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  1. The Two-Envelope Paradox: Asymmetrical Cases.Chunghyoung Lee - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):1-26.
    In the asymmetrical variant of the two-envelope paradox, the amount in envelope A is determined first, and then the amount in envelope B is determined to be either twice or half the amount in A by flipping a fair coin. Contra the common belief that B is preferable to A in this case, I show that the proposed arguments for this common belief all fail, and argue that B is not preferable to A if the expected values of the amounts (...)
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  • The Two-Envelope Paradox: An Axiomatic Approach.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):239-248.
    There has been much discussion on the two-envelope paradox. Clark and Shackel (2000) have proposed a solution to the paradox, which has been refuted by Meacham and Weisberg (2003). Surprisingly, however, the literature still contains no axiomatic justification for the claim that one should be indifferent between the two envelopes before opening one of them. According to Meacham and Weisberg, "decision theory does not rank swapping against sticking [before opening any envelope]" (p. 686). To fill this gap in the literature, (...)
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  • Decision Theory, Symmetry and Causal Structure: Reply to Meacham and Weisberg.Michael Clark & Nicholas Shackel - 2003 - Mind 112 (448):691-701.
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  • The Nonidentity Problem and the Two Envelope Problem: When is One Act Better for a Person Than Another?Melinda A. Roberts - 2009 - In David Wasserman & Melinda Roberts (eds.), Harming Future Persons. Springer. pp. 201--228.
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  • Biased Information and the Exchange Paradox.Anubav Vasudevan - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2455-2485.
    This paper presents a new solution to the well-known exchange paradox, or what is sometimes referred to as the two-envelope paradox. Many recent commentators have analyzed the paradox in terms of the agent’s biased concern for the contents of his own arbitrarily chosen envelope, claiming that such bias violates the manifest symmetry of the situation. Such analyses, however, fail to make clear exactly how the symmetry of the situation is violated by the agent’s hypothetical conclusion that he ought to switch (...)
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