RESUMEN El artículo sostiene que el consenso no es un tema de primer orden en la filosofía política de Charles Taylor, pero una lectura orientada al problema puede ofrecer los elementos para establecer una teoría sobre dicha noción e identificar los argumentos para su justificación. Además, se enfatiza en el contexto de discusión que permite introducir la filosofía de Taylor como un modo de pensar sobre el consenso, alternativo al constructivismo. ABSTRACT The article argues that although consensus is not a (...) first-order issue in Charles Taylor's political philosophy, a reading oriented toward that problem can provide the elements for a theory of that notion, as well as for the identification of arguments to justify it. It also highlights the context of discussion that makes it possible to present Taylor's philosophy as a way of thinking about consensus and as an alternative to constructivism. (shrink)

El artículo sostiene que el consenso no es un tema de primer orden en la filosofía política de Charles Taylor, pero una lectura orientada al problema puede ofrecer los elementos para establecer una teoría sobre dicha noción e identificar los argumentos para su justificación. Además, se enfatiza en el contexto de discusión que permite introducir la filosofía de Taylor como un modo de pensar sobre el consenso, alternativo al constructivismo.

Opponents of Hegel's philosophy traditionally support their arguments against his metaphysics and dialectical methodology by implying that the lack of an ethics in his system has unfortunate consequences for personal and political life. In rebuttal, defenders of Hegel then block thead hominemcharges by pointing out examples of sound moral and political behavior in Hegel's own life and by arguing that amoral or immoral conduct is not entailed by Hegel's dialectical reasoning. The success of this defense of the biographical Hegel has (...) not yet been matched, however, by a systematic explanation of the nature of morality based on Hegel's philosophical writings themselves. Instead of supplying an alternative to Kant's conception of morality, Hegel's texts indeed seem to involve the devious strategy of attacking Kantian morality and then abruptly moving on to another topic. The shift of discussion to religion or the state appears to force commentators to conclude either that his philosophy lacks a systematic moral philosophy or that it surreptitiously preserves an essentially Kantian ethics. In the former case his system apparently permits immoral conduct, and in the latter the philosopher merely deceives us with a dialectical sleight of hand. In either case, Hegel's morals are still in doubt. (shrink)

The author's thesis is that human rights can be substantiated on the basis of discourse theory. The argument has two steps. The first step is the justification of the rules of discourse. The second step consists in the foundation of human rights.

What do we want from a theory of justice? Amartya Sen argues that what we should not want is to follow the social contract approach revived by John Rawls, or transcendental institutionalism, in its preoccupation with perfectly just institutions. Sen makes an effective case against approaches, such as G. A. Cohen’s, concerned with transcendent, fact-independent principles of justice, but not against Rawls’ constructivist approach to justice when this is properly interpreted as making a weak transcendental argument. Situating Rawls’ approach within (...) the tradition of the liberalism of freedom provides a basis for interpreting his Kantian constructivism as a form of transcendental institutionalism, and for revealing the affinities between Rawls’ idea of reflective equilibrium and Jürgen Habermas’ method of rational reconstruction. Such a Kantian conception of justice, concerned with constituting relations of equal liberty between free and equal citizens, remains essential for orienting our pursuit of justice. (shrink)

This article was first published in 1982 in Educational Analysis (4, 75–91) and republished in 1998 (Hirst, P. H., & White, P. (Eds.), Philosophy of education: Major themes in the analytic tradition, Vol. 1, Philosophy and education, Part 1, pp. 61–78. London: Routledge). I was then a lecturer in philosophy of education at Sheffield University teaching the subject to Master’s students on both full- and part-time programmes. My first degree was in philosophy, read under D. W. Hamlyn and David Cooper (...) and, given their interests, inevitably emphasized the philosophy of language, in particular the work of Wittgenstein in this field. When I subsequently turned my attention to the philosophy of education it seemed obvious to me that there were serious problems with Professor Peters’ approach to language, and I had particular difficulties with his approach to criteria, meaning theory and what seemed an odd interpretation of a transcendental argument. This article thus set out to show that the then dominant form of philosophy of education seemed not to take account of developments in the philosophy of language that preceded Professor Peters’ early work by at least a decade and which cast serious doubt on the enterprise as it was then understood. As the articles in the 1998 collection indicate, I was not alone in thinking there was something amiss, although at the time I seemed to be ploughing a somewhat lonely furrow. In revisiting this early article some 30 years after it was first published I have found to my surprise that there is little I would now change, although I have been forcibly reminded of the very lively discussions Professor Peters and I had over these issues. The fact that there is little I would now add to, or subtract from, my critique is in itself a telling comment on the enduring and influential legacy of the approach to the philosophy of education that Professor Peters championed so powerfully. (shrink)