The orthodox view on higher education financing is that students should bear some of the costs of attending and, where necessary, meet that cost through debt financing. New economic realties, including protracted economic slowdown and increasing austerity of the state with respect to the public funding of goods and services has meant that the same generation who have to borrow the most in order to attend face significantly fewer employment prospects upon graduation. In this context, is the current approach of (...) shifting the costs of post-secondary education from the general public to individual students justified? Most debate on the issue has focused on the demands of distributive justice within the modern higher education system and on the whole accepts the idea that students ought to pay. I argue that distributive arguments alone are insufficient because they tacitly endorse the provision of higher education as being much like a consumer's choice. As an alternative, I explore the place and importance of higher education in supporting personal autonomy as a central liberal democratic value. I then argue that debt financing of higher education places unreasonable constraints on student's choices with respect to the kind of democratic citizens that they would otherwise aspire to be. This constraint has negative implications for the wellbeing of individual students and the larger society. (shrink)

Liberal philosophers of education often concentrate on issues of accommodation and recognition coming from minority cultures within pluralistic societies. While this remains an important task, I argue that there are troubling currents within the mainstream culture that merit philosophical critique by liberals. In this thesis I situate the educational platform of liberal philosopher Eamonn Callan within critiques coming from social theorists concerned with the growing influence of the market in our culture. I argue that unless these critiques are taken seriously (...) liberals will have trouble translating their educational ideals into feasible modes of practice. I conclude by suggesting three ways in which this dialogue between liberals and social theorists can address these troubling currents. (shrink)

Drawing on recent debates about the relationship between propositional and practical knowledge, this article is concerned with broad concepts of agency. Specifically, it is concerned with agency that involves the forming and putting into effect of intentions over relatively extended periods, particularly in work contexts (called, for want of a better term, ?project management?). The main focus of interest is thus not on ?know-how? in the sense of ability to perform types of tasks but on the ability to form and (...) carry through projects. Much, although by no means all, of the limited literature on this topic assumes that such abilities are largely independent of social interaction. This article will challenge that assumption. The article concludes with a reflection on the implications of an adequate account of project management ability for contemporary debates on the relationship between propositional and practical knowledge, and examines the implications for vocational and professional education that prepares people for this type of broadly based agency for their personal development. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Different concepts of democracy are considered as they reflect deep problems in modem democratic societies such as the lack of participation by citizens, the loss of a sense of community, and excessive individualism. Three models of teaching, the executive, the therapist, and the liberationist, are then explored with regard to what students may learn about being a member of a democratic society when they are treated differently by such teachers. It is argued that while each model has its positive (...) and negative influences, the liberationist approach has the best potential for meeting some of the deficiencies of participatory forms of democratic life. (shrink)

The current age is characterised by many as secular, and a source of such a characterisation can be found in the Nietzschean claim that thoughts about there being some ultimate reality have to be jettisoned, and human existence and the world need to be embraced as they are. That claim is renewed by some secular thinkers who insist that education has to be reconceived in ways congenial to the new age. It is argued that central to their logic is the (...) dichotomy between the religious and the secular or the otherworldly and the earthly, and that this dichotomy is simplistic as well as problematic. As an alternative to the ‘two worlds’ view, the ‘two aspects’ view is suggested, with an interpretation of reality that the noumenon––the non-human––has to be taken in the negative sense. Against secularising the domain of education, it is indicated that there still remains a place for education to occupy between the two poles of religiousness and secularity. (shrink)

This paper addresses three questions raised by recent literature on the concept of ‘autonomy’. (I) Should the value of autonomy more properly be seen as a moral constraint or as a goal of action? (2) Is autonomy either possible or desirable, given the ways in which human beings are located within a situation and a community? (3) If autonomy is a desirable goal, is it a universal value or merely one appropriate to modern liberal-democratic societies? Use is made of the (...) distinction between ‘weak’ and ‘strong’ versions of the concept of ‘autonomy’, which helps to provide an answer to the first question. It is also important, however, to recognise the continuity between the weak and strong versions, and this recognition helps to supply answers to the second and third questions. (shrink)

The ‘humanisation’ of education is one of the three leitmotifs in a recent Soviet planning document A Conception of General Education. It is suggested that Western education systems also need to be humanised, although not so radically as the Soviet, by the removal of obstacles to educating pupils as members of a liberal democratic society. A future joint research agenda between East and West should concentrate on improving mutual understanding of this goal, clarifying conceptual obstacles, and reflecting on means of (...) realising it. Specific proposals are put forward under all three headings. (shrink)

This paper contrasts the model of the teacher-pupil relationship implied by instrumental 'new' era values currently being imposed on schools with that implied by a more ancient but highly relevant conception of education which is concerned with the search for personal meaning and the development of authentic understanding. It is argued that there is a significant 'poetic' dimension to the latter in which the learner's own engagement with things is celebrated and the teacher's role is essentially receptive-responsive both towards the (...) learner and the living traditions in which things receive their significance. It is suggested that the 'poetic' provides an important orientation, not just with respect to how teachers interact with children, but also with respect to the larger institutional context in which this interaction is situated. (shrink)

Educational neutrality states that decisions about school curricula and instruction should be made independently of particular comprehensive doctrines. Many political philosophers of education reject this view in favor of some non-neutral alternative. Contrary to what one might expect, some prominent liberal neutralists have also rejected this view in parts of their work. This paper has two purposes. The first part of the paper concerns the relationship between liberal neutrality and educational neutrality. I examine arguments by Rawls and Nagel and argue (...) that some of the same arguments they use to justify liberal neutrality also justify educational neutrality; thus, if we accept these arguments for liberal neutrality, we should also accept educational neutrality. The second part of the paper defends educational neutrality against objections that it is impossible and objections that it is undesirable. (shrink)

The paper examines two recent arguments, by Keith Graham and Richard Norman, to the effect that a liberal individualist foundation is insufficient for a socialist conception of democracy and needs to be replaced or supplemented by collectivist notions [I]. It concludes that these arguments are unsound and that a defensible education for democratic citizenship on socialist lines should be based on liberal values, not least that of personal autonomy. At the same time it concedes to collectivism that socialist democracy needs (...) to operate within a social framework, but sees national communities rather than social classes or smaller-scale groupings as the most promising candidates for this. (shrink)

The Dutch education system relies upon a large number of publicly-subsidized, denominational schools. The authors defend the importance of schools that educate children within a specific — including denominational — conception of the good by arguing for the importance of such a conception for the development of the child's identity. An essential component of this developmental process is critical reflection, conceived as crucial to the formation of moral autonomy.

A popular justification of education for autonomy is that autonomy possession has intrinsic prudential value. Communitarians have argued, however, that although autonomy may be a core element of a well-lived life in liberal societies, it cannot claim such a prudential pedigree in traditional societies in which the conception of a good life is intimately tied to the acceptance of a pre-established worldview. In this paper I examine a recent attempt made by Ishtiyaque Haji and Stefaan Cuypers to respond to this (...) challenge by reestablishing the intrinsic prudential value of autonomy, and I argue that although their work has merit in some respects, it suffers from a notable theoretical deficiency as well as a practical deficiency. Like Haji and Cuypers, I wish to argue that autonomy has intrinsic prudential value; but my argument is not grounded on the claim that autonomy is a necessary part of well-being. I argue, rather, that it stands to reason—and that liberals and traditionalists alike have reason to accept—that autonomous assent to a conception of the good life is an intrinsically prudentially better state of affairs than nonautonomous assent to the same. My goal in this essay, then, is to clarify the prudential significance of (and to provide a justification for) education for autonomy in a manner that will be appealing to liberals and traditionalists alike. (shrink)

This paper argues that egalitarianism, in itself and as a basis for educational policy, is unacceptable. Three recent defences of it are examined and rejected. Three anti-egalitarian positions, however, all of which stress sufficiency rather than equality, pass muster. Educational implications are followed through, with reference to mixed ability grouping, selection, equal opportunities in education and conflicting views about the minimum content of a common school curriculum.

The earlier much discussed issue of a society's right to educate the young is the starting point for various observations regarding education itself. A distinction is drawn between additive and transformative conceptions of education, the latter seeking to bring about changes to the learner's subjective self as reflected in a tripartite division of entities intended by the phenomenological self. Despite liberal or progressive educators' intuitive preference for the transformative conception, it may be asked whether this may not infringe the learner's (...) rights, however worthy the educator's motives or benign the intended outcomes. This possibility is rejected, however, on grounds of the learner's residual freedom to criticise the educator's values, the necessity of value assumptions as the essential basis of moral freedom and the unpredictability of human perceptions and responses, given the potential gap between the intentions and perceptions of the emitter of language and the understandings of the receiver. (shrink)

Difficulties in liberal secularism are considered in relation to the views of ethnic minorities and in terms of the misleading nature of its supposed neutrality and objectivity. Cultural liberalism is seen in contrast to be committed to the preservation of other cultures and to celebrating diversity. This might avoid relativism and, within the Wisdom Tradition, offer a mutual enrichment and better access to truth. The practice of religious education can be seen as implicating the general behaviour of the teacher and (...) the ethos of the school. A postmodernist pedagogy, involving dialogue with text and teacher, might both respect diversity and recover a sense of mystery. Reassessment of the relationship between knowledge and morality might lead to new practice in moral education, with relevant activities leading beyond the facts towards reflection on values. Moral education might also go beyond the intellect to encourage appropriate emotional dispositions in a communicative ethics. The dominance of certain metaphors in the language of cultural identity and authenticity channels thinking: this needs to be questioned. (shrink)

Journal of Philosophy of Education, EarlyView.