LaBerge examines the ethical positions of Rawls, Kant, John Walzer adapted from J. S. Mill, and Canadian philosopher Howard Adelman are, and writes that they constitute "an ethics of human rights, ethics of the right to a historical community, and an ethics of peace.".

This article considers the ethical aspects of the question: should a scientist engage in war-related research, particularly use-inspired or applied research directed at the development of the means for the better waging of war? Because scientists are simultaneously professionals, citizens of a particular country, and human beings, they are subject to conflicting moral and practical demands. There are three major philosophical views concerning the morality of war that are relevant to this discussion: realism, just war theory and pacifism. In addition, (...) the requirements of professional codes of ethics and common morality contribute to an ethical analysis of the involvement of scientists and engineers in war-related research and technology. Because modern total warfare, which is facilitated by the work of scientists and engineers, results in the inevitable killing of innocents, it follows that most, if not all, war-related research should be considered at least as morally suspect and probably as morally prohibited. (shrink)

The suffering of war refugees is often regarded as a wrong-less harm. Although war refugees have been made worse off in severe ways, they have not been wronged, because no one intentionally caused their suffering. In military parlance, war refugees are collateral damage. As such, nothing is owed to them as a matter of justice, because their suffering is not the result of intentional wrongdoing; rather, it is the regrettable and unintended result of necessary and proportionate wartime actions. So, while (...) the warring national or extra-national groups might help war refugees, such aid is regarded as humanitarian, not as justice.I challenge the view that war refugees are harmed but not wronged when those harms directly result from necessary and proportionate wartime actions. War refugees are innocent bystanders, and so are an exception to the principle that permits defense by any necessary and proportionate means. Just as an individual may not kill or seriously harm an innocent bystander to save herself, so too national or extra-national groups may not create refugees to win a war. If such groups do create war refugees during the legitimate pursuit of military goals, they have wronged those refugees, and so owe them recompense. (shrink)

Is abortion a question of personal morality? Liberals and feminists often embrace this idea, but so also do those who are personally opposed to abortion. Someone may claim to believe personally that abortion is wrong without holding the corresponding public belief. I am interested in what exactly one means when one says that abortion is a question of personal morality. In Sec. II, I consider three influential interpretations of the claim that abortion is a question of personal morality. After showing (...) that each of these interpretations is inadequate, I develop a fourth that avoids some of the problems with the first three (in Sec. III). But even on this interpretation, the claim that abortion is a question of personal morality is difficult to defend. This is because we cannot show that abortion is a question of personal morality without first knowing something about the moral status of the fetus. I conclude the paper with some pessimistic remarks concerning our ability to arrive at a compromise position on abortion. (shrink)

Dale Jamieson has claimed that conventional human-directed ethical concepts are an inadequate means for accurately understanding our duty to respond to climate change. Furthermore, he suggests that a responsibility to respect nature can instead provide the appropriate framework with which to understand such a duty. Stephen Gardiner has responded by claiming that climate change is a clear case of ethical responsibility, but the failure of institutions to respond to it creates a (not unprecedented) political problem. In assessing the debate between (...) Gardiner and Jamieson, I develop an analysis which shows a three-part structure to the problem of climate change, in which the problem Gardiner identifies is only one of three sub-problems of climate change. This analysis highlights difficulties with Jamieson’s argument that the duty of respect for nature is necessary for a full understanding of climate ethics, and suggests how a human-directed approach based on the three-part analysis can avoid Jamieson’s charge of inadequacy. (shrink)

This article investigates the Neo-Confucian discourse on war, premised on the “Chinese versus barbarian” binary, and its impact on the Neo-Confucian scholar-officials of 17th-century Chosŏn Korea. It shows that Korean Neo-Confucians suffered invasions from the Jurchens, who they regarded as “barbarians,” and that the political debate on how to respond to the “barbarians” drove the advocates of the pro-peace argument to reimagine Chosŏn’s statehood. The article consists of three parts. First, it reconstructs the philosophical foundations of the mainstream Neo-Confucian discourse (...) on the war with the “barbarians” with reference to Zhu Xi. Second, it discusses the strong impact of the Neo-Confucian paradigm of war on the orthodox Korean Neo-Confucians of the 17th century. Third, it examines how Ch’oe Myŏng-kil, one of the rare champions of the pro-peace argument at the time, justified making peace with the Jurchens through the judicious use of “the expedient.”. (shrink)

In their article “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino argue that the American public evaluates soldiers’ wartime actions more according to whether the war they are fighting was initiated justly, than on their actions during warfare. In this respect, their views are more similar to those of revisionist philosophers than to those of traditional just war theorists. Before leaping to broad conclusions from their survey, it should be (...) replicated. If the findings hold in the replication, intriguing questions could be asked about comparative cross-national attitudes and about the relationship between democracy and war. (shrink)

The author argues that all governments are morally obliged to support international institutions that advocate crosscultural and global public goods to advance the fairness principle.

During the spring of 1981, students enrolled in James Childress’ University of Virginia seminar read a great many of the historic and contemporary treatments of just war and pacifist strands in Chr...

Abstract The increasing prevalence of armed drones in the conduct of military operations has generated robust debate. Among legal scholars, the crux of the dispute generally pits those who herald the new technology's unparalleled precision against those who view such newfound capabilities as an inducement to employ excessive force. Largely overlooked in the discussion over how drone strikes can be accomplished lawfully is a more fundamental question: Can a model of warfare that eschews any risk of harm to one party (...) be squared with the ethical framework that informs the law of war? This matter has less to do with the technology per se than with a policy orientation that utilizes such technology as a strategy in itself, as opposed to one military tool in a larger arsenal. A corollary to the incongruity of riskless warfare is to query whether the ensuing breakdown of ethical and legal norms unwittingly encourages the very instability that the law of war attempts to control, thereby endangering the civilian populations of all parties to the conflict. While other authors have previously addressed the challenges posed by asymmetry to the law of armed conflict in different formats, this article explores these issues through a hypothetical scenario and seeks to elucidate some of the potential ramifications of the pursuit of physical impunity in war. (shrink)

The articles reviews the problem of humanitarian terrorism that is a terrorism of self-proclaimed humanitarian goals and self-inflicted constraints. This type of terrorism justifies itself by lofty aspirations and claims that its actions are targeted killings of guilty individuals only. This terrorism is the product of the Enlightenment, it emerged by the end of the 18th century and passed three stages in its development. The first stage is the classical terror of the Jacobins 1793–1794. The second one is Russian revolutionary (...) terror of the end of the 19th – early 20th centuries. The third stage is the contemporary American warfare waged by the unmanned aerial vehicles, called drones. From the perspective of the contemporary just war theory, this terrorism is not only morally superior to the ordinary primitive terrorism of straightforward attacks on civilians (this terrorism may be no less fair in terms of self-imposed goals, but is doubtful in terms of means), but even contemporary war. Terrorists of this type kill the few but teach a lesson to many. But it must be clearly born in mind that humanitarian terrorism is not only the summit of just war but also the summit of absolute war. It is founded in personal and individual enmity, which makes the core of absolute enmity. Absolute enmity may at times be inevitable and even justified, but it blocks the road to peace. Revengeful spite, stemming from absolute enmity, is capable of creating its own phantoms of justice, propelling the war. The author concludes that the vicious circle is thus completed. The logic of just war drags in the direction humanitarian terrorism, humanitarian terrorism drags in the mire of absolute enmity. Absolute enmity proclaims just war. (shrink)

The legitimacy of humanitarian intervention has been contested for more than a century, yet pressure for such intervention persists. Normative evolution and institutional design have been closely linked since the first debates over humanitarian intervention more than a century ago. Three norms have competed in shaping state practice and the normative discourse: human rights, peace preservation, and sovereignty. The rebalancing of these norms over time, most recently as the state’s responsibility to protect, has reflected specific international institutional environments. The contemporary (...) legitimacy of humanitarian intervention is based on UN Security Council authorization of the use of force. Although the Security Council is often viewed as representative of great-power influence, international acceptance of its role is based on the role of non-permanent members and their support for the sovereignty norm. The current rebalanced norms supporting humanitarian intervention, institutional bias that protects state sovereignty, and the changing character of mass violence may undermine the tenuous contemporary legitimacy of humanitarian intervention. Normative adjustments and new institutional designs are required to insure the legitimacy of international action that protects populations against mass violence. (shrink)

The first issue of Ethics & International Affairs was published in 1987, when the Cold War still dominated international affairs. It was appropriate at that time to launch the journal with an issue devoted in part to the theme "superpower ethics." In his introduction to the topic Nye argues that the challenge of establishing an ethics for the United States and the Soviet Union is not met by any traditional Western system. Aristotle's "virtue," Kant's "good intent," and the "good result" (...) of the consequentialists are inadequate to the task of determining right on the superpower playing field. In reference to this insufficiency, Nye sketches the arguments of the subsequent articles by Mazrui, Hassner, and Hoffman, each of whom offers an instructive picture of the state of superpower ethics. (shrink)

Commonsense moral thought holds that what makes terrorism particularly abhorrent is the fact that it tends to be directed toward innocent victims. Yet contemporary philosophers tend to doubt that the concept of innocence plays any significant role here, and to deny that prohibitions against targeting noncombatants can be justified through appeal to their moral innocence. I argue, however, that the arguments used to support these doubts are ultimately unsuccessful. Indeed, the philosophical positions in question tend to misunderstand the justification of (...) both the prohibition against targeting noncombatants, and that of the permission to attack combatants, for which the paper offers a new account. Such misunderstandings make it all too easy to justify both terrorist actions and morally objectionable actions on the part of nations at war. Taking proper account of the role of innocence in the context of armed conflict will alter our ordinary ways of thinking about the ethics of war, with respect to both jus in bello and jus ad bellum. (shrink)

What is, or should be, the role of defense in thinking about the justification of use of armed force? Contemporary just war thinking prioritizes defense as the principal, and perhaps the only, just cause for resorting to armed force. By contrast, classic just war tradition, while recognizing defense as justification for use of force by private persons, did not reason from self-defense to the justification of the use of force on behalf of the political community, but instead rendered the idea (...) of just cause for resort to force in terms of the sovereign's responsibility to maintain justice, vindicating those who had suffered from injustice and punishing evildoers. This paper moves through three major stages in the historical development of just war thinking, first examining a critical phase in the formation of the classical idea of just cause as the responsibility to maintain justice, then discussing the shift, characteristic of the modern period, to an idea of sovereignty as connected to the state and the prioritization of defense of the state as just cause for use of force, and lastly showing how this conception of the priority of defense became part of the recovery of just war thinking in the latter part of the twentieth century. The paper concludes by noting recent changes in thought on international law that tend to emphasize justice at the expense of the right of self-defense, suggesting that the roots of just war thinking imply the need for a similar rethinking of contemporary just war discourse. (shrink)

This essay responds to the six essays on my thought above, doing so both directly on particularly important points and indirectly through my own reflections on how I understand my work and its development.

In contrast to the period when the "Journal of Religious Ethics" began publishing, the study of religion in relation to war and connected issues has prospered in recent years. This article examines three collections of essays providing comparative perspectives on these topics, two recently authored studies of Buddhism and Islam in relation to war, and a compendious collection of texts on Western moral tradition concerning war, peace, and related issues from classical Greece and Rome to the present.

Several robotic automation systems, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), are being used in combat today. This evokes ethical questions. In this paper, it is argued that UAVs, more than any other weapon, may determine which normative theory the interpretation of the laws of war (LOW) will be based on. UAVs have advantages in terms of reducing casualties for the UAV possessor, but they may at the same time make war seem more like a risk-free enterprise, much like a computer (...) game, lowering the threshold for starting a war. This indicates the importance of revising the LOW, or adding some rules that focus specifically on UAVs. (shrink)

The increasingly widespread and energetic engagement with the idea of just war over the last fifty years of thinking on morality and armed conflict—especially in English-speaking countries—presents a striking contrast to the previous several centuries, going back to the early 1600s, in which thinkers addressing moral issues related to war did so without reference to the just war idea.

Cyberweapons are software and software, at least intuitively, is nonphysical. Several authors have noted that this potentially renders problematic the application of normative frameworks like UN Charter Article 2(4) to cyberweapons. If Article 2(4) only proscribes the use of physical force, and if cyberweapons are nonphysical, then cyberweapons fall outside the purview of Article 2(4). This article explores the physicality of software, examining Stuxnet in particular. First, I show that with a few relatively uncontroversial metaphysical claims we can secure the (...) conclusion that Stuxnet is physical. In particular, there exist instances of Stuxnet that are both located in space and causally efficacious, and this is very strong evidence for their being physical. Second, I argue that the question of physicality is actually irrelevant for the moral evaluation of an attack like Stuxnet because of its undeniably physical effects. Finally, I argue that some features of Stuxnet should make us optimistic about the prospects for discrimination and proportionality in cyberwarfare. (shrink)

Jeff McMahan famously defends a moral inequality of combatants, where liability to be attacked and potentially killed in war, should be grounded in the individual combatant’s moral responsibility for posing an unjust threat. In a response, Seth Lazar shows that McMahan’s criterion for liability leads to an unacceptable dilemma between “contingent pacifism” and “total war”, i.e. between war being practically infeasible, or implausibly many civilians being legitimate targets. The problem is that McMahan grounds liability mainly in the individual’s causal responsibility (...) for posing an unjust threat, but where a large proportion of combatants and civilians are approximately equally causally responsible. Recently, Saba Bazargan has come to the aid of McMahan by injecting an alternative supplementary criterion for liability, namely the individual’s complicity in a group act. This criterion is supposed to uphold the noted moral inequality, while avoiding the responsibility dilemma, by grounding moral incrimination in the individual’s participatory intention, instead of her causal contribution. I argue that the complicity account fails to resolve the dilemma. It fails because complicity grounded in a causally inert participatory intention is insufficient for liability. Further, I show why this reveals a deeper problem with the complicity account itself, namely that though it purports to ground incrimination non-causally, it fails to do so to any serious extent. (shrink)

Michael Walzer presents the theory of the just war that he develops in Just and Unjust Wars as a set of principles governing the initiation and conduct of war that are entailed by respect for the moral rights of individuals. I argue in this essay that some of the principles he defends do not and cannot derive from the basic moral rights of individuals and indeed, in some cases, explicitly permit the violation of those rights. I argue, further, that it (...) does not follow, at least in some cases, that the principles are false. Even if some of the principles are not adaptations of a theory of rights to the problems of war, they may still be rational, pragmatic accommodations to epistemic and institutional constraints under which we must now act. Yet I also argue that respect for the rights that Walzer claims that individuals have requires us to try to overcome the epistemic and institutional impediments that restrict us at present. As those impediments are removed, the reasons for acknowledging and following some of the central principles Walzer espouses will diminish and, perhaps, disappear. (shrink)

Abstract Noting that the use of modern instruments of war had unpredictable and revolutionary consequences, Morris Janowitz introduced the concept of a ?constabulary force? to show how a professional military in a liberal democratic state might use modern weapons and yet conserve the existing political order. This article explores the meaning of this concept in three ways. First, it examines the strategic assumptions underlying the concept to explain why Janowitz thought it offered an approach to containing the revolutionary consequences of (...) the use of force that was more promising than alternative concepts of military force. Second, it explores the moral implications of the concept (which Janowitz did not do), identifying key moral commitments a constabulary force must meet to sustain a liberal democratic order as it attempts to resolve dilemmas posed by the use of force. Third, it considers in what way these moral commitments are particular to a constabulary force, while yet preserving an approach to the use of force that could be applied across the spectrum of force by military structures of various kinds. (shrink)

Unit 731, a biological warfare research organisation that operated under the authority of the Imperial Japanese Army in the 1930s and 1940s, conducted brutal experiments on thousands of unconsenting subjects. Because of the US interest in the data from these experiments, the perpetrators were not prosecuted and the atrocities are still relatively undiscussed. What counts as meaningful moral repair in this case—what should perpetrators and collaborator communities do decades later? We argue for three non-ideal but realistic forms of moral repair: (...) (1) a national policy in Japan against human experimentation without appropriate informed and voluntary consent; (2) the establishment of a memorial to the victims of Unit 731; and (3) US disclosure about its use of Unit 731 data and an apology for failing to hold the perpetrators accountable. (shrink)

If the state outsources a responsibility to private actors to plant trees, is that necessarily a bad thing? Surely, one would think not. Still, in constitutional theory, there are many forceful arguments against privatisation. One of the core arguments against privatisation is the question of who ought to do what and what it means for a policy area to be inherently public. In this paper, I am interested in varieties of privatisation and in particular what privatisation means in the context (...) of climate change. The aim of the paper is to show that precisely because there is a variety of privatisation, in some areas, such as the environment and regarding climate change, we may discuss the question of ‘duty’ rather than privatisation as such. (shrink)

Are field medics morally permitted to treat unjust combatants? I distinguish between two kinds of enemy combatants: reactivated ones who will rejoin the fight, and deactivated ones who will not rejoin the fight. Helen Frowe has argued that field medics are not permitted to treat reactivated combatants but is silent about deactivated ones. First, I argue that Frowe’s account plausibly extends to a moral prohibition on treating deactivated combatants in addition to reactivated ones. Second, I argue that the best argument (...) for treating deactivated enemy soldiers extends also to reactivated ones but holds only for groups, which undermines Frowe’s general position. I thus defend the mainstream view, enshrined in the Geneva Convention, that the treatment of deactivated unjust combatants (and maybe, in some cases, reactivated unjust combatants) by partisan or nonpartisan field medics is often all-things-considered morally obligatory. -/- . (shrink)

Does multilateral action always succeed in creating a Pax Universalis? On the contrary, it may lead to war. With arguments from the U.S. perspective and examples from the Gulf War, Hendrickson sees both collective and unilateral action as neither good nor bad.

This article furnishes a philosophical background for the current debate about responsibility and culpability for war crimes by referring to ideas from three important just war thinkers: Augustine, Francisco de Vitoria, and Michael Walzer. It combines lessons from these three thinkers with perspectives on current problems in the ethics of war, distinguishes between legal culpability, moral culpability, and moral responsibility, and stresses that even lower-ranking soldiers must in many cases assume moral responsibility for their acts, even though they are part (...) of a military hierarchy and act under orders. The questions addressed in this article are arguably among the hardest and most muddled in military ethics and deserve close philosophical analysis and scrutiny. (shrink)

. Morality is often dismissed as irrelevant in what is seen as the global anarchy of rival states each pursuing its national interest. When morality is invoked, it is usually the morality of justice with its associated moral conceptions of individual rights, equality, and universal law. In the area of moral theory, an alternative moral approach, the ethics of care, has been developed in recent years. It is beginning to influence how some see their global responsibilities.

Concern regarding overly demanding duties has been a prominent feature of moral debate ever since the possibility was famously sounded out by Bernard Williams nearly fifty years ago. More recently, some theorists have attempted to resolve the issue by reconsidering its underlying structure, drawing attention to the possibility that the duties to respond to large-scale moral issues like global poverty, systemic racism, and climate change may be fundamentally collective duties rather than indi- vidual ones. On this view, the relationship between (...) potentially overly demanding individual duties and large-scale moral issues is mediated by the fact that the duties are, first and foremost, ours together rather than each of ours on our own. We believe this theoretical shift constitutes an important development for moral theory regarding large-scale moral problems, but in this paper we focus on two dis- tinct reasons to think that the interplay between collective duties and demanding- ness is more complicated than has typically been appreciated. First, we argue that in cases in which risks or burdens are indivisible, the move to collectivize duties fails to fulfill its promise to alleviate demandingness concerns, and moreover that those kinds of cases are far more widespread than they may initially appear to be. Sec- ond, we argue that if concerns over individual demandingness could block a putative obligation from becoming an actual moral duty, then, in some cases at least, con- cerns over collective demandingness could do so as well. These complications help elucidate the fact that while the move to collectivize duties can address demanding- ness concerns in a particular subset of cases, in others doing so may merely relo- cate—or even exacerbate—the problem. (shrink)

This article explores the role of reflective judgement in international relations through the lens of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. It argues that Hannah Arendt's writings on reflective judgement, and the dual perspectives of actor and spectator she articulates, offer us a set of conceptual tools with which to examine the failure of the international community to respond to the genocide as well as more broadly to understand the moral dilemmas posed by such crimes against humanity. Having identified elements which (...) form part of Arendt's concept of judgement, parallels in the case of Rwanda are found, drawing on both empirical evidence and recent interpretations of the genocide. Reflective judgement is offered as both a means of critique and as a source of normative guidance for political actors. (shrink)

Targeted killings have traditionally been viewed as a dirty tactic, even within war. However, I argue that just combatants actually have a prima facie duty to use targeted strikes against military and political leadership rather than conventional methods of fighting. This is because the leaders of a military engaging in aggression are typically responsible for the wrongful harms they threaten, whereas significant numbers of their solders usually will not be. Conventional warfare imposes significant risks on soldiers who are not liable (...) to be killed, violating their rights. Narrowly targeted strikes frequently provide a less-wrongful alternative. Consequently, there is a prima facie duty to conduct such strikes, and to exercise “due care” if engagement with conventional forces becomes necessary. (shrink)

Economic sanctions are emerging as one of the major tools of international governance in the post-Cold War era. Gordon considers the issue of sanctions within three ethical frameworks: just war doctrine, deontological ethics, and utilitarianism.

Commenting on Michael Walzer’s essay, the author adopts a perspective that traces back to Machiavelli. In this view, ‘dirty hands’ is a true problem faced by politicians, not a philosophical fiction or a moral quandary resulting from wrong reasoning. ‘Dirty hands’ results from the collision of two spheres of human action -morality and politics- which entail different duties; it concerns actions which have extremely serious public consequences and therefore applies eminently to politicians and the public sphere. The author examines different (...) scenarios to elicit a clear view of the specificity of this problem, which is not analogous to the conventional issue of immorality in politics. ‘Dirty hands’ is a problem that cannot be avoided by politicians, because they have responsibility over the ultimate decisions; it follows that people who wish not to dirty their hands should thus refrain from entering the political realm. (shrink)

The government itself, which is the only mode which the people have chosen to execute their will, is equally liable [with the standing army] to be abused and perverted before the people can act through it. Witness the present Mexican war, the work of comparatively a few individuals using the standing government as their tool; for, in the outset, the people would not have consented to this measure. Henry Thoreau, in “Civil Disobedience”It is easy to say — and often is (...) said — that we cannot have tolerable relations with new revolutionary regimes. The problem is that our anticommunist paranoia has made it impossible to find out. We do not know whether Mao's declared interest in a relationship with the Americans in the 1940s or Ho Chi Minh's were sincere. And the reason we don't know is that we never tried to find out. Those who reported it was a possibility were hounded out of the foreign service because of our suspicion and fear of communism. The legacy of that era brings to mind Ivan the Terrible's practice of murdering the bearer of bad news. We are more civilized than that; we have been content simply to ruin people's careers. J. William Fulbright, in The Price of Empire (1989) This poisonous thing I'm trying to describe is [a] characteristic way of dealing with criticism. It used to be enough to brand a critic as a radical or a leftist to make people turn away. Now we need only to call him a liberal. Soon “moderate” will be the M word, “conservative” will be the C word and only fascists will be in the mainstream. E. L. Doctorow, Brandeis Commencement, May 21, 1989We have lived with violence for seven yearsIt was not worth one single lifeBut the patriot's fist is at her throatHer voice is in mortal danger...Adrienne Rich, “Natural Resources,” in Dream of a Common Language (Norton, 1978). (shrink)

To provide a way to understand warfare and debate military conduct, Michael Walzer's Just and Unjust Wars tries to show that civilians and soldiers are not separated by a barrier of violence as we might think, but rather inhabit the same moral world. While this view enables us to question and criticize our leaders during times of war instead of simply claiming ignorance, its success is gained by obscuring certain fundamental boundaries that exist between combatants and noncombatants. By comparing Walzer's (...) just war theory with the existential theories of Jean-Paul Sartre and Martin Heidegger, we can therefore find a more complete picture of what it means to declare war and what it means to engage in combat. This will allow us to see that what separates the soldier from the civilian is our everyday avoidance of death and anything associated with it. Through an investigation into the relationship between death and killing we can then ask, from an existential standpoint, whether we can call any war just so long as our evasion of death also results in our evasion of what soldiers must go through to protect us, thus preventing the soldier from being able to truly return home. (shrink)

Purpose– This paper aims to explore human technology relations through the lens of sci-fi movies within the life cycle of the ETHICOMP conference series. Here, different perspectives on artificial intelligent agents, primarily in the shape of robots, but also including other kinds of intelligent systems, are explored. Hence, IT-ethical issues related to humans interactions with social robots and artificial intelligent agents are illustrated with reference to: Alex Proyas’ I, Robot; James Cameron’s Terminator; and the Wachowski brothers’ Matrix. All three movies (...) present robots cast in the roles of moral agents capable of doing good or evil. Steven Spielberg’s Artificial Intelligence, A.I. gives rise to a discussion of the robot seen as a moral patient and furthermore reflects on possibilities for care and trust relations between robots and humans. Andrew Stanton’s Wall-E shapes a discussion of robots as altruistic machines in the role as facilitators of a flourishing society. Steven Spielberg’s Minority Report allows for a discussion of knowledge-discovering technology and the possibility for balancing data utility and data privacy.Design/methodology/approach– Observations of themes in sci-fi movies within the life span of the ETHICOMP conference series are discussed with the purpose of illustrating ways in which science fiction reflects (science) faction. In that sense, science fiction does not express our worries for a distant future, but rather casts light over questions, which is of concern in the present time.Findings– Human technology interactions are addressed and it is shown how sci-fi films highlight philosophical questions that puzzle us today, such as which kind of relationships can and ought to be formed with robots, and whether the roles they play as social actors demand that one ought to assign moral standing to them. The paper does not present firm answers but instead pays attention to the selection and framing of questions that deserve attention.Originality/value– To relate sci-fi movies to topics raised during the past 20 years of the ETHICOMP conference series, seemed to be an appropriate way of celebrating the 20-year anniversary of the ETHICOMP conference series. (shrink)

This article offers a cultural approach to critical discourse analysis of major addresses made by Israeli leaders before the initiation of new wars between 1982 and 2008. The article reveals an intriguing phenomenon: the intensive use of the word ‘peace’ in these texts. The article's central claim is that the word ‘peace’ is an integral part of the Israeli just war rhetoric, a phenomenon that can be termed: Peace in the Service of War. PSW aims at rationalizing and legitimizing war (...) by using a series of discursive strategies creating various pseudo-logical connections between war and peace: false narrative, logic of binarism, dogma and metaphor. Israeli war speeches, an interesting and relatively unknown arena for the non-Hebrew reader, can shed light on the current global just war rhetoric from an unfamiliar perspective. (shrink)