Analyses of the theological virtue of hope tend to focus on its interior dispositional structure, shifting attention away from the social dimensions crucial to its formation and exercise. We argue that one can better appreciate the place of hope in Christian thought by attending to communal features that have been peripheral to or excluded from traditional analyses. To this end, we employ resources from the literature on the extended mind and group agency to develop an account of the theological virtue (...) of hope as a socially extended virtue—that is, a virtue scaffolded by and enacted within a community whose practices are ordered toward a shared conception of human flourishing. (shrink)

This paper addresses the relationships between hope and trust. I suggest that different kinds of hope and trust relate to one another in different ways, which I conceive of in dynamic terms. I propose that the movement of hope and trust has a unifying context: the changing structure of a human life and its dependence on other people. I further argue that the most fundamental forms of hope and trust are inextricable. Together, they comprise a diffuse way of anticipating things (...) in general, which could equally be described in terms of “faith.” This sustains a life structure upon which more specific forms of hope and trust depend. (shrink)

When seriously ill patients reach the end of the standard treatment trajectory for their condition, they may qualify for the use of unapproved, investigational drugs regulated via expanded access programs. In medical-ethical discourse, it is often argued that expanded access to investigational drugs raises ‘false hope’ among patients and is therefore undesirable. We set out to investigate what is meant by the false hope argument in this discourse. In this paper, we identify and analyze five versions of the false hope (...) argument which we call: (1) the limited chance at benefit argument, (2) the side effects outweighing benefits argument, (3) the opportunity costs argument, (4) the impossibility of making informed decisions argument, and (5) the difficulty of gaining access argument. We argue that the majority of these five versions do not provide normative ground for disqualifying patients’ hopes as false. Only when hope is rooted in a mistaken belief, for example, about the likelihood of benefits or chances on medical risks, or when hope is directed at something that cannot possibly be obtained, should it be considered false. If patients are adequately informed about their odds of obtaining medical benefit, however small, and about the risks associated with an investigational treatment, it is unjustified to consider patients’ hopes to be false, and hence, to deny them access to investigational drug based on that argument. (shrink)

Hope is crucial human agency, but its fragility grounds a substantive challenge to Christian belief. It is not clear how a perfectly loving God could permit despairinducing experiences of divine silence. Drawing upon a distinctively Christian psychology of hope, this paper seeks to address this challenge. I contend that divine silence can act as a corrective to misplaced natural hopes. But there are risks in God’s choice to allow a person to lose all natural hope. Thus, if God is perfectly (...) loving, God ought to find a way to demonstrate goodness to those who are tempted by theological despair. I argue that the Church demonstrates God’s goodness through its merciful care and hope for the afflicted. The local community can act to sustain or recover a person’s capacity to remain open to the gift of hope even in the midst of divine silence. (shrink)

This paper addresses the phenomenology of hopelessness. I distinguish two broad kinds of predicament that are easily confused: ‘loss of hopes’ and ‘loss of hope’. I argue that not all hope can be characterised as an intentional state of the form ‘I hope that p’. It is possible to lose all hopes of that kind and yet retain another kind of hope. The hope that remains is not an intentional state or a non-intentional bodily feeling. Rather, it is a ‘pre-intentional’ (...) orientation or ‘existential feeling’, by which I mean something in the context of which certain kinds of intentional state, including intentional hope, are intelligible. I go on to discuss severe depression, lack of aspiration, demoralisation and loss of trust in the world, in order to distinguish some qualitatively different forms that loss of hope can take. (shrink)

This paper explores the tension between pragmatism and utopia, especially in the concept of "realistic utopianism". It argues that historically, the pragmatic and gradualist rejection of utopia has been anti-utopian in effect, notably in the case of Popper. More recent attempts to argue in favour of "realistic utopianism" or its equivalent, by writers such as Wallerstein and Rorty are also profoundly anti-utopian, despite Rorty's commitment to "social hope". They co-opt the terminology of utopia to positions that are antagonistic to radical (...) alterity. But this is not a necessary response to the utopia/pragmatism tension: Unger, who is explicitly opposed to utopia, in fact proffers a more sympathetic resolution based on the merits of vision, social improvization and collective learning. These may lie closer to the core of the utopian project as a vehicle for the education of desire than Unger himself recognizes. (shrink)

Résumé L’espoir joue un rôle important dans notre vie de tous les jours et pour le future. Bien que l’espoir et le désespoir soient des concepts importants adressés dans de nombreuses analyses théoriques en psychologie, théologie, philosophie, sciences politiques, infirmerie, littérature et les arts ; ils sont omis en théorie économique. Cette absence est d’autant plus notable que l’espoir joue un rôle fondamental dans la prise de décisions et plus particulièrement pour les choix inter-temporels qui sont au centre de la (...) théorie économique. Dans le but de l’incorporer dans la théorie des choix inter-temporels il est essentiel de définir clairement les caractéristiques de l’espoir et de le dissocier d’autres concepts. L’espoir n’est pas constant à travers le temps. L’espoir diffère de l’optimisme et du rêve sans fondements réels. L’espoir n’est pas irrationnel. Je définis l’espoir en me basant sur des caractéristiques identifiées dans plusieurs disciplines. Grace à la comparaison de ces caractéristiques, je peux identifier les points communs et les définitions communes. En utilisant les définitions obtenues, j’incorpore l’espoir dans l’analyse économique et j’analyse les implications en termes de modélisation des choix et de comportement économique. Cela me permet de vérifier si l’espoir est implicitement inclus ou est absent de l’analyse économique actuelle. (shrink)

Hope is a ubiquitous feature of human experience, but there has been relatively little scholarship within contemporary analytic philosophy devoted to the systematic analysis of its nature and value. In the last decade, however, there has been a resurgence of interest in the study of hope and, in particular, its role in human agency. This scholarly attention reflects an ambivalence about hope's effects. While the possession of hope can have salutary consequences, it can also make the agent vulnerable to certain (...) kinds of personal risk. The pervasiveness of hope is not a sign of its quality; only a well‐tuned hope can be a virtue. Recently, Nancy Snow has argued that hope can be an intellectual virtue. Framing her account as a contribution to regulative epistemology, she contends that the intellectual virtue of hope can (i) motivate the pursuit of important epistemic ends, (ii) create dispositions that enable the successful pursuit of these aims, and (iii) generate a method for enduring intellectual projects. In this paper, I provide a critical appraisal of Snow's account of hope as an intellectual virtue. One important implication of this critique is that hope can function as an intellectual virtue only to the extent that it has benefitted from the correcting and perfecting influence of other cognitive excellences. (shrink)

This article explores Richard Rorty’s status in academic political theory in the decades after his conscious departure from disciplinary philosophy. Rorty found a receptive audience in this pluralistic field, and he became a point of orientation in a number of ongoing, research-agenda driving conversations, if often as an extreme example against which interlocutors could define themselves. In like fashion, Rorty refined his own self-conception as a patriotic liberal ironist in the course of his political theoretical engagements. I offer a sketch (...) of political theory’s landscape as a contrast to the reductivism and esotericism Rorty criticized in disciplinary philosophy, and survey his presence in the field over the years substantively, qualitatively, and quantitatively. (shrink)