Citations of:
Add citations
You must login to add citations.


The program put forward in von Wright's last works defines deontic logic as ``a study of conditions which must be satisfied in rational normgiving activity'' and thus introduces the perspective of logical pragmatics. In this paper a formal explication for von Wright's program is proposed within the framework of settheoretic approach and extended to a twosets model which allows for the separate treatment of obligationnorms and permission norms. The three translation functions connecting the language of deontic logic with the language (...) 

Two parallelism hypotheses have been adopted and the third one on their relationship has been put forward. The illocutionary logic hypothesis states that the logic of linguistic commitments runs parallel to the logic of intentionality. The normative pragmatics hypothesis states that the logic of utterances runs parallel to the logic of linguistic commitments. According to the third stance or the logic projection hypothesis, the logic of utterances is the origin of all other logics used in describing psychological and social realities. (...) 

Deontic logic is standardly conceived as the logic of true statements about the existence of obligations and permissions. In his last writings on the subject, G. H. von Wright criticized this view of deontic logic, stressing the rationality of norm imposition as the proper foundation of deontic logic. The present paper is an attempt to advance such an account of deontic logic using the formal apparatus of update semantics and dynamic logic. That is, we first define norm systems and a (...) 

The programmatic statement put forward in von Wright's last works on deontic logic introduces the perspective of logical pragmatics, which has been formally explicated here and extended so to include the role of normrecipient as well as the role of normgiver. Using the translation function from the language of deontic logic to the language of settheoretical approach, the connection has been established between the deontic postulates, on one side, and the perfection properties of the normset and the counterset, on the (...) 

In this paper, the settheoretic approach in the logical theory of normative systems is extended using Broome’s definition of the normative code function. The syntax and semantics for first order metanormative language is defined, and metanormative language is applied in the formalization of the basic principles in Broome’s approach and in the construction of a logical typology of normative systems. Special attention is given to the types of normative systems which are not definable in terms of the properties of singular (...) 

The relationship between the structural identity of narrative and the truth claim of the historical narrative work is one of importance to Ricœur. He considers the attempts of two interwoven models of history emerging from analytic philosophy—explanatory and narrative—to articulate this relationship. This paper explores the trajectories of these models as well as the epistemological and ontological crises culminating from the “simple” theses of each model. The solution to these crises requires a more complex method to account for the nature (...) 

We present the inconsistencyadaptive deontic logic DP r , a nonmonotonic logic for dealing with conflicts between normative statements. On the one hand, this logic does not lead to explosion in view of normative conflicts such as O A ∧ O ∼A, O A ∧ P ∼A or even O A ∧ ∼O A. On the other hand, DP r still verifies all intuitively reliable inferences valid in Standard Deontic Logic (SDL). DP r interprets a given premise set ‘as normally (...) 

We present two defeasible logics of normpropositions (statements about norms) that (i) consistently allow for the possibility of normative gaps and normative conflicts, and (ii) map each premise set to a sufficiently rich consequence set. In order to meet (i), we define the logic LNP, a conflict and gaptolerant logic of normpropositions capable of formalizing both normative conflicts and normative gaps within the object language. Next, we strengthen LNP within the adaptive logic framework for nonmonotonic reasoning in order to meet (...) 



This paper provides an analysis of contrarytoduty reasoning from the prooftheoretical perspective of category theory. While Chisholm’s paradox hints at the need of dyadic deontic logic by showing that monadic deontic logics are not able to adequately model conditional obligations and contrarytoduties, other arguments can be objected to dyadic approaches in favor of nonmonotonic foundations. We show that all these objections can be answered at one fell swoop by modeling conditional obligations within a deductive system defined as an instance of (...) 