This paper explores the nature of rights, and their implications for the ethics of nursing. A right is seen as an entitlement which is justified on moral and/or legal grounds, and which may take the form of a right of action or a right of recipience, or both; in either case, correlative duties are generally imposed on others. Some of the conflicts which can occur among two or more conflicting rights are examined through three hypothetical scenarios, and approaches to their (...) resolution are suggested. The question of whether nurses, as nurses, possess rights is then considered, and it is suggested that they do not. In conclusion, it is argued that, if rights are to be a helpful concept, they must be carefully defined and analysed, and their relationship to one another, and to duties, must be clarified. Cet article étudie la nature des droits et leur implications pour l'éthique des soins infirmiers. Un droit reste sur des bases morales et légales et peut prendre la forme d'un droit d'action ou d'un droit de récipience ou des deux formes ensembles. En chaque instant, des devoirs corrélatifs sont normalement imposés à d'autres personnes. Quelques uns des conflits qui peuvent arriver entre deux (ou plusieurs) droits opposés sont considérés ici par trois possibilités hypothétiques et des possibilités de résoudre les problèmes sont proposées. Enfin, la question est considérée si les infirmiers/ères possèdent des droits en tels qu'infirmiers/ères, et il est proposé qu'ils/elles ne les possèdent pas. En conclusion, il est proposé que pour les droits d'être utiles, ils doivent être bien définis et analysés et les relations entre eux et envers les devoirs doivent être bien claires. Dieser Artikel erforscht des Wesen der Rechte und deren Auswirkungen in der Krankenpflegeethik. Ein Recht hat moralische oder legale Gründe und nimmt die Form entweder eines Rechtes der Aktion oder eines Rechtes des Empfanges, oder beider Arten. In allen Fällen sind entsprechende Pflichten anderen aufgelegt. Einige Konflikte, die unter zwei (oder mehreren) Rechten entstehen können, sind hier untersucht an Hilfe von drei hypothetischen Szenarien. Möglichkeiten für die Lösung der Probleme sind vorgeschlagen. Anschliessend wird die Frage, ob das Krankenpflegepersonal Rechte hat - als Personal - betrachtet, und es ist vorgeschlagen, dass solche Rechte nicht bestehen. Zum Abschluss wird vorgeschlagen dass Rechte hilfreich sind wenn sie sorgfältig analysiert und festgelegt sind und wenn deren Beziehung zu einander und zu Pflechten klar ist. (shrink)

The objective of the article is to examine the human rights enforcement in Indonesian legal and political system. This is done by studying the legal basis of human rights, the process of proliferation of human rights discourse, and the actual controversies of human rights enforcement. The study has the effect of highlighting some of the immense deficits in ensuring that violations are treated under judicial procedure and the protection of human rights is available and accessible for victims. The author inevitably (...) came into a conclusion that the openness of legal and political arenas for human rights discourses is not followed with a tangible impact on the entitlement positions of the people. The problems of the weak institutions and the unenthusiastic enforcement show that, in Indonesia, human rights are formally adopted as a political strategy to avoid substantial implementation. (shrink)

Argues, against Anscombe, that Aristotle had the concept of morality as an interpersonal normative order: morality is justice in general. For an action to be wrong is not for it to warrant blame, or to wrong another person, but to be something one should not do that one has no right to do. In the absence of rights, morality makes no sense.

This article deals with the conceptual features and the rational justification of moral rights. For this purpose, the author starts with a common classification of rights, i.e., the distinction between rights in rem and rights in personam. He argues that rights of the first kind can be justified by a two‐fold application of the principle of universalizability, while the latter are based on moral rules concerning special social relations, rules which themselves are founded on the principle of universalizability. This distinction, (...) however, does not suffice to cover a further category of rights that play a very important role in social life, namely the rights of community membership, i.e., the particular rights that exist between the members of a social community. These rights cannot be derived from universalizability alone, but, instead, are based on the idea of social justice. This paper provides a short account of the main principles of social justice, and tries to apply them to property and welfare rights. (shrink)

Moral rights feature prominently and are relied on substantially in debates in bioethics. Conceptually, however, duties can perform the logical work of rights, but not vice versa, and reference to rights is therefore inessential. Normatively, rights, like duties, depend on more basic moral values or principles, and attempts to establish the logical priority of rights over duties or the reverse are misguided. In practical decision making, however, an analysis in terms of duties is more fruitful than one based on rights. (...) A right may function as a proxy term for a consequentialist rule, or for a deontological constraint, but does not thereby enrich these concepts. Rights may also help in a purely expressive sense and may assist an initial focusing on a moral conflict. However, their role in bioethics discourse is more one of convenience than of necessity. Moreover, unless rights are firmly founded on fundamental moral values, their use encourages rhetoric rather than argument. (shrink)

In the United States, hate speech sits at the intersection of ethical and legal debates and has a complex relationship with journalism. The First Amendment provides broad legal protections for hate...

In a series of papers in the early 1970s and in his important book _Abortion and the Sanctity of Human Life_ (1975), Baruch Brody offered what remains to this day one of the most philosophically rigorous contributions to the debate concerning the morality of abortion and the ethics of homicide more generally. In this paper I would like to critically examine Brody’s argument that abortion is sometimes justifiable in some cases even when (1) one cannot claim self-defense, or (2) diminished (...) responsibility, and (3) the abortion is a ‘killing’ rather than a ‘not saving.’ This justification, I argue, is limited to certain cases in which the life of the mother is at stake. The cautious principle which he finally formulates merits serious attention and consideration. While I find a great deal of value in Brody’s discussion, I will argue that there are several difficulties with the principle of justifiable homicide he constructs. Accordingly, I will further amend and supplement his final version by offering my own alternative principle. (shrink)