ethically and theoretically motivated, and provides two insights into the philosophical significance of reports by subjects with schizophrenia. First, the reports can be seen as evidence that rational judgments of ownership of a thought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Social Epistemology of Introspection.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):925-942.
    I argue that introspection recruits the same mental mechanism as that which is required for the production of ordinary speech acts. In introspection, in effect, we intentionally tell ourselves that we are in some mental state, aiming thereby to produce belief about that state in ourselves. On one popular view of speech acts, however, this is precisely what speakers do when speaking to others. On this basis, I argue that every bias discovered by social epistemology applies to introspection and other (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • From speech to voice: On the content of inner speech.Shivam Patel - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):10929-10952.
    Theorists have found it difficult to reconcile the unity of inner speech as a mental state kind with the diversity of its manifestations. I argue that existing views concerning the content of inner speech fail to accommodate both of these features because they mistakenly assume that its content is to be found in the ‘speech processing hierarchy’, which includes semantic, syntactic, phonemic, phonetic, and articulatory levels. Upon rejecting this assumption, I offer a position on which the content of inner speech (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Thinking through talking to yourself: Inner speech as a vehicle of conscious reasoning.Wade Munroe - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (2):292-318.
    People frequently report that their thought has, at times, a vocal character. Thinking commonly appears to be accompanied or constituted by silently ‘talking’ to oneself in inner speech. In this paper, I argue that inner speech ‘utterances’ can constitute occurrent propositional attitudes, e.g., occurrent judgments, suppositions, etc., and, thereby, we can consciously reason through tokening a series of inner speech utterances in working memory. As I demonstrate, the functional role a mental state plays in working memory is determined in a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Semiotics in the head: Thinking about and thinking through symbols.Wade Munroe - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (2):413-438.
    Our conscious thought, at least at times, seems suffused with language. We may experience thinking as if we were “talking in our head”, thus using inner speech to verbalize, e.g., our premises, lemmas, and conclusions. I take inner speech to be part of a larger phenomenon I call inner semiotics, where inner semiotics involves the subjective experience of expressions in a semiotic (or symbol) system absent the overt articulation of the expressions. In this paper, I argue that inner semiotics allows (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Relationship Between Conscious and Unconscious Intentionality.Raamy Majeed - 2022 - Philosophy 97 (2):169-185.
    The contemporary view of the relationship between conscious and unconscious intentionality consists in two claims: unconscious propositional attitudes represent the world the same way conscious ones do, and both sets of attitudes represent by having determinate propositional content. Crane has challenged both claims, proposing instead that unconscious propositional attitudes differ from conscious ones in being less determinate in nature. This paper aims to evaluate Crane's proposal. In particular, I make explicit and critique certain assumptions Crane makes in support of his (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Cognitive Phenomenology: In Defense of Recombination.Preston Lennon - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    The cognitive experience view of thought holds that the content of thought is determined by its cognitive-phenomenal character. Adam Pautz argues that the cognitive experience view is extensionally inadequate: it entails the possibility of mix-and-match cases, where the cognitive-phenomenal properties that determine thought content are combined with different sensory-phenomenal and functional properties. Because mix-and-match cases are metaphysically impossible, Pautz argues, the cognitive experience view should be rejected. This paper defends the cognitive experience view from Pautz’s argument. I build on resources (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inner speech as a cognitive tool—or what is the point of talking to oneself?Nikola A. Kompa & Jutta L. Mueller - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology:1-24.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Inner Speech and ‘Pure’ Thought – Do we Think in Language?Nikola A. Kompa - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-18.
    While the idea that thinking is a form of silent self-talk goes back at least to Plato, it is not immediately clear how to state this thesis precisely. The aim of the paper is to spell out the notion that we think in language by recourse to recent work on inner speech. To that end, inner speech and overt speech are briefly compared. I then propose that inner speaking be defined as a mental episode that substantially engages the speech production (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • How not to decide whether inner speech is speech: Two common mistakes.Daniel Gregory - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-22.
    Philosophical interest in inner speech has grown in recent years. In seeking to understand the phenomenon, many philosophers have drawn heavily on two theories from neighbouring disciplines: Lev Vygotsky’s theory on the development of inner speech in children and a cognitive-scientific theory about speech production. I argue that they have been too uncritical in their acceptance of these theories, which has prevented a proper analysis of inner speech.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Commentary: The Nature of Unsymbolized Thinking.Daniel Gregory - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Conceivability of a Cognitive Phenomenology Zombie.Martina Fürst - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):105-127.
    The cognitive phenomenology thesis has it that conscious cognitive states essentially exhibit a phenomenal character. Defenders of ‘conservatism’ about cognitive phenomenology think that the phenomenology of thought is reducible to sensory phenomenology. In contrast, proponents of ‘liberalism’ hold that there is a proprietary, sui generis cognitive phenomenology. Horgan develops a morph-sequence argument to argue for liberalism. The argument is based on the conceivability of a cognitive phenomenology zombie, i.e. a man who does not understand Chinese but shares the behavior and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Action and Reaction: The Two Voices of Inner Speech.Tom Frankfort - 2022 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (1):51-69.
    Is inner speech an intentional action, something we do, or a reaction, something that happens to us? This paper will argue that it can be both, (although not at the same time). Some inner speech utterances are reactive: they are spontaneous, they require no effort, and we are not in control of their occurring. These inner speech utterances fail to meet the traditional criteria for qualifying as intentional actions. But some inner speech ut- terances are intentional actions, performed deliberately, effortfully (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Inner Speech.Peter Langland-Hassan - forthcoming - WIREs Cognitive Science.
    Inner speech travels under many aliases: the inner voice, verbal thought, thinking in words, internal verbalization, “talking in your head,” the “little voice in the head,” and so on. It is both a familiar element of first-person experience and a psychological phenomenon whose complex cognitive components and distributed neural bases are increasingly well understood. There is evidence that inner speech plays a variety of cognitive roles, from enabling abstract thought, to supporting metacognition, memory, and executive function. One active area of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Speaking for Thinking: “Thinking for Speaking” reconsidered.Agustin Vicente - forthcoming - In Pablo Fossa (ed.), Inner Speech, Culture & Education. Springer.
    Two connected questions that arise for anyone interested in inner speech are whether we tell ourselves something that we have already thought; and, if so, why we would tell ourselves something that we have already thought. In this contribution I focus on the first question, which is about the nature and the production of inner speech. While it is usually assumed that the content of what we tell ourselves is exactly the content of a non-linguistic thought, I argue that there (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark