Die Idee des modernen Verfassungsstaats beruht auf dem Akt der freiheitlichen Selbstbestimmung aller Bürger*innen. Insofern bildet er die ethische Institution schlechthin. Denn wo das Volk die Parameter der Freiheit bestimmt, da gilt es, das Wesen der Freiheit selbst zu begreifen. Bleibt dieses Begreifen aus, wird der Gründungsakt zur gewesenen Freiheit und die Verwaltung des Staats zur Expert*innensache. Doch wo bleibt da die kreative Freiheit? Diese Frage macht eine Kritik der ethischen Institution notwendig. Dabei zeigt Thies Münchow in Anschluss an Kant (...) und Hegel den integralen Zusammenhang von Ethik und Politik auf und nimmt zuletzt eine Neubestimmung der politischen Theologie vor. (shrink)

Although Hegel is increasingly recognized as an important figure in the history of political economy, his economic views are never strictly economic. In contrast to other modern thinkers, his primary concern is not the economic efficacy of different practices or institutions but the extent to which they enable and promote the development of human freedom. In this article, I argue that Hegel's pioneering critique of modern liberal economy plays out simultaneously at a more empirical level, corresponding to the properly economic (...) dimension of his analysis, and at a deeper, logical level, which grounds and guides his position. Moreover, I argue that the tendency to favour the first of these levels, found in most of the literature on Hegel's economic thought, reduces the Philosophy of Right's main argument to a more or less vigorous plea for economic interventionism. Against this kind of reading, I show that a renewed focus on the text's logical structure reveals a different and more radical philosophical proposition, which has yet to be fully acknowledged. In particular, I argue that Hegel's dialectical logic leads him beyond the liberalism‐interventionism debate, towards a qualitatively different conception of social and economic relations. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Although Hegel is increasingly recognized as an important figure in the history of political economy, his economic views are never strictly economic. In contrast to other modern thinkers, his primary concern is not the economic efficacy of different practices or institutions but the extent to which they enable and promote the development of human freedom. In this article, I argue that Hegel's pioneering critique of modern liberal economy plays out simultaneously at a more empirical level, corresponding to the properly economic (...) dimension of his analysis, and at a deeper, logical level, which grounds and guides his position. Moreover, I argue that the tendency to favour the first of these levels, found in most of the literature on Hegel's economic thought, reduces the Philosophy of Right's main argument to a more or less vigorous plea for economic interventionism. Against this kind of reading, I show that a renewed focus on the text's logical structure reveals a different and more radical philosophical proposition, which has yet to be fully acknowledged. In particular, I argue that Hegel's dialectical logic leads him beyond the liberalism‐interventionism debate, towards a qualitatively different conception of social and economic relations. (shrink)