ABSTRACTI suggest that Kierkegaard proves a helpful interlocutor in the debate about Analects 13.18 and the meaning of yin 隱. After surveying the contemporary debate, I argue that Kierkegaard and the Confucians agree on three important points. First, they both present relational selves. Second, both believe certain relationships are integral for moral knowledge. Third, both present a differentiated account of love where our obligations are highest to those with whom we are closest. Moreover, Kierkegaard’s ‘covering’ in the deliberation ‘Love covers (...) a multitude of sins’ in Works of Love of ‘covering’ suggests innovative meanings for yin 隱 that are compatible with Confucian philosophy. Finally, I argue that sagely discretion in covering on the Confucian account is like the teleological suspension of the ethical. (shrink)

How much should adult children sacrifice to care for their chronically ill parents? If parents commit crimes, should their children report them to the authorities? What are the demands of filial obligation in these cases? Traditionally, Confucians have favoured a somewhat stringent view of filial obligation. By this view, adult children have to provide long‐term care to their parents as well as place their parents' interests over any concerns of justice, should the two happen to conflict. I will call these (...) stringent views the principles of filial caregiving and filial favoritism. In this paper, I will use Scanlon's Contractualism to analyze the two principles, and juxtapose the Contractualist analysis with the Confucian filial piety. By doing this, we sharpen Confucianism's critical elements, and highlight the coherence of Contractualism with this ethical ideology from a non‐analytic tradition. (shrink)

Scholars have often recognized the “touch of irony” in Kongzi’s “collected conversations” (Lunyu 論語 or Analects of Confucius). Some interpreters have taken the ironic face as one of his faces. Others have celebrated the ironic Kongzi as the “true” depiction of the Master. This paper presents two seemingly contrasting images of Kongzi – the non-ironic sage and the ironic non-sage – and looks at their assumptions. I then explore the methodological implications of taking the Master’s irony seriously. I argue that, (...) touching upon irony, any interpretation is necessarily touched by it – it renders itself ironic. Finally, I discuss the post-comparative approach as an ironic approach. Post-comparative readings recognize that identity is the necessary condition for the transformation of identity. In this way, Kongzi’s irony is transformed by but also transforms more familiar, non-Chinese discourses on irony. (shrink)

In this article, I present different readings of Confucius's irony in the Analects (or Lunyu 論語) and expand on the implications of irony for how we perceive Confucius. Scholars who have appreciated the irony of Confucius tend to see it as distinctive of an unsagely, everyday man, often juxtaposed to the dominant image of the Master as a hyperserious sage. Moreover, irony is considered a pedagogical tool. These readings mainly recognize verbal irony (Confucius means the opposite of what he says). (...) I discuss a second type of irony: complex irony (Confucius both means and does not mean what he says). I argue that sageliness is not incompatible with irony, and further propose that complex irony can be found beyond the sentence level; it can be the feature of the relation between specific sayings. Adapting to his interlocutors' diverse personalities and needs, and to a constantly changing world, Confucius sometimes provides different and even conflicting answers to the same questions, based on contextual appropriateness. Each answer is meant to be taken literally and fits one concrete situation. The same answer, however, can be simultaneously ineffective or even dangerous in another albeit seemingly similar context. Thus Confucius sometimes both means what he says and does not mean it in an absolute sense. (shrink)