Unlike other classical arguments for the existence of God, Pascal’s Wager provides a pragmatic rationale for theistic belief. Its most popular version says that it is rationally mandatory to choose a way of life that seeks to cultivate belief in God because this is the option of maximum expected utility. Despite its initial attractiveness, this long-standing argument has been subject to various criticisms by many philosophers. What is less discussed, however, is the rationality of this choice in situations where the (...) decision-makers are confronted with greater uncertainty. In this paper, I examine the imprecise version of Pascal’s Wager: those scenarios where an agent’s credence that God exists is imprecise or vague rather than precise. After introducing some technical background on imprecise probabilities, I apply five different principles for decision-making to two cases of state uncertainty. In the final part of the paper, I argue that it is not rationally permitted to include zero as the lower probability of God’s existence. Although the conditions for what makes an act uniquely optimal vary significantly across those principles, I also show how the option of wagering for God can defeat any mixed strategy under two distinct interpretations of salvation. (shrink)

This paper presents a critical reflection on dynamic consistency as commonly used in economics and decision theory, and on the difficulty to test it experimentally. It distinguishes between the uses of the term dynamic consistency in order to characterize two different properties: the first accounts for the neutrality of individual preferences towards the timing of resolution of uncertainty whereas the second guarantees that a strategy chosen at the beginning of a sequential decision problem is immune to any reevaluation and will (...) effectively be implemented from then on in the decision problem. Although these two properties are equivalent under expected utility, this is not the case under non-EU. Building on the possible characteristics of individual dynamic preferences under risk, this paper proposes a conceptual categorization, that is experimentally testable, of possible sequential decision making behaviors of non-EU maximizers. (shrink)

This paper is about the role of interpersonal comparisons in Harsanyi's aggregation theorem. Harsanyi interpreted his theorem to show that a broadly utilitarian theory of distribution must be true even if there are no interpersonal comparisons of well-being. How is this possible? The orthodox view is that it is not. Some argue that the interpersonal comparability of well-being is hidden in Harsanyi's premises. Others argue that it is a surprising conclusion of Harsanyi's theorem, which is not presupposed by any one (...) of the premises. I argue instead that Harsanyi was right: his theorem and its weighted-utilitarian conclusion do not require interpersonal comparisons of well-being. The key to making sense of this possibility is to treat Harsanyi's weights as dimensional constants rather than dimensionless numbers. (shrink)

De Finetti's treatise on the theory of probability begins with the provocative statement PROBABILITY DOES NOT EXIST, meaning that probability does not exist in an objective sense. Rather, probability exists only subjectively within the minds of individuals. De Finetti defined subjective probabilities in terms of the rates at which individuals are willing to bet money on events, even though, in principle, such betting rates could depend on state-dependent marginal utility for money as well as on beliefs. Most later authors, from (...) Savage onward, have attempted to disentangle beliefs from values by introducing hypothetical bets whose payoffs are abstract consequences that are assumed to have state-independent utility. In this paper, I argue that de Finetti was right all along: PROBABILITY, considered as a numerical measure of pure belief uncontaminated by attitudes toward money, does not exist. Rather, what exist are de Finetti's `previsions', or betting rates for money, otherwise known in the literature as `risk neutral probabilities'. But the fact that previsions are not measures of pure belief turns out not to be problematic for statistical inference, decision analysis, or economic modeling. (shrink)

In this paper we study three-valued simple games as a natural extension of simple games. We analyze to which extent well-known results on the core and the Shapley value for simple games can be extended to this new setting. To describe the core of a three-valued simple game we introduce vital players, in analogy to veto players for simple games. Moreover, it is seen that the transfer property of Dubey can still be used to characterize the Shapley value for three-valued (...) simple games. We illustrate three-valued simple games and the corresponding Shapley value in a parliamentary bicameral system. (shrink)

In an article in this journal [2], A. C. Michalos, while arguing for the normative and empirical inadequacy of the Von Neumann and Morgenstern postulates of rational preference, completely misconstrued the concept of simple additivity contained in the postulates. As a result, the following argument is a non-sequitur.

I examine some behavioural and heuristic models of individual decision-making and argue that the diverse psychological mechanisms these models posit are too demanding to be implemented, either consciously or unconsciously, by actual decision makers. Accordingly, and contrary to what their advocates typically claim, behavioural and heuristic models are best understood as ‘as-if’ models. I then sketch a version of scientific antirealism that justifies the practice of as-if modelling in decision theory but goes beyond traditional instrumentalism. Finally, I relate my account (...) of decision models to the recent controversy about mentalism versus behaviourism, reject both positions, and offer an alternative view. (shrink)

Abstract:Humans often comply with social norms, but the reasons why are disputed. Here, we unify a variety of influential explanations in a common decision framework, and identify the precise cognitive variables that norms might alter to induce compliance. Specifically, we situate current theories of norm compliance within the reinforcement learning framework, which is widely used to study value-guided learning and decision-making. This framework offers an appealingly precise language to distinguish between theories, highlights the various points of convergence and divergence, and (...) suggests novel ways in which norms might penetrate our psychology. (shrink)

Economics bases the choice theory on the mental experiment that introduces the choice correspondence, which associates to every set of possible actions the subset of preferred actions. If some conditions are satisfied, then the choice correspondence implies a binary preference ordering on actions and an ordinal utility function. This approach applies both to decisions under certainty and decisions under uncertainty. The preference ordering depends on the consequence of actions. Under certainty, there is only one consequence to every action, while, under (...) uncertainty, many consequences are possible, associated with the states of the world. These consequences are represented by the action itself, the states of the world, and the corresponding outcomes. Current theories consider only outcomes, but some theories include state dependent preference. Preference for the action itself is not considered, but it might be relevant. The rationality of the theory is a different question from the rationality of the decision-maker. Moreover, the rationality of the theory may imply the rationality of a preference ordering, but this does not require the rationality of the decision-maker. It is only assumed that he/she behaves according to the calculation made by the theorist. The rationality of the preference ordering requires the rationality of the preference on outcomes, of the expectations on the events, and of their connection with the preference ordering on actions. The normative relevance of rational preferences is removed by the introduction of many alternative rational theories, which justify contrasting behaviors in identical situations. (shrink)

In this paper I propose and motivate a logic of the interdefined concepts of making true and control, understood as intensional propositional operators to be indexed to an agent. While bearing a resemblance to earlier logics in the tradition, the motivations, semantics, and object language theory differ on crucial points. Applying this logic to widespread formal theories of agency, I use it as a framework to argue against the ubiquitous assumption that the strongest actions or options available to a given (...) agent must always be pairwise incompatible. The conclusion is that this assumption conflicts with failures of higher order control of agents over their degree or precision of control, failures exhibited by such imperfect agents as ourselves. I discuss models in this setting for understanding such imperfectly self-controlling agents. In an appendix, I prove several relevant results about the logic described, including soundness and completeness both for it and for certain natural extensions. (shrink)

Expected utility maximization problem is one of the most useful tools in mathematical finance, decision analysis and economics. Motivated by statistical model selection, via the principle of expected utility maximization, Friedman and Sandow (J Mach Learn Res 4:257–291, 2003a) considered the model performance question from the point of view of an investor who evaluates models based on the performance of the optimal strategies that the models suggest. They interpreted their performance measures in information theoretic terms and provided new generalizations of (...) Shannon entropy and Kullback–Leibler relative entropy and called them U-entropy and U-relative entropy. In this article, a utility-based criterion for independence of two random variables is defined. Then, Markov’s inequality for probabilities is extended from the U-entropy viewpoint. Moreover, a lower bound for the U-relative entropy is obtained. Finally, a link between conditional U-entropy and conditional Renyi entropy is derived. (shrink)

I argue that many of the priority rankings that have been proposed by effective altruists seem to be in tension with apparently reasonable assumptions about the rational pursuit of our aims in the face of uncertainty. The particular issue on which I focus arises from recognition of the overwhelming importance and inscrutability of the indirect effects of our actions, conjoined with the plausibility of a permissive decision principle governing cases of deep uncertainty, known as the maximality rule. I conclude that (...) we lack a compelling decision theory that is consistent with a longtermist perspective and does not downplay the depth of our uncertainty, while also supporting orthodox effective altruist conclusions about cause prioritization. (shrink)

David Christensen and others argue that Dutch Strategies are more like peer disagreements than Dutch Books, and should not count against agents‘ conformity to ideal rationality. I review these arguments, then show that Dutch Books, Dutch Strategies, and peer disagreements are only possible in the case of what computer scientists call Byzantine Failures—uncorrected Byzantine Faults which update arbitrary values. Yet such Byzantine Failures make agents equally vulnerable to all three kinds of epistemic inconsistencies, so there is no principled basis for (...) claiming that only avoidance of true Dutch Books characterizes ideally rational agents. Agents without Byzantine Failures can be ideally rational in a very strong sense, but are not normative for humans. (shrink)

The postulates of rational preference suggested by Von Neumann and Morgenstern have been defended as descriptive or empirical generalizations and as normative principles. It is argued that the postulates are inaccurate empirical generalizations and unacceptable normative principles.

Any fundamental examination of managerial practices must consider a philosophical conundrum at the heart of market exchange. Economically, the opportunity for profit seems to demand somebody else’s loss, and ethically, we must not take advantage of others’ misfortune. In a market system involving a multiplicity of stakeholders, profit opportunities may arise in which relationships between winners and losers are distant, indirect, or even nonexistent; their motives are multivalent; and their market participation may be intentional or accidental. Reflecting two decades later (...) upon several cases arising from the 9/11/2001 terrorist attacks, this paper describes several examples of profiting from loss that demonstrate the ubiquity and variety of the problem. It also invokes numerous bodies of literature that demonstrate the inherent complexity and interdisciplinarity of the problem and the absence of determinative principles to answer the question of when it is justifiable to profit from loss. The paper positions casuistry, the ancient philosophical art of case analysis that resembles modern business pedagogy, as a complement to ethical theory. The Loss Agency-Division of Benefits framework developed in the paper demonstrates the value of philosophy to managerial practices when economic theory is insufficient for ethically classifying and evaluating forms of profiting from loss. (shrink)

We introduce the notion of an outcome space, in which strategic interactions are embedded. This allows us to investigate the idea that one strategic interaction might be an expanded version of another interaction. We then characterize the Nash equilibria arising in such extensions and demonstrate a folk-type theorem stating that any individually rational element of the outcome space is a Nash equilibrium.

The Nash-Harsanyi theory of bargaining is usually taken as the correct theory of rational bargaining, and, as such, as the correct theory for the basic political contract for a society. It grafts a theory of cooperation to a base that essentially articulates the perspective of non-cooperative interaction. The resultant theory is supposed make clear how rational bargaining can fully realize the mutual gains that cooperation can make possible. However, its underlying commitment to the concepts of non-cooperative interaction renders this doubtful. (...) I argue for an alternative theory—the theory of Full Cooperation—that avoids this difficulty. As applied to bargaining over the basic political contract, it calls for the selection of the most egalitarian of the Strictly Pareto-Optimal outcomes. This is essentially a version of Rawls’ principle of Justice as Fairness, but it is derived, unlike Rawls’ theory, without appeal to a problematic theory of individual decision-making behind the veil of ignorance. It also provides an alternative basis for what Hart calls the Principle of Mutual Restrictions, and what Rawls’ calls the Duty of Fair Play. (shrink)

Abstract:The kind of commitment to moral rules that characterizes effective interaction between persons in among others places, manufacturing and commercial settings is characteristically treated by economists and game theorists as a public good, the securing of which requires the expenditure of scarce resources on surveillance and enforcement mechanisms. Alternatively put, the view is that, characteristically, rational persons cannot voluntarily guide their choices by rules, but can only be goaded into acting in accordance with such rules by the fear of social (...) and formal sanctions. On this way of thinking, rational individuals are condemned to having to settle for the “second-best” results that are thereby implied. This conclusion rests not only on an appeal to a consequentialist perspective, but also a separability principle. Against this, it is argued that consequentialism itself offers a basis for the rejection of the separability principle, and a defense of the thesis that, for a wide range of realistic cases, being disposed to voluntarily guide one’s choice by rules (on the condition that others can be expected to do so as well) is a necessary condition of engaging in rational interaction.Most people do not trust most other people, unmonitored, to honor obligations completely. Because of this they use substantial amounts of resources to specify the details of agreements, and to police them. Use of these resources … could be greatly reduced, if transacting parties would agree to honor the spirit of their agreement and simply shake hands. The resource saving to the two parties combined, from substituting this mode of “enforcing” agreements to those currently used, is clear. Why, then, does not this more efficient mode of transacting drive out the more costly methods through the normal competitive process? … The underlying rationale for this … is that it is privately profitable to engage in some degree of “cheating” on agreements, and to use resources to disguise this fact. — M. W. Reder, “The Place of Ethics in the Theory of Production”. (shrink)

Hamilton games-theoretic conflict model, which applies Maynard Smith's concept of evolutionarily stable strategy to the Prisoner's Dilemma, gives rise to an inconsistency between theoretical prescription and empirical results. Proposed resolutions of thisproblem are incongruent with the tenets of the models involved. The independent consistency of each model is restored, and the anomaly thereby circumvented, by a proof that no evolutionarily stable strategy exists in the Prisoner's Dilemma.

Collecting information that one expects to be useful is a powerful way to facilitate learning. However, relatively little is known about how people decide which information is worth sampling over the course of learning. We describe several alternative models of how people might decide to collect a piece of information inspired by “active learning” research in machine learning. We additionally provide a theoretical analysis demonstrating the situations under which these models are empirically distinguishable, and we report a novel empirical study (...) that exploits these insights. Our model-based analysis of participants' information gathering decisions reveals that people prefer to select items which resolve uncertainty between two possibilities at a time rather than items that have high uncertainty across all relevant possibilities simultaneously. Rather than adhering to strictly normative or confirmatory conceptions of information search, people appear to prefer a “local” sampling strategy, which may reflect cognitive constraints on the process of information gathering. (shrink)

This article concerns the prescriptive function of decision analysis. Consider an agent who must choose an action yielding welfare that varies with an unknown state of nature. It is often asserted that such an agent should adhere to consistency axioms which imply that behavior can be represented as maximization of expected utility. However, our agent is not concerned the consistency of his behavior across hypothetical choice sets. He only wants to make a reasonable choice from the choice set that he (...) actually faces. Hence, I reason that prescriptions for decision making should respect actuality. That is, they should promote welfare maximization in the choice problem the agent actually faces. Any choice respecting weak and stochastic dominance is rational from the actualist perspective. (shrink)

In this article the theoretic evolution and the empirical-experimental efforts that have led to the affirmation of the bounded/procedural rationality paradigm are discussed. Moreover, the debate on supporters of the "optimization" approach and supporters of the "bounded/procedural rationality" approach is traced, highlighting the irreconcilability of these two approaches and, in retort, a solid defense against a merely "reductionist" attempt of the innovative context of the Simonian theory. Critically going over the debate on decision dynamics, it becomes clear how, due to (...) the uncertain nature of rational processes, it is impossible to establish the decision-making best way. The imperfect character of individual choice is explained by how the decider identifies a solution that appears satisfying in that moment due to cognitive and temporal limits. (shrink)

It is argued that existing axiomatic theories of utility do not provide the utility principle or the principle of maximising expected utility with a formal justification. It is also argued that these theories only put mild constraints on a decision-maker in a decision-context. Finally, it is argued that the prospects are not particularly bright for finding formal non-circular arguments for the utility principle that do not rely on the law of large numbers.

Consistency of choice is a fundamental and recurring theme in decision theory, social choice theory, behavioral economics, and psychological sciences. The purpose of this paper is to study the consistency of choice independent of the particular decision model at hand. Consistency is viewed as an inherently logical concept that is fundamentally void of connotation and is thus disentangled from traditional rationality or consistency conditions imposed on decision models. The proposed formalization of consistency takes two forms: internal consistency, which refers to (...) the property that a choice model does not generate contradictory statements; and semantic consistency, which refers to the idea that a theory’s predictions are valid with respect to some observed data. In addressing semantic consistency, the relationship between theory and data is analyzed in terms of so-called duality mappings, which allow a passage between the two universes in a way that consistency is preserved. The formalization of consistency concepts relies on adapting the revealed preference theory to the context-dependent setting. The paper concludes by discussing the implications of the proposed framework and how it relates to classical revealed preference theory and other formalizations of the relationship between the theory and reality of choice. (shrink)

This article analyses how normative decision theory is understood by economists. The paradigmatic example of normative decision theory, discussed in the article, is the expected utility theory. It...

The aim of this article is to question the epistemic presuppositions of applying behavioural science in public policymaking. Philosophers of science who have examined the recent applications of the behavioural sciences to policy have contributed to discussions on causation, evidence, and randomised controlled trials. These have focused on epistemological and methodological questions about the reliability of scientific evidence and the conditions under which we can predict that a policy informed by behavioural research will achieve the policymakers’ goals. This paper argues (...) that the philosophical work of Helen Longino can also help us to have a better and fuller understanding of the knowledge which the behavioural sciences provide. The paper advances an analysis of the knowledge claims that are made in the context of policy applications of behavioural science and compares them with the behavioural research on which they are based. This allows us to show that behavioural policy and the debates accompanying it are based on an oversimplified understanding of what knowledge behavioural science actually provides. Recognising this problem is important as arguments that justify reliance on the behavioural sciences in policy typically presume this simplification. (shrink)

The integration of learning cognitive agents in the research agenda is an important step in the evolution of economics. However, relying on a retrospective analysis of the treatment of decision making in economics, this article argues that the cognitive programme aims to justify rational behaviour in an equilibrium framework rather than to integration an interpretative conception of agents' behaviour. As a consequence, the level of generality of analytical results remains limited and economists miss the opportunity to establish a discussion with (...) other social sciences. In particular, it fails to analyse a class of situations related to the problem of knowledge creation and the subsequent learning paradox. Building on recent advances in heterodox cognitive science, we suggest a behavioural approach that discriminates different learning situations. If applied, this approach would permit a better understanding of human behaviour and a richer analysis of coordination mechanisms in unfamiliar environment with no loss of rigour. (shrink)

: Autonomous driving systems promise important changes for future of transport, primarily through the reduction of road accidents. However, ethical concerns, in particular, two central issues, will be key to their successful development. First, situations of risk that involve inevitable harm to passengers and/or bystanders, in which some individuals must be sacrificed for the benefit of others. Secondly, and identification responsible parties and liabilities in the event of an accident. Our work addresses the first of these ethical problems. We are (...) interested in investigating how humans respond to critical situations and what reactions they consider to be morally right or at least preferable to others. Our experimental approach relies on the trolley dilemma and knowledge gained from previous research on this. More specifically, our main purpose was to test the difference between what human drivers actually decide to do in an emergency situations whilst driving a realistic simulator and the moral choices they make when they pause to consider what they would do in the same situation and to better understand why these choices may differs. Keywords: Self-driving Cars; Trolley Problem; Moral Choices; Moral Responsibility; Virtual Reality Dilemmi morali nelle automobili a guida autonoma Riassunto: I sistemi di guida autonomi promettono importanti cambiamenti per il futuro dei trasporti, principalmente attraverso la riduzione degli incidenti stradali. Tuttavia, vi sono preoccupazioni etiche, in particolare due questioni centrali, fondamentali per il loro sviluppo. In primo luogo, le situazioni di rischio che comportano inevitabili danni ai passeggeri e/o ai pedoni, ovvero situazioni in cui alcune persone devono essere sacrificate a beneficio di altri. In secondo luogo, l’identificazione delle parti responsabili in caso di incidente. Il nostro lavoro affronta il primo di questi problemi etici. Siamo interessati a studiare come gli umani rispondono a situazioni critiche e quali reazioni considerano moralmente giuste o almeno preferibili. Il nostro approccio sperimentale si basa sul trolley problem e sulle conoscenze acquisite da precedenti ricerche su questo ambito. Più specificamente, il nostro scopo principale è quello di testare la differenza tra ciò che i conducenti umani decidono effettivamente di fare in una situazione di emergenza, mentre guidano un simulatore realistico, e le scelte morali che compiono se posti nella stessa situazione e hanno la possibilità di decidere senza limiti di tempo. Lo scopo è inoltre comprendere come e perché queste scelte possono differire. Parole chiave: Automobili a guida autonoma; Trolley problem; Scelte morali; Responsabilità morale, Realtà virtuale. (shrink)

We are today agents of a peculiar reality, the global network or the system for automated information production. Our condition in the global network is that of agents of the real, since we all contribute to the coproduction of this ever-evolving process. Nevertheless, I will argue, this reality is but the effect of the adoption of a notion of instrumental pragmatic rationality which denies the existence of any other possible reality as the actualization of different determinations of Reason. While following (...) Deleuze s notion of deterritorialization, I ll show that the real philosophical choice does not concern the introduction of new moves that create differentiations within a universal game, but that it is concerned with the possible abolition of the agency which is instantiated within the collective network. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that recent sociological theory has become increasingly bifurcated into two mutually incompatible styles of theorizing that I label formalist and behavioral-realist. Formalism favors mathematization and proposes an instrumentalist ontology of abstract processes while behavioral-realist theory takes at its basis the "real" physical individual endowed with concrete biological, cognitive and neurophysiological capacities and constraints and attempts to derive the proper conceptualization of social behavior from that basis. Formalism tends to lead toward a conceptually independent sociology that (...) in principle requires only minimal reference to the empirical and ontological storehouse of other disciplines, while behavioral-realist theory leads to an interdisciplinary sociology that can be located within a hierarchy of behavioral sciences, leading to questions regarding the relationship between sociology and other disciplines as well as issues of transdisciplinary unification and possible interdisciplinary reduction. I explore the consequences of this split for the project of explanatory sociological theory within the context of how it has manifested itself in sociological network theory and social psychology. I close with a critique and assessment of formalist tendencies in sociological theorizing. (shrink)

On the orthodox view in economics, interpersonal comparisons of utility are not empirically meaningful, and "hence" impossible. To reassess this view, this paper draws on the parallels between the problem of interpersonal comparisons of utility and the problem of translation of linguistic meaning, as explored by Quine. I discuss several cases of what the empirical evidence for interpersonal comparisonsof utility might be and show that, even on the strongest of these, interpersonal comparisons are empirically underdetermined and, if we also deny (...) any appropriate truth of the matter, indeterminate. However, the underdetermination can be broken non-arbitrarily (though not purely empirically) if (i) we assign normative significance to certain states of affairs or (ii) we posit a fixed connection between certain empirically observable proxies and utility. I conclude that, even if interpersonal comparisons are not empirically meaningful, they are not in principle impossible. (shrink)

Newcomb’s problem involves a decision-maker faced with a choice and a predictor forecasting this choice. The agents’ interaction seems to generate a choice dilemma once the decision-maker seeks to apply two basic principles of rational choice theory : maximize expected utility ; adopt the dominant strategy. We review unsuccessful attempts at pacifying the dilemma by excluding Newcomb’s problem as an RCT-application, by restricting MEU and ADS, and by allowing for backward causation. A probability approach shows that Newcomb’s original problem-formulation lacks (...) causal information. This makes it impossible to specify the probability structure of Newcomb’s univocally. Once missing information is added, Newcomb’s problem and RCT re-align, thus explaining Newcomb’s problem as a seeming dilemma. Building on Wolpert and Benford :1637–1646, 2013), we supply additional details and offer a crucial correction to their formal proof. (shrink)

In Rawls’ influential social contract approach to distributive justice, the fair income distribution is the one that an individual would choose behind a veil of ignorance. Harsanyi treated this situation as a decision under risk and arrived at utilitarianism using expected utility theory. This paper investigates the implications of applying cumulative prospect theory instead, which better describes behavior under risk. I find that the specific type of inequality in bottom-heavy right-skewed income distributions, which includes the log-normal income distribution, could be (...) perceived as desirable. This optimal inequality result contrasts the implications of other social welfare criteria. (shrink)

We propose a framework for including information‐processing bounds in rational analyses. It is an application of bounded optimality (Russell & Subramanian, 1995) to the challenges of developing theories of mechanism and behavior. The framework is based on the idea that behaviors are generated by cognitive mechanisms that are adapted to the structure of not only the environment but also the mind and brain itself. We call the framework computational rationality to emphasize the incorporation of computational mechanism into the definition of (...) rational action. Theories are specified as optimal program problems, defined by an adaptation environment, a bounded machine, and a utility function. Such theories yield different classes of explanation, depending on the extent to which they emphasize adaptation to bounds, and adaptation to some ecology that differs from the immediate local environment. We illustrate this variation with examples from three domains: visual attention in a linguistic task, manual response ordering, and reasoning. We explore the relation of this framework to existing “levels” approaches to explanation, and to other optimality‐based modeling approaches. (shrink)

Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is (...) offered which does not entail a behavioral analysis of "accepting a hypothesis"; and the conclusion that non-behavioral analyses of belief are compatible with the application of current statistical theory in the sciences is tentatively advanced. (shrink)

This paper argues that any specific utility or disutility for gambling must be excluded from expected utility because such a theory is consequential while a pleasure or displeasure for gambling is a matter of process, not of consequences. A (dis)utility for gambling is modeled as a process utility which monotonically combines with expected utility restricted to consequences. This allows for a process (dis)utility for gambling to be revealed. As an illustration, the model shows how empirical observations in the Allais paradox (...) can reveal a process disutility of gambling. A more general model of rational behavior combining processes and consequences is then proposed and discussed. (shrink)

In his early experimental work with Suppes, Davidson adopted rationality assumptions, not as necessary constraints on interpretation, but as practical conceits in addressing methodological problems faced by experimenters studying decision making under uncertainty. Although the content of their theory has since been undermined, their methodological approach—a Galilean form of methodological rationalism—lives on in contemporary psychological research. This article draws on Max Weber’s verstehen to articulate an account of Galilean methodological rationalism; explains how anomalies faced by Davidson’s early experimental work gave (...) rise to his later, canonical claims about rationality and interpretation; and reclaims this Galilean framework for use in contemporary psychological research. (shrink)

How should deontologists concerned with the ethics of killing apply their moral theory when we don’t know all the facts relevant to the permissibility of our action? Though the stakes couldn’t be higher, and uncertainty is endemic where killing is concerned, few deontologists have an answer to this question. In this paper I canvass two possibilities: that we should apply a threshold standard, equivalent to the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applied for criminal punishment; and that we should fit our (...) deontological ethical theory into the apparatus of decision theory. I show that the first approach faces insurmountable obstacles, while the second holds much more promise for deontologists than they might first have assumed. (shrink)

Here we argue that the concept of strategies, as it was introduced into biology by John Maynard Smith, is a prime illustration of the four dimensions of theoretical biology in the post-genomic era. These four dimensions are: data analysis and management, mathematical and computational model building and simulation, concept formation and analysis, and theory integration. We argue that all four dimensions of theoretical biology are crucial to future interactions between theoretical and empirical biologists as well as with philosophers of biology.