In this paper I argue that there is a significant but often overlooked metaphysical distinction to be made between contextualism and contrastivism. The orthodox view is that contrastivism is merely a form of contextualism. This is a mistake. The contextualist view is incompatible with certain naturalist claims about the metaphysical nature of concepts within whichever domain is being investigated, while the contrastivist view is compatible with these claims. So, choosing one view over the other will involve choosing to affirm or (...) deny a significant metaphysical claim. As such, a demarcation ought to be put in place between contextualism and contrastivism. (shrink)

The paper uses the theory of generalized quantifiers to discuss existential import and its implications for Aristotelian logic, namely the square of opposition, conversions and the assertoric syllogistic, as well as for more recent generalizations to intermediate quantifiers like “most”. While this is a systematic discussion of the semantic background one should assume in order to obtain the inferences and oppositions Aristotle proposed, it also sheds some light on the interpretation of his writings. Moreover by applying tools from modern formal (...) semantics to the investigation of classical Aristotelian logic and its extensions, we combine different approaches to the logic of quantification. We will present variants of quantifiers that are associated to the four corners of the square of opposition with and without existential import and discuss their role for the logical square, conversions and the syllogistic. It will turn out that there is no way to ascribe existential import that validates all inferences and relations which one is willing to hold in Aristotelian logic. Two options, however, provide reasonable results. Existential import should either be ascribed only to affirmative statements or only be ascribed to universal quantification. The former option is preferable for a mere reconstruction of the classical Aristotelian logic while the latter option is more attractive if Aristotelian logic is generalized to intermediate quantifiers. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to present a new reconstruction of Aristotle's assertoric logic as he develops it in Prior Analytics, A1-7. This reconstruction will be much closer to Aristotle's original...

We present a system of relational syllogistic, based on classical propositional logic, having primitives of the following form: $$\begin{array}{ll}\mathbf{Some}\, a \,{\rm are} \,R-{\rm related}\, {\rm to}\, \mathbf{some} \,b;\\ \mathbf{Some}\, a \,{\rm are}\,R-{\rm related}\, {\rm to}\, \mathbf{all}\, b;\\ \mathbf{All}\, a\, {\rm are}\,R-{\rm related}\, {\rm to}\, \mathbf{some}\, b;\\ \mathbf{All}\, a\, {\rm are}\,R-{\rm related}\, {\rm to}\, \mathbf{all} \,b.\end{array}$$ Such primitives formalize sentences from natural language like ‘ All students read some textbooks’. Here a, b denote arbitrary sets (of objects), and R denotes an (...) arbitrary binary relation between objects. The language of the logic contains only variables denoting sets, determining the class of set terms, and variables denoting binary relations between objects, determining the class of relational terms. Both classes of terms are closed under the standard Boolean operations. The set of relational terms is also closed under taking the converse of a relation. The results of the paper are the completeness theorem with respect to the intended semantics and the computational complexity of the satisfiability problem. (shrink)

The Aristotelian syllogistic cannot account for the validity of certain inferences involving relational facts. In this paper, we investigate the prospects for providing a relational syllogistic. We identify several fragments based on (a) whether negation is permitted on all nouns, including those in the subject of a sentence; and (b) whether the subject noun phrase may contain a relative clause. The logics we present are extensions of the classical syllogistic, and we pay special attention to the question of whether reductio (...) ad absurdum is needed. Thus our main goal is to derive results on the existence (or nonexistence) of syllogistic proof systems for relational fragments. We also determine the computational complexity of all our fragments. (shrink)

We introduce a simple inference system based on two primitive relations between terms, namely, inclusion and exclusion relations. We present a normalization theorem, and then provide a characterization of the structure of normal proofs. Based on this, inferences in a syllogistic fragment of natural language are reconstructed within our system. We also show that our system can be embedded into a fragment of propositional minimal logic.

Adopting a different method from the previous scholars, this article deduces the remaining 23 valid syllogisms just taking the syllogism AEE-4 as the basic axiom. The basic idea of this study is as follows: firstly, make full use of the trichotomy structure of categorical propositions to formalize categorical syllogisms. Then, taking advantage of the deductive rules in classical propositional logic and the basic facts in the generalized quantifier theory, we deduce the remaining 23 valid categorical syllogisms by taking just one (...) syllogism (that is, AEE-4) as the basic axiom. This article not only reveals the reducible relations between the syllogism AEE-4 and the other 23 valid syllogisms, but also establishes a concise formal axiomatic system for categorical syllogistic logic. We hope that the results and methods will provide a good mathematical paradigm for studying other kinds of syllogistic logics, and that the project will appeal to specialists in logic, linguistic semantics, computational semantics, cognitive science and artificial intelligence. (shrink)

"However that may be, Aristotelian syllogistic concerned itself exclusively with monadic predicates. Hence it could not begin to investigate multiple quantification. And that is why it never got very far. None the less, the underlying grammar of Aristotle's logic did not in itself..

The thesis of the empirical underdetermination of theories (U-thesis) maintains that there are incompatible theories which are empirically equivalent. Whether this is an interesting thesis depends on how the term incompatible is understood. In this paper a structural explication is proposed. More precisely, the U-thesis is studied in the framework of the model theoretic or emantic approach according to which theories are not to be taken as linguistic entities, but rather as families of mathematical structures. Theories of similarity structures are (...) studied as a paradigmatic case. The structural approach further reveals that the U-thesis is related to problems of uniqueness in the representational theory of measurement, questions of geometric conventionalism, and problems of structural underdetermination in mathematics. (shrink)