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Responsibility, Compensation and Accident Law Reform

Dissertation, University of Adelaide (2007)

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  1. On the Relevance of Neuroscience to Criminal Responsibility.Nicole A. Vincent - 2010 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 4 (1):77-98.
    Various authors debate the question of whether neuroscience is relevant to criminal responsibility. However, a plethora of different techniques and technologies, each with their own abilities and drawbacks, lurks beneath the label “neuroscience”; and in criminal law responsibility is not a single, unitary and generic concept, but it is rather a syndrome of at least six different concepts. Consequently, there are at least six different responsibility questions that the criminal law asks—at least one for each responsibility concept—and, I will suggest, (...)
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  • Responsibility, dysfunction and capacity.Nicole A. Vincent - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):199-204.
    The way in which we characterize the structural and functional differences between psychopath and normal brains – either as biological disorders or as mere biological differences – can influence our judgments about psychopaths’ responsibility for criminal misconduct. However, Marga Reimer (Neuroethics 1(2):14, 2008) points out that whether our characterization of these differences should be allowed to affect our judgments in this manner “is a difficult and important question that really needs to be addressed before policies regarding responsibility... can be implemented (...)
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  • Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments.Nicole A. Vincent - 2011 - Neuroethics 4 (1):35-49.
    Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility.
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