This paper tackles the main changes that have taken place in the mechanical worldview of simple, self-regulating and intelligent machines, and studies their repercussions at the ethical and organisational level. These views of machines agree with the scientific, human-relations and postmodern proposals in organisation theory, in that they are in fact reflections on human nature which depend on metaphorical devices within which the machine metaphor is central.

This essay is, primarily, a discussion of four results about the principle of maximizing entropy (MAXENT) and its connections with Bayesian theory. Result 1 provides a restricted equivalence between the two: where the Bayesian model for MAXENT inference uses an "a priori" probability that is uniform, and where all MAXENT constraints are limited to 0-1 expectations for simple indicator-variables. The other three results report on an inability to extend the equivalence beyond these specialized constraints. Result 2 established a sensitivity of (...) MAXENT inference to the choice of the algebra of possibilities even though all empirical constraints imposed on the MAXENT solution are satisfied in each measure space considered. The resulting MAXENT distribution is not invariant over the choice of measure space. Thus, old and familiar problems with the Laplacian principle of Insufficient Reason also plague MAXENT theory. Result 3 builds upon the findings of Friedman and Shimony (1971; 1973) and demonstrates the absence of an exchangeable, Bayesian model for predictive MAXENT distributions when the MAXENT constraints are interpreted according to Jaynes's (1978) prescription for his (1963) Brandeis Dice problem. Lastly, Result 4 generalizes the Friedman and Shimony objection to cross-entropy (Kullback-information) shifts subject to a constraint of a new odds-ratio for two disjoint events. (shrink)

When Whitehead's views of relativity are mentioned, everyone thinks of the views Whitehead published between 1919 and 1924. Concerning these views, C. D. Broad is “depressed”1 that physicists paid so little attention. And Victor Lowe has written:There is a bare possibility that Whitehead's theory of relativity may yet affect the history of science.

This paper considers combinations of frictionless mechanical amplifiers arranged in a cycle so that the amplified signal passes around through an endless chain of such systems the output of the last system being fed into the first. It appears that while each amplifier may be reversible in the absence of friction, the effect of the combination is such that the signal would be unable to pass around the cycle indefinitely, using the same energy over and over again. It is felt (...) that the assumptions upon which this cycle is based are related to some of the conditions met with in consideration of open thermodynamic systems such as heat engines and living organisms when in finite environments. (shrink)

This paper situates Bogdanov in the context of social theory generally and socialist theory in particular. It outlines briefly the principal characteristics of his mature system, and assesses the strengths and weaknesses of his approach to the fundamental problems of social thought. The paper devotes particular attention to the problem of just how systems develop from less complex to more complex forms of organization, and evaluates Bogdanov’s solution to this problem against the background of populist, social democratic, and Leninist alternatives.

: Few concepts have created more sound and fury than the concepts of development and environment. The difficulty associated with these concepts increases exponentially when one attempts to clarify them by adding some attributes such as concrete definitions and measurements pertaining to the quantity and quality of these concepts. This essay deals with the private, for-profit corporation as the primary agent in the process of satisfying the human struggle for survival. This agent has been the epicenter of the "development-environment" issue (...) for quite some time. Further, this agent has been frequently singled out as the most important, if not the exclusive, contributor to society's inability to achieve the desired "sustainable development," whatever meaning one attaches to it. We present a framework for designing a "new" type of organization which will be environmentally sustainable. This Environmentally Sustainable Organization (ESO) resembles a living organism that pursues its own survival in an environment with finite natural resources and infinite human desires. (shrink)

A weak version of the life-mind continuity thesis entails that every living system also has a basic mind (with a non-representational form of intentionality). The strong version entails that the same concepts that are sufficient to explain basic minds (with non-representational states) are also central to understanding non-basic minds (with representational states). We argue that recent work on the free energy principle supports the following claims with respect to the life-mind continuity thesis: (i) there is a strong continuity between life (...) and mind; (ii) all living systems can be described as if they had representational states; (iii) the ’as-if representationality’ entailed by the free energy principle is central to understanding both basic forms of intentionality and intentionality in non-basic minds. In addition to this, we argue that the free energy principle also renders realism about computation and representation compatible with a strong life-mind continuity thesis (although the free energy principle does not entail computational and representational realism). In particular, we show how representationality proper can be grounded in ’as-if representationality’. (shrink)

A quarter of a century has elapsed since quantum mechanics was discovered. Perhaps it is not too much to say, in retrospect, that the time was ripe for this particular development. This is attested, not only by the speed with which the edifice of the theory was completed immediately following the basic discoveries of Heisenberg and Schrödinger, but also by the rapidity, well-nigh unprecedented in the history of science with which the new results were applied to almost every branch of (...) physics and chemistry. A mental readiness on the part of the scientists involved might have had much more to do with this than the facilities of modern communication systems. (shrink)

The subjectivism of the Austrian school of economics is a special case of Dewey's transactional philosophy, also known as pragmatism or pragmatic epistemology. The Austrian economists Carl Friedrich Menger (1840-1921) and Ludwig von Mises (1881-1973) adopted an Aristotelian deductive approach to economic issues such as social behavior and exchange. Like Menger and Mises, Friedrich A. Hayek (1899-1992) viewed scientific knowledge, even in the social sciences, as asserting and aiming for objective certainty. Hayek was particularly critical of attempts to apply the (...) empiricism of the natural sciences in the social sciences. Though Hayek was not a positivist in the sense ascribed to Milton Friedman (1912-), because he accepted the possibility of final, objective certainty, Hayek's view of scientific knowledge was closer to that of the logical positivists of the Vienna circle than to Dewey's pragmatism. Mises' a priorism, asserting and aiming for apodictic certainty, represented a more extreme form of objectivism even than Hayek's. Mises was similar in this regard to non-Austrian axiomatists such as Gerard Debreau (1921-2005), though he joined Hayek in eschewing mathematical formalism. In Dewey's contrasting view, the scientist commends new, alternative ways of knowing to the scientific community, offering more profound insight or more efficacious practical applications. Alternative ways of knowing which do not offer practical or intellectual benefits are to be rejected. Both the radical subjectivism of the Austrian school and Dewey's transactional strategy justify rejection of the mirage of social justice. Dewey's knowledge as ways of knowing suggests a broader and more fundamental critique of the socialist position in the calculation debate. The arguments presented by the Austrian school can be reformulated in terms of Dewey's pragmatic philosophy. (shrink)

Clinical fields of the “sciences of the mind” (psychotherapy, psychiatry, etc.) lack integrative conceptual frameworks that have explanatory power. Mainly descriptive-classificatory taxonomies like DSM dominate the field. New taxonomies such as Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) aim to collect scientific knowledge regarding “systems” for “processes” of the brain. These terms have a supradisciplinary” meaning if they are considered in context of Systems Science. This field emerges as a platform of theories like general systems theory, catastrophe theory, synergetics, chaos theory, etc. It (...) provides a lot of abstract concepts, constructs, methods and models. We assume that these tools also enable theoretical integration in the diversified field of clinical practice in the sciences of the mind. Additionally, systems thinking in clinical psychology improves conceptual links to currently network-oriented neurobiology. However, clear definitions of systemic terms are necessary to emerge from their mainly metaphorical use. Here we revise mainly terms like “structure”, “process” and “dynamics” as they are used already in psychology, psychoanalysis, psychopathology and psychiatry in an ill-defined way. For instance, affective-cognitive structures like “life space” or “object representations” can be seen as products of mental processing. These structures, in turn, modulate dynamics of mental processes. Additionally, we suggest a coupled network concept of emotions and motivations as the main subsystem that modulates mental dynamics that results in a qualitative systemic model of the mind. Finally, we assume that a revisited systemic approach could improve interdisciplinary understanding of the mental. ystem for mental dynamics. In this context, we assume that a revisited systemic approach could improve interdisciplinary understanding of the mental. (shrink)

The potential societal impacts of automation using intelligent control and communications technologies have emerged as topics in a number of recent writings and public policy initiatives. Many of these expressions have referenced the writings and research efforts of Herbert Simon (1961), Norbert Wiener (1948), and contemporaries from their early technological and social vantage points concerning the future of technology and society. Constructed entities labeled as “thinking machines” (such as IBM’s Watson as well as intelligent chatbot and robotic systems) have also (...) played significant roles in this discourse. This paper provides an historical sequencing then analyzes a selection of writings produced since the 1940s concerning the economic and social issues involving artificial intelligence (AI) research and applications. The paper explores how overstatements and hyperbolic themes and concepts, often stemming from AI’s early periods, are being employed in characterizations of current AI approaches in apparently opportunistic attempts to provide rhetorical support for various large-scale business and societal initiatives. It also addresses the relative neglect of the consideration of many of AI’s sociotechnical failures and discontinued approaches in recent examinations of automation and social welfare issues. The paper discusses the moral logic of AI researchers and developers providing reasonable and measured narratives in public discourse rather than hyperbole, efforts that can empower decision makers to make sounder judgments concerning the technology’s current and future applications as well as allocate the rewards of the technology more equitably. (shrink)

Cybernetics, or self-governance of animal and machine, requires the ability to sense the world and to act on it in an appropriate manner. Likewise, self-governance of a human society requires groups of people to collectively sense and act on their environment. I argue that the evolution of political systems is characterized by a series of innovations that attempt to solve two ‘scalability’ problems: scaling up a group’s ability to make sense of an increasingly complex world, and to cooperate in increasingly (...) larger groups. I then explore some recent efforts toward using the Internet and social media to provide alternative means for addressing these scalability challenges, under the banners of crowdsourcing and computer-supported argumentation. I present some lessons from those efforts about the limits of technology, and the research directions more likely to bear fruit. (shrink)

Four experiments investigated the effects of probability manipulations on the indicative four card selection task (Wason, 1966, 1968). All looked at the effects of high and low probability antecedents (p) and consequents (q) on participants' data selections when determining the truth or falsity of a conditional rule, if p then q . Experiments 1 and 2 also manipulated believability. In Experiment 1, 128 participants performed the task using rules with varied contents pretested for probability of occurrence. Probabilistic effects were observed (...) which were partly consistent with some probabilistic accounts but not with non-probabilistic approaches to selection task performance. No effects of believability were observed, a finding replicated in Experiment 2 which used 80 participants with standardised and familiar contents. Some effects in this experiment appeared inconsistent with existing probabilistic approaches. To avoid possible effects of content, Experiments 3 (48 participants) and 4 (20 participants) used abstract material. Both experiments revealed probabilistic effects. In the Discussion we examine the compatibility of these results with the various models of selection task performance. (shrink)

Machines and Biology have been, since antiquity, closely related. From the zoological figures present in astronomical simulacra, through renaissance mechanical imitations of animals, through Decartes' wind pipe nerves, to present day discussions on the computer and the brain, runs a continuous thread. In fact, the very name of mechanism for an attitude of inquiry throughout the history of Biology reveals this at a philosophical level. More often than not, mechanism is mentioned in opposition to vitalism, as an assertion of the (...) validity of the objectivity principle in biology: there are no purposes in animal nature; its apparent purposefulness is similar to the purposefulness of machines. Yet, the fact that one picks machines as a set of objects comparable to living systems, deserves a closer look. What in machines makes it possible to establish such a connection? (shrink)

The paper presents the analysis of the philosophical roots of cybernetic thinking and its links to the important scientific trends. The programs launched by cybernetics have justified the accents placed on ‘intentionality’, ‘teleological worlds’, ‘worlds of the artificial’. The founder of cybernetics, Norbert Wiener, emphasized what he called ‘human use’ or ‘human dimensions’ of cybernetics and its applications.

The research reported in this document has been sponsored by the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, OAR, under Contract AF61 ‐640 with the European Office of Aerospace Research, United States Air Force; by the Aeronautical Systems Division of the Air Force Systems Command, United States Air Force, through the European Office of the Office of Aerospace Research, under Contract AF61‐402, and by the US Department of the Army, through its European Research Office, under Contract No. DA‐91‐591‐EUC‐3216.

The paper argues that contemporary consciousness studies can profit from Charles S. Peirce’s philosophy of consciousness. It confronts mainstream tendencies in contemporary consciousness studies, including those which consider consciousness as an unsolvable mystery, with Peirce’s phenomenological approach to consciousness. Peirce’s answers to the following contemporary issues are presented: phenomenological consciousness and the qualia, consciousness as self-controlled agency of humans, self-control and self-reflection, consciousness and language, self-consciousness and introspection, consciousness and the other, consciousness of nonhuman animals, and the question of a (...) quasi-consciousness of the physical universe. A detailed account of Peirce’s three modes of consciousness is presented: primisense, qualisense or feeling-consciousness, altersense, and medisense, the consciousness of cognition, thought, and reasoning. In contrast to consciousness studies that establish a rather sharp dividing line between conscious and unconscious states of mind, Peirce adopts the principle of synechism, the theory of continuity. For him, consciousness is a matter of degree. An important difference between Peirce’s concept of qualia and current theories of qualia in human consciousness is discussed. The paper shows how consciousness, according to Peirce, emerges from unconscious qualia and vanishes into equally unconscious habits. It concludes with a study of the roles of qualia, habit, and self-control in Peirce’s theory of signs, in particular in qualisigns and symbols, and the question of signs as quasi-conscious agents in semiosis. (shrink)

This paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of one of science's most pervasive and flexible metaprinciples;optimalityis used to explain utility maximization in economics, least effort principles in physics, entropy in chemistry, and survival of the fittest in biology. Fermat's principle of least time involves both teleological and causal considerations, two distinct modes of explanation resting on poorly understood psychological primitives. The rationality heuristic in economics provides an example from social science of the potential biases arising from the extreme flexibility of (...) optimality considerations, including selective search for confirming vidence, ex post rationalization, and the confusion of prediction with explanation. Commentators are asked to reflect on the extent to which optimality is an organizing principle of nature, a set of relatively unconnected techniques of science, a normative principle for rational choice and social organization, a metaphysical way of looking at the world, or something else still. (shrink)