We begin by introducing our readers to the Extended Mind Thesis and briefly discuss a series of arguments in its favour. We continue by showing of such a theory can be resisted and go on to demonstrate that a more conservative account of cognition can be developed. We acknowledge a stalemate between these two different accounts of cognition and notice a couple of issues that we argue have prevented further progress in the field. To overcome the stalemate, we propose to (...) focus on the ethical implications of these theories. We link work conducted on the Extended Mind Thesis with contemporary transhumanist research and claim that extended may be ethically preferred over embedded because it is a more progressive and inclusive theory. (shrink)

Given the metaphysical and explanatory stalemate between Embedded and Extended cognition, different authors proposed moral arguments to overcome such a deadlock in favor of EXT. Farina and Lavazza attribute to EXT and EMB a substantive moral content, arguing in favor of the former by virtue of its progressiveness and inclusiveness. In this treatment, I criticize four of their moral arguments. In Sect. 2, I focus on the argument from legitimate interventions and on the argument from extended agency. Section 3 concerns (...) the argument from better protection and the argument from better treatment. Sections 4 and 5 are dedicated to counterarguments against each respectively. By distinguishing between EXT and the extended view, I argue that it is sufficient to use this second version for directly addressing and evaluating moral problems on normative grounds, independently of the causal or constitutive cognitive influence of the external resource on the agents’ minds. Moreover, I argue that the arguments and assumptions used by EXT theorists do not foster values of progressiveness and inclusiveness. To conclude, in Sect. 6, I show that the analysis of each argument converges on the conclusion that EXT does not have substantive moral content and implications per se, since they always depend on further assumptions. (shrink)