The book offers the first systematic comparative treatment of the thoughts of Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty. Through an account of each philosopher's thought as organized around their ambiguous relationship with the concept of truth, the book offers an elucidation of the concept of ambiguity and its dependence on the absolute as one of the determining features of modern thinking.

This paper will seek firstly to understand Deleuze’s main challenges to phenomenology, particularly as they are expressed in The Logic of Sense and What is Philosophy?, although reference will also be made to Pure Immanence and Difference and Repetition. We will then turn to a discussion of one of the few passages in which Deleuze directly engages with Merleau-Ponty, which occurs in the chapter on art in What is Philosophy? In this text, he and Guattari offer a critique of what (...) they call the “final avatar” of phenomenology – that is, the “fleshism” that Merleau-Ponty proposes in his unfinished but justly famous work, The Visible and the Invisible. It will be argued that both Deleuze’s basic criticisms of phenomenology, as well as he and Guattari’s problems with the concept of the flesh, do not adequately come to grips with Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. Merleau-Ponty is not obviously partisan to what Deleuze finds problematic in this tradition, despite continuing to identify himself as a phenomenologist, and is working within a surprisingly similar framework in certain key respects. In fact, in the more positive part of this paper, we will compare Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh, and Deleuze’s equally infamous univocity of being, as a means to consider the broader question of the ways in which the two philosophers consider ontological thought, its meaning and its conditions. It is our belief that through properly understanding both positions, a rapprochement, or at least the foundation for one, can be established between these two important thinkers. (shrink)

This paper seeks firstly to understand Deleuze’s main challenges to phenomenology, particularly as they are expressed in The Logic of Sense and Difference and Repetition. We then turn to a discussion of one of the few passages in which Deleuze and Guattari directly engage with Merleau-Ponty, which occurs in the chapter on art in What is Philosophy? In this text, he and Guattari offer a critique of what they call the “final avatar” of phenomenology – that is, the “fleshism” that (...) Merleau- Ponty proposes in his unfinished but justly famous work, The Visible and the Invisible. We argue that both Deleuze’s basic criticisms of phenomenology, as well as he and Guattari’s problems with the concept of the flesh, do not adequately come to grips with Merleau-Ponty’s later philosophy. Merleau-Ponty is not obviously partisan to what Deleuze finds problematic in this tradition, despite continuing to identify himself as a phenomenologist, and is working within a surprisingly similar framework in certain key respects. In fact, in the more positive part of this paper, we compare Merleau-Ponty’s notion of flesh, and Deleuze’s equally infamous univocity of being, as a means to consider the broader question of the ways in which the two philosophers consider ontological thought, its meaning and its conditions. It is our argument that through properly understanding both positions, a rapprochement, or at least the foundation for one, can be established between these two important thinkers. (shrink)

This paper expresses wonder about how bodies in motion can lead towards an understanding of lived meaning in silent lifeworlds. In such lifeworlds, expressions are without words, pre-symbolic, and thus embodied. To address the wonder, phenomenological philosophy and phenomenological methodology were employed to frame an approach that acknowledges lives with disabilities as qualitatively different from, and yet not inferior to, nor less imbued with meaning than, lives without.The paper focuses on spatiality as decisive in determining possibilities for persons to express (...) their perspectives through a wide range of movements. Movements take place in the continuum between the spatiality of positions as objective bodily sensations and the spatiality of situations as embodied interactions with others and the world. Thus, in order to access the perspectives of students with severe and multiple disabilities, transitions between and movements within different spaces are examined.Approaching an educational everyday life where students are restricted in the possibilities available to them for moving in and out of spaces, the study reported points to the importance of recognizing the relationship between subjective movements and the spaces enveloping them as what creates a spatiality that is meaningful to the subject. It is accordingly suggested that choosing which spaces to include in educational contexts are formative choices that express a view of humanity. The paper also emphasizes the importance of recognizing temporality as a pedagogical resource when detecting and acting upon students’ changing expressions. (shrink)