It is commonly assumed that blameworthiness is epistemically constrained. If one lacks sufficient epistemic access to the fact that some action harms another, then one cannot be blamed for harming. Acceptance of an epistemic condition for blameworthiness can give rise to a worry, however: could agents ever successfully evade blameworthiness by deliberately stunting their epistemic position? I discuss a particularly worrisome version of such epistemic shirking, in which agents pre-emptively seek to avoid access to potentially morally relevant facts. As Roy (...) Sorensen and Jan Willem Wieland have argued, we seem to be faced with a potentially troubling regress when trying to explain what goes wrong in such situations. I argue that the solution to this so-called Shirker Problem is not to be found in complicated and demanding anti-shirking-principles with universal scope and potentially self-reflexive content. Instead, careful consideration of the necessary motivational make-up of genuine shirkers reveals their ignorance to lack the necessary depth to be exculpatory. Since shirkers by definition react to the possibility of the revelation of morally relevant facts with acts of epistemic self-limitation, they necessarily prove guilty of a form of culpable moral recklessness. Epistemic shirking thus does not pose a worrisome problem for ethical theory. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Should animal advocates be allowed to publicly display graphic footage of how animals live (and die) in industrial animal use facilities? Cube of truth (‘cube’) demonstrations are a form of animal advocacy aimed at informing the public about the realities of animals’ experiences in places such as slaughterhouses, feedlots, and research facilities, by showing footage of mostly lawful practices within these workplaces. Activists engaging in cube-style protests have recently been targeted by law enforcement agencies in two Australian states on the (...) basis that the footage on display was too offensive to be shown in public. In this paper, I argue that these justifications do not stand up to scrutiny. Using an original politics of sight analysis, this paper demonstrates how the democratic costs associated with targeting cube protests outweigh the costs to the public. Cube activists are engaging in public dialogue by drawing attention to sites of potential injustice, and are playing an important role in highlighting the agency of the animals involved in exploitative industries. I further make the case that, where such demonstrations fall foul of the law, they should be regarded as legitimate acts of civil disobedience. (shrink)

Obgleich die Ausdrücke ‚moralische Pflicht’ und ‚moralische Verantwortung’ auf den ersten Blick nahezu austauschbar scheinen, ist in einigen Debatten dennoch fast ausschließlich von moralischer Verantwortung die Rede. Dies gilt insbesondere für die moralische Beurteilung von individuellen Handlungen in kollektiven Kontexten. Hier scheint die Rede von einer ‚kollektiven Verantwortung‘ besonders attraktiv zu sein. In diesem Aufsatz setze ich mich diesem Trend entgegen und argumentiere dafür, dem Pflichtbegriff in kollektiven Kontexten gegenüber dem Begriff der Verantwortung den Vorrang zu geben. Mein Fokus liegt (...) hierbei auf einer bestimmten Art von Handlungen in kollektiven Kontexten, nämlich auf Handlungen in sogenannten Aggregatkollektiven. Von Aggregatkollektiven verursachte Schäden sind häufig kumulative Schäden, bei denen die Handlungen der Mitglieder eines Aggregatkollektivs einzeln betrachtet keinen merklichen Unterschied für das Auftreten des Schadens machen. Die Rede von Verantwortung legt ein Haftbarkeitsmodell moralischer Verantwortung nahe, welches sich in Bezug auf Handlungen in Aggregatkollektiven als problematisch erweist. Ich zeige, dass Kants Konzeption unvollkommener Pflichten eine vielversprechende Alternative zu dem kausal gefärbten Begriff der moralischen Verantwortung darstellt. Durch den Spielraum, den unvollkommene Pflichten Akteuren lassen, bieten sie eine ähnliche Offenheit wie der Begriff der moralischen Verantwortung. Anders als die Zuschreibung von Verantwortung vermeidet die Rede von unvollkommenen Pflichten jedoch die in kollektiven Kontexten oft inadäquate und kontraproduktive Assoziation von Haftung und Schuld. (shrink)

Public health communications often attempt to persuade their audience to adopt a particular belief or pursue a particular course of action. To a large extent, the ethical defensibility of persuasion appears to be assumed by public health practitioners; however, a handful of academic treatments have called into question the ethical defensibility of persuasive risk- and health communication. In addition, the widespread use of persuasive tactics in public health communications warrants a close look at their ethical status, irrespective of previous critiques. (...) In this article, we review some ethical objections previously advanced against the use of persuasion in public health communications, and also consider some novel but potentially relevant objections. We conclude that persuasion is ethically problematic in some circumstances and attempt to clarify what these circumstances are. However, whereas persuasion may be ethically problematic in some circumstances, it need not be viewed as intrinsically problematic. (shrink)

In this article, I will argue that ethical veganism can be understood as a form of quietism, as a quiet retreat from a world burdened by human moral failings and animal suffering. I will also show how this retreat, although quiet in nature, is both a legitimate and valuable form of genuine resistance to animal oppression. Positing ethical veganism as a form of sociopolitical resistance to animal exploitation is not new, but thinking of it as a quietist retreat and a (...) legitimate and valuable form of quiet resistance is a different matter. (shrink)

Paul-Mikhail Podosky introduces the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice and argues that non-human animals are often the subjects of such injustice. In this paper, I argue that although the notion of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice is coherent, Podosky’s examples – including his primary case of non-human animals – are not instances of it. I attempt to show that an epistemology of ignorance serves as a better theoretical basis for Podosky’s argument. In the final section of the paper, I discuss a case (...) that, at first glance, seems to be one of other-oriented hermeneutical injustice. However, I argue that ultimately an epistemology of ignorance gives us a better account of the case. (shrink)

Kant claims that animal suffering only matters if it affects us indirectly by making us more callous toward other persons. This seems inconsistent with Kant’s formal moral theory, and it seems to entail that we are morally better off if we remain willfully ignorant of animal suffering. In defense of Kant’s indirect view, I explain how psychological facts should play a role in the application of the categorical imperative. I then give three responses to the objection that Kant encourages willful (...) ignorance. First, supporting practices of animal exploitation facilitates a system that harms workers. Second, moral ignorance as a habit of mind makes us more likely to ignore morally relevant harm to other persons. Third, remaining intentionally ignorant is not in keeping with our capacity for intellectual self-determination. (shrink)

There has been growing global interest in livestock animal welfare. Previous research into attitudes towards animal welfare has focused on Europe and the United States, with comparatively little focus on Australia, which is an important location due to the prominent position of agriculture economically and culturally. In this article, we present results from qualitative research on how Australian meat consumers conceptualise sheep and beef cattle welfare. The study was conducted in two capital cities (Melbourne, Victoria and Adelaide, South Australia) and (...) a much smaller rural centre (Toowoomba, Queensland) using focus groups (involving 40.9% of participants) and mall-intercept interviews (59.1% of participants), totalling 66 participants. Qualitative analysis highlights that participants had clear ideas of what it means for an animal to live a ‘good life’ and experience a ‘good death,’ with their beliefs strongly tied to their expectations and cultural understandings of what Australian agriculture ‘should be.’ In response to open-ended questions, participants expressed attitudes that relied on romanticised visions of the ‘rural idyll’ as seen in frequent discussions about what is ‘normal’ for sheep meat and beef production, and relatedly, what count as ‘natural behaviours.’ Many participants rejected anything associated with the ‘other,’ classifying it as not ‘normal’: we argue that which is not considered normal, including intensive production, foreign ownership, and halal slaughter practices, appear to place participants’ conceptualizations of an animal’s ‘good death,’ and in turn the potential for a ‘good life,’ at risk. (shrink)

In this research, we develop a reporting framework based on an ethical account of the Australian live sheep export industry’s current operations. We demonstrate that LSE operates within a legitimacy vacuum constituted by a repeated cycle of events that we characterize as scandal-response-obduracy with a constant factor being animal cruelty on an industrial scale. The lack of legitimacy is facilitated by an obdurate regulatory context, an absence of consumer awareness of industry practices, jurisdictional impediments to enforcement of animal cruelty laws (...) and foundational epistemic vices upon which the industry calculates an unethical cost benefit analysis of current practice. While legitimacy theory would expect demise of the LSE industry, its prolonged continuation is more than a curiosity. It presents an opportunity to understand how focus on vice epistemics and reporting of animal welfare may contribute to emancipatory change in the form of improved animal welfare in agricultural industries. (shrink)

In this paper we try to identify the roots of the persistent contemporary problems in our modernized agriculture: overproduction, loss of biodiversity and of soil fertility, the risk of large animal disease, social controversies on the lack of animal welfare and culling of animals, etc. Attention is paid to the historical development of present-day farming in Holland as an example of European agriculture. We see a blinkered quest for efficiency in the industrialization of agriculture since the Second World War. Key (...) factor is the cultural mindset at the foundation of our modern society, originating from the ideas of the enlightenment. It makes people vulnerable to ideologies, causing them to focus on a certain goal without considering the consequences. Due to the overemphasis on efficiency, modern industrial agriculture has never been comfortably embedded in its ecological and social context, and as a result displays the characteristics of an ideology. The cause of the inability to solve today’s problems is therefore deeper than simply a failure to apply the right mix of standard remedies. Unless stakeholders in farming start to counter this very one-sided approach to efficiency, modernization will continue to cause all kinds of friction. The implications of the results for agricultural policy, farming and further research are discussed. (shrink)