When people argue, they are vulnerable to unwanted and costly changes in their beliefs. This vulnerability motivates the position that belief involuntarism makes argument inherently adversarial, as well as the development of alternatives to adversarial argumentation such as “invitational rhetoric”. The emphasis on involuntary belief change in such accounts, in our perspective, neglects three dimensions of arguing: the diversity of arguer intentions, audience agency, and the benefits of belief change. The complex impact of arguments on both audiences and arguers involves (...) vulnerabilities related to various forces of argument, not just the intellectual force of premise-conclusion complexes. Shifting emphasis from adversariality to vulnerability, we propose a more holistic understanding of argument, in which vulnerability reveals various sources of strength and opportunity in addition to risk. (shrink)

Sanford Goldberg’s account of epistemic coverage constitutes a special case of Douglas Walton’s view that epistemic closure arises from dialectical argument. Walton’s pragmatic version of epistemic closure depends on dialectical norms for closing an argument, and epistemic coverage operates at the limits of argument closure because it minimizes dialectical exchange. Such closure works together with a shared hypothetical consideration to justify dismissal of surprising claims.

The aim of this paper is to critically review the traditional typology of argument macrostructures, particularly, the dichotomy between linked and convergent structure. We have found an argument structure that does not fall under one of those five traditional categories: basic, serial, divergent, linked and convergent. We show that the new argument structure, which we call the recursive structure, is not rare-earth, but ubiquitous in real argumentation. Then, we propose and justify a new approach to diagramming arguments of the structure. (...) The new argument structure is really new because arguments of the new structure are analyzed and evaluated differently from those of the other structures, especially from hybrid arguments considered in the literature. In light of the new argument structure, we present a hypothesis why assumptions and exceptions of a defeasible argument play different roles in dialectical settings. (shrink)