G. A. Cohen's argument against the claim that respect for self‐ownership entails libertarianism features the imaginary example of “Able and Infirm.” Richard Epstein, Tom Palmer, and Am Feallsanach criticize the example, but fail to rescue libertarianism from Cohen's attack. This is due to a misunderstanding of the role the example plays in Cohen's argument, and to a false belief that the initial ownership status of the world is important for resolving disputes in political philosophy.

Este texto propone una defensa de la crítica que Cohen realiza al concepto de propiedad de uno mismo. Para ello, presentaremos la crítica de Cohen a dicho concepto en la obra de Nozick. Luego, se expondrá la defensa elaborada por Mack de la propiedad de uno mismo en la obra de Nozick, por medio de la formulación de lo que denomina “cláusula de propiedad de uno mismo”. Por último, se sostendrá que dicha cláusula no permite superar las críticas de Cohen, (...) debido a que su cumplimiento es compatible con un régimen de propiedad colectiva. (shrink)

G.A. Cohen has produced an influential criticism of libertarian‐ism that posits joint ownership of everything in the world other than labor, with each joint owner having a veto right over any potential use of the world. According to Cohen, in that world rationality would require that wealth be divided equally, with no differential accorded to talent, ability, or effort. A closer examination shows that Cohen's argument rests on two central errors of reasoning and does not support his egalitarian conclusions, even (...) granting his assumption of joint ownership. That assumption was rejected by Locke, Pufendorf and other writers on property for reasons that Cohen does not rebut. (shrink)

Libertarian arguments about the empirical benefits of capitalism are, as yet, inadequate to convince anyone who lacks libertarian philosophical convictions. Yet “philosophical” libertarianism founders on internal contradictions that render it unfit to make libertarians out of anyone who does not have strong consequentialist reasons for libertarian belief. The joint failure of these two approaches to libertarianism explains why they are both present in orthodox libertarianism—they hide each other's weaknesses, thereby perpetuating them. Libertarianism retains significant potential for illuminating the modern world (...) because of its distance from mainstream intellectual assumptions. But this potential will remain unfulfilled until its ideological superstructure is dismantled. (shrink)

In a certain sense, voluntary communities and market relationships are relatively less coercive than democracy and bureaucracy: they offer more positive freedom. In that respect, they are more like romantic relationships or friendships than are democracies and bureaucracies. This tends to make voluntary communities and markets not only more pleasant forms of interaction, but more effective ones—contrary to Weber's confidence in the superior rationality of bureaucratic control.

In his “Freedom, Self‐Ownership, and Libertarian Philosophical Diaspora, “Justin Weinberg attempts to show, by using arguments from G.A. Cohen, that philosophical defenses of libertarian natural rights are doomed to failure, because they are either circular (by basing libertarianism on the value of “freedom") or invalid (by basing libertarianism on a self‐ownership premise that actually leads to some form of egalitarianism). In fact, however, a natural‐rights libertarianism based on the self‐ownership premise is not inconsistent if it holds that the earth is (...) initially unowned, rather than collectively owned by all humanity. Under this thesis, the self‐ownership assumption may lead to libertarianism, though other hurdles (such as social‐contract theory) stand in the way. Finally, ordinary usage of the term ‘freedom” permits its application as a moralized concept to a political philosophy that has been demonstrated true. (shrink)

In Simple Rules for a Complex World, I outlined a set of legal rules that facilitate just and efficient social interactions among individuals. Frederick Schauer's critique of my book ignores the specific implications of my system in favor of a general critique of simplicity that overlooks the dangers to liberty when complex rules confer vast discretion on public figures. He also does not refer to the nonlibertarian features of my system that allow for overcoming holdout positions. These “take and pay” (...) rules explain how a system broadly protective of private property responds to well‐known two‐person (Able‐Infirm) hypothetical of the sort advanced by G. A. Cohen, which are designed to show how claims of self‐ownership lend strong support to egalitarian outcomes. (shrink)

Głównym celem tego artykułu jest wyjaśnienie, na czym polega specyfika instytucji wymogu uzyskania terytorialnego rozłożenia głosów w wyborach prezydenckich, który funkcjonuje w trzech wieloetnicznych państwach (Nigerii od 1979 r., Kenii od 1992 r. i Indonezji od 2001 r.) oraz określenie panujących w tych państwach warunków politycznych, które przyczyniły się do jej wprowadzenia i trwania. W końcowej części artykułu, dzięki porównaniu trzech kazusów, zostały wskazane szczegółowe różnice występujące obecnie między nimi. W artykule zostały również zaprezentowane wnioski dotyczące dotychczasowych doświadczeń związanych z (...) funkcjonowaniem przedmiotowej instytucji. Pozwolą one wstępnie ocenić, czy uprawnione jest stwierdzenie, że jej zastosowanie wpływa na obniżenie konfliktowych zachowań w relacjach między grupami etnicznymi i na budowanie międzyetnicznego porozumienia. (shrink)