Drawing on empirical material from social psychology, ‘situationism’ argues that the astonishing susceptibility of moral behaviour to situational influences undermines certain conceptions of character. The related, albeit more limited, thesis proposed in this paper, ‘embodied situationism’, engages a larger number of empirical sources from different fields of study and sheds light on the mechanisms responsible for particular, seemingly puzzling, situational judgments and behaviours. It is demonstrated that the empirical material supports the claims of ES and that ES is immune to (...) some important objections against situationism. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to defend, and in so doing clarify, the claim that the affective component of emotional experience plays an essential explanatory role in the acquisition of evaluative knowledge. In particular, it argues that the phenomenally conscious affective component of emotional experience provides the subject with the epistemic access to the semantic value of evaluative concepts. The core argument relies on a comparison with the role played by the phenomenal character of perceptual experience in the acquisition (...) of knowledge of colours. The upshot is that it is a disanalogy with perceptual experience that explains the essential role of affective experience in acquiring evaluative knowledge, namely its motivational component. (shrink)

Debates about the legitimacy of embryonic stem-cell research have largely focused on the type of ethical value that should be accorded to the human embryo in␣vitro. In this paper, I try to show that, to broaden the scope of these debates, one needs to articulate an ontology that does not limit itself to biological accounts, but that instead focuses on the embryo’s place in a totality of relevance surrounding and guiding a human practice. Instead of attempting to substantiate the ethical (...) value of the embryo exclusively by pointing out that it has potentiality for personhood, one should examine the types of practices in which the embryo occurs and focus on the ends inherent to these practices. With this emphasis on context, it becomes apparent that the embryo’s ethical significance can only be understood by elucidating the attitudes that are established towards it in the course of specific activities. The distinction between fertilized embryos and cloned embryos proves to be important in this contextual analysis, since, from the point of view of practice, the two types of embryos appear to belong to different human practices: (assisted) procreation and medical research, respectively. In my arguments, I highlight the concepts of practice, technology, and nature, as they have been analyzed in the phenomenological tradition, particularly by Martin Heidegger. I come to the conclusion that therapeutic cloning should be allowed, provided that it turns out to be a project that benefits medical science in its aim to battle diseases. Important precautions have to be taken, however, in order to safeguard the practice of procreation from becoming perverted by the aims and attitudes of medical science when the two practices intersect. The threat in question needs to be taken seriously, since it concerns the structure and goal of practices which are central to our very self understanding as human beings. (shrink)

The availability of a range of new psychotropic agents raises the possibility that these will be used for enhancement purposes (smart pills, happy pills, and pep pills). The enhancement debate soon raises questions in philosophy of medicine and psychiatry (eg, what is a disorder?), and this debate in turn raises fundament questions in philosophy of language, science, and ethics. In this paper, a naturalistic conceptual framework is proposed for addressing these issues. This framework begins by contrasting classical and critical concepts (...) of categories, and then puts forward an integrative position that is based on cognitive-affective research. This position can in turn be used to consider the debate between pharmacological Calvinism (which may adopt a moral metaphor of disorder) and psychotropic utopianism (which may emphasize a medical metaphor of disorder). I argue that psychiatric treatment of serious psychiatric disorders is justified, and that psychotropics are an acceptable kind of intervention. The use of psychotropics for sub-threshold phenomena requires a judicious weighing of the relevant facts (which are often sparse) and values. (shrink)

This paper explores one facet of Paul Russell’s unique “critical compatibilist” position on moral responsibility, which concerns his rejection of R. Jay Wallace’s “narrow construal” of moral responsibility as a concept tied exclusively to the Strawsonian reactive attitudes of resentment, indignation, and guilt. After explaining Russell’s critique of Wallace’s view, the paper considers a Wallace-inspired challenge based on the idea that questions of moral responsibility raise distinct issues of “fairness” that apply only to a narrow subset of the Strawsonian reactive (...) attitudes. The paper offers a defense of Russell’s view against this challenge. (shrink)

Huw Price’s subject naturalism has emerged as a leading pragmatist position within recent debates surrounding philosophical naturalism. Unlike orthodox views which tend to be guided by metaphysical questions about the “place” of, for instance, the mind, meaning, and morality within the natural world, subject naturalism focuses philosophical attention on language-users and the functions that certain concepts play within discursive practices. This paper considers two objections to subject naturalism and argues that they can be overcome by looking to the methodological insights (...) of philosophical genealogy. Although Price occasionally characterizes his project as a kind of genealogy, he offers little explanation of what such a methodological orientation is supposed to involve. I suggest that subject naturalists ought to remedy this theoretical lacuna by looking to the work of Bernard Williams. On the one hand, doing so can serve a diagnostic function: Williams’ conception of genealogy affords a perspective from which subject naturalism’s explanatory inadequacies are more clearly understood. On the other hand, Williams’ elaborated conception of genealogy represents a path by which the subject naturalist can overcome the shortcomings discussed in this paper. (shrink)

Traditionally the study of computer ethics involves taking students who are not philosophically trained, exposing them to action-guiding theories, presenting them with the codes of ethics of several companies and professional organizations and asking them to make ethical decisions in scenario-based cases. This approach is deliberately action-based and focuses on doing. "What would you do?" is the traditional question we ask our students. While this pedagogical methodology forces them to examine situations and argue from a particular point of view, it (...) does little to influence their character. They see the utilitarian or deontologist as someone other than themselves. There seems to be very little internalization of these action-based theories.Virtue Ethics offers character-forming theory that has been more successful with my students than the action-based theories of computer ethics texts. Why? Virtue Ethics is directed toward character development. The focus is on being rather than doing. It presents a good heuristic or approach to the problem of moral agency. Virtue ethics offers a way of teaching self-reflection through narratives that focus on core values, heroes and moral exemplars. It is grounded in practical wisdom. It is experiential, learning to care about the self, others, the community, living the good life, flourishing and striving for moral excellence. It offers a model for the development of character and personal ethics which will lead to professional ethics. Yet, the strict Virtue Ethics espoused by Aristotle has its limitations. This paper will explore the need for a more integrative approach to contemporary moral theory, one that may be found by revisiting the virtues through the works of Aristotle and Kant. It will offer insight into translating theory into practice for students of computer science and information technology. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine different forms of altruism. We commence by analysing the definition and, after clarifying its conditions for altruism, we argue that it is not in with everyday linguistic usage of the term. We therefore consider a definition, which we likewise refine, and argue that it better reflects ordinary language use. Both behavioural and psychological approaches define altruism descriptively and thus fail to capture an important aspect of altruism, namely its normative component. Altruism, we argue, is a, (...) i.e. one which embodies both positive and normative components. We discuss and compare various formulations of this normative component. (shrink)

All’interno del dibattito sulla definizione filosofica della menzogna, alcuni autori hanno sostenuto che mentire è sempre sbagliato. Margolis, in particolare, ha espresso la tesi radicale secondo cui “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” è una tautologia. Nella prima parte dell’articolo introduco la tesi di Margolis, e ne difendo la plausibilità contro le semplificazioni che ha subito all’interno del dibattito filosofico, mostrando che l’applicazione condizionale del predicato “sbagliato” consente di trattare in modo adeguato alcune menzogne intuitivamente giustificabili. Nella seconda parte argomento che, nonostante (...) questo stratagemma, non è possibile difendere la tesi che “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” sia una tautologia, perché bisognerebbe assumere che “mentire è moralmente sbagliato” sia una condizione necessaria fra quelle che definiscono il concetto stesso di menzogna. Questo non è desiderabile perché, come dimostro nella parte finale del mio articolo, ogni definizione di menzogna che incorpori requisiti morali nelle sue condizioni necessarie é destinata a contraddire le intuizioni del senso comune su che cos’é una menzogna. La conclusione è che la tesi che “mentire è moralmente è sbagliato” è una tautologia non può essere difesa, se non al prezzo, troppo alto, di ridefinire in modo controintuitivo il significato del termine “menzogna”. (shrink)

Most work on fallacies continues to conceptualize fallacious reasoning as involving a breach of a formal or quasi-formal rule. Chaim Perelman's theory of argumentation provides a way to conceptualize fallacies in a completely different way. His approach depends on an understanding of standards of rationality as essentially connected with conceptions of universality. Such an approach allows one to get beyond some of the basic problems of fallacy theory, and turns informal logic toward substantive philosophical questions. I show this by reinterpreting (...) three so-called fallacies - theargumentum ad baculum, equivocation and composition/division - in the light of Perelman's account. (shrink)

A theory is value-neutral when no constitutive values are part of its content. Nonneutral theories seem to lack objectivity because it is not clear how the constitutive values could be empirically confirmed. This article analyzes Franz Boas’s famous arguments against nineteenth-century evolutionary anthropology and racial theory. While he recognized that talk of "higher civilizations" encoded a constitutive, political value with consequences for slavery and colonialism, he argued against it on empirical and methodological grounds. Boas’s arguments thus provide a model of (...) how, under the right conditions, scientific inquiry can provide empirically objective grounds for political critique. Key Words: value-freedom • Franz Boas • race • objectivity • neutrality. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 7, Page 28-29, July 2011.

This paper proposes a novel distinction between accounts of scientific representation: it distinguishes thin accounts from thick accounts. Thin accounts focus on the descriptive aspect of representation whereas thick accounts acknowledge the evaluative aspect of representation. Thin accounts focus on the question of what a representation as such is. Thick accounts start from the question of what an adequate representation is. In this paper, I give two arguments in favor of a thick account, the Argument of the Epistemic Aims of (...) Modeling and the Argument of the Normativity of the Practice of Modeling. I also discuss possible objections to a thick account: the Argument from Misrepresentation and the Objections from Model Testing. The conclusion will be that the arguments on balance support a thick account of representation. (shrink)

This paper considers the character of moral peoplehood, our life as a people, and the rules and principles through which that life is expressed. In so far as those rules and principles take legal form, as determining the ground rules of association and denoting political rights and duties, this moral community is also a jural community. The paper engages with Bernard Williams’s thought with a view to resolving the tension between two conceptions of the constitution that differ in their account (...) of the relationship between norms and time. Williams offers the prospect of a non-Kantian liberalism that grows out of the habits and minds of persons but which does not collapse into relativism. I argue that Williams’s account of moral personhood devotes insufficient attention to the dynamics of moral deliberation, essential to the growth of personhood. I argue that Williams’s account of moral peoplehood is similarly deficient in that it overlooks the role constitutional deliberation plays in constructing the jural community. Plural politics requires accepted ground rules and the sense that we are a unity of plural associates, and this is what constitutional deliberation aims to provide. (shrink)

The book has two interrelated objectives. One objective is meta-theoretical and concerns the exploration of theoretical debates connected to issues of studying society and environmental problems; another objective is empirical/analytical, referring to the analysis of "green" public participation in the electricity and waste sectors in Sweden, and partly in the Netherlands as well as the UK. The metatheoretical part draws the conclusion that the ontology of critical realism, combined with a problem-subjectivist tenet, is a particularly fruitful basis for the social (...) sciences in order to provide an understanding environmental conflicts. The empirical questions refer to preconditions and obstacles to public participations in the "greening" of the domestic practices related to electricity and waste. Methodologically, the empirical part is based on a combination of statistical data and comparative case study research, conducted through semi-structured interviews with local authorities, housing organizations, energy companies, a windpower cooperative, and households. The challenges of providers are divided into making visible, making acceptable, and making doable, based on both material and socio-political characteristics of the sectors. Households, in turn, face the challenges of constructing combinations of green identity as a foundation of their motivation: ecological, environmental, economic, and social green identities. The study shows how differences in identity-combinations across cases-although materially influenced-are rarely materially determined in any irrevocable way. Instead, policy reform may substantially strengthen the social support of action-motivating combinations of green identities. (shrink)

Ethical reasoning as an action (praxis) as opposed to a knowing (epistemology) strategy is not always effective in guilding ethical, stopping or turning around unethical organizational behavior. In contrast, nonviolent forcing strategies can be very effective, but also destructive. If reasoning is an idealistic thesis and forcing is its pragmatic, material antithesis, then do we need a synthesis action (praxis) strategy such as problem solving negotiating? There are also limitations with negotiating.

Prominent ethical and policy issues such as affirmative action and female enrollment in science and engineering revolve around the idea that diversity is good. However, a precise definition is seldom provided. I show that diversity may be construed as a factual description, a craving for symmetry, an intrinsic good, an instrumental good, a symptom, or a side effect. These acceptions differ vastly in their nature and properties. Some are deeply mistaken and some others cannot lead to concrete policies. It is (...) thus necessary to clarify what one means by ‘diversity.’ It may be a neutral description of a given state; but this is insufficient to act. The idea that there should be the same representation in a specific context as in the overall population is both puzzling and arbitrary. Diversity as intrinsic good is a mere opinion, which cannot be concretely applied; moreover, the most commonly invoked forms of diversity are not intrinsically good. On the other hand, diversity as instrumental good can be evaluated empirically and can give rise to policies, but these may be very weak. Finally, symptoms and side effects are not actually about diversity. I consider the example of female enrollment in science and engineering, interpreting the various arguments found in the literature in light of this polysemy. (shrink)

Graham Haydon; Collective Moral Philosophy and Education for Pluralism, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 20, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, Pages 97–106, https.

Genetic predispositions often concern not only individual persons, but also other family members. Advances in the development of genetic tests lead to a growing number of genetic diagnoses in medical practice and to an increasing importance of genetic counseling. In the present article, a number of ethical foundations and preconditions for this issue are discussed. Four different models for the handling of genetic information are presented and analyzed including a discussion of practical implications. The different models’ ranges of content reach (...) from a strictly autonomous position over self-governed arrangements in the practice of genetic counseling up to the involvement of official bodies and committees. The different models show a number of elements which seem to be very useful for the handling of genetic data in families from an ethical perspective. In contrast, the limitations of the standard medical attempt regarding confidentiality and personal autonomy in the context of genetic information in the family are described. Finally, recommendations for further ethical research and the development of genetic counseling in families are given. (shrink)

Today we can identify two challenges of pluralism: the ever-growing conflicts between religious, national and ethnic groups on the one hand and the oppression of dissenting individuals by their respective communities on the other hand. Both intercommunitarian and intracommunitarian conflicts find their origin in a communitarian conception of our political, cultural, or religious identities. After presenting some of the problems of the communitarian solution in particular with regard to the challenge of internal pluralism, I introduce alternative conceptions of multiculturalism that (...) consider our commitments to be part of our personal or individual identity. Distinguishing a conception of identity based upon self-knowledge from liberal, postmodern theories (Richard Rorty) and alternative non-cognitive theories (Bernard Williams) that consider identity to be individual in nature, I propose that the awareness of the individual nature of commitments makes it possible for us not to impose our values upon other individuals who do not share them while at the same time justifying the multicultural project. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article explores how Charles Taylor’s account of moral personhood and Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot’s account of justificatory regimes can add breadth, depth, and specificity to discussions of ethical dilemmas in public relations. These frameworks are analyzed for their potential to make the following contributions to public relations ethics. First, they convey that there is more to ethics than choosing the right duties and actions. Second, they reveal the diversity of goods that people consider to be ethically worthy and (...) admirable, as well as the complex personal issues involved in ranking these goods. Third, they emphasize that these different goods often need to be articulated and evaluated in different ways. Last, they can either point toward new ways of resolving ethical dilemmas or show why such resolutions are not possible. (shrink)

Whereas theories on health generally argue in favor of one specific concept, we argue that, given the variety of health practices, we need different concepts of health. We thus approach health concepts as a Wittgensteinian family of thick concepts. By discussing five concepts of health offered by theory, we argue that all capture something that seems relevant when we talk and think about health. Classifying these concepts reveals their family resemblances: each of these concepts differs from the others in at (...) least one respect and resembles the others in several respects. Moreover, our classification shows that “health” always both describes a condition and evaluates that condition at the same time. Having both descriptive and evaluative dimensions, we can see health concepts as “thick concepts.” It is because of this evaluative dimension that it is important to reflect on the question of what understanding of health guides specific practices. We show that the distinctions revealed by our classification can serve as a conceptual toolbox for reflection on the assumptions and purposes of particular health practices. Finally, we illustrate how such reflection could work out by briefly exploring three specific health practices. (shrink)

Matthew Clayton, David Stevens and Laura D’Olimpio have advanced a series of objections to arguments I set out in my recent book A Theory of Moral Education – in particular to the problem-of-sociality justification for basic moral standards. Here I reply to their objections.

Using the works of Richard Rorty and John Caputo, I want to suggest that we might be better off treating the traditional ethical theories of Kant, Mill, Aristotle and Hobbes as normative narratives rather than as justificatory schemes for moral decision making to be set up against one another. In a spirit akin to Husserl's ‘bracketing’ of metaphysics, when discussing ethical theories in business ethics, we can easily avoid metaphysics and use an approach that sees ethical theory as socially convincing (...) normative narratives – narratives that unify us with others insofar as they describe our phenomenological experiences in a way with which many of us mutually resonate. I will do this by attempting to show how John Caputo's thinking in Against Ethics and Rorty's postmodern pragmatism might be appropriated to some extent by us in business ethics. (shrink)

Partindo de um sentido prescritivo de necessidade, própria do que é condição depossibilidade para a realização de um certo objetivo, analiso inicialmente o procedimentoscotista de neutralização de duas abordagens tradicionais sobre a necessidade da metafísica.Há, por um lado, a neutralização da pretensão dos philosophi de demonstrar a suficiênciada metafísica para a consecução de nosso fim último; e, por outro, a neutralizaçãoda tentativa dos theologi de provar a insuficiência da metafísica para a realização daquelemesmo fim. O procedimento de Scotus de justificação (...) da necessidade da metafísica será emseguida reconstruído, um procedimento que incorpora frente à tradição traços de umaprofunda redefinição dos objetivos e procedimentos daquela ciência. (shrink)

As a contribution to the continuing debate about tax practitioner ethics, this paper explores the main streams of Western ethical thought that are relevant to tax practitioners’ work, most typically deontology and consequentialism. It then goes on to consider the impact of such ethical influences on the professional ethical codes of conduct that govern tax practitioners’ work, and attempts to unravel the complex work and ethical environment of the practice of tax in terms of tax compliance and tax avoidance. The (...) paper then examines the prior studies on tax practitioners and ethics and the type of dilemmas that practitioners face in the context of their work. The paper proceeds to examine empirically the extent to which tax practitioners take a consequentialist versus a deontological approach in their reasoning about moral dilemmas. This is carried out by an innovative use of the Defining Issues Test. (shrink)

In this paper, I aim to support contextual ethics as a broad and open understanding of ethics and the ethical by commenting on the origin of the words ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’ in Greek philosophy and on the ambiguities built into them from the beginning. I further list some complexities that arose when the Latinate words ‘morals’ and ‘moral’ began to be used in Roman, medieval and modern philosophy, sometimes as synonyms of and sometimes in contrast to ‘ethics’ and ‘ethical’. Finally, (...) I return to discuss the prospects of contextual ethics in the context of developments in moral philosophy in the twentieth century, adding some pragmatist arguments in its favour. (shrink)

This paper examines a particularly egregious example of a NIMBY claim and considers three proposals for explaining what about that claim might be ethically problematic: The NIMBY claimant is being selfish or self-serving; The NIMBY claim cannot be morally justified, because respecting everyone's NIMBY claims leaves communities worse off; and if policymakers were to defer to people's NIMBY claims, they would end up perpetuating environmental injustices. We argue that these proposals fail to explain why there is anything wrong with the (...) NIMBY claim per se. (shrink)

Anti-theory is a multi-faceted critique of moral theory which, it appears, is undergoing something of reassessment. In a recent paper Hämäläinen discusses the relevance of an anti-theoretical perspective for the activity of applied ethics. This paper explores her view of anti-theory. In particular I examine its relevance for understanding the formal guidance on pandemic flu planning issues by the Department of Health in the UK and some subsequent discussions around triage and reverse triage decisions which may be considered by both (...) Primary and Secondary Care Trusts. in setting their own policies and which may face clinicians in the eventuality of a pandemic. Following Hämäläinen in contrasting reflective equilibrium with her anti-theory inspired suggestion of an instrumental approach to moral theory in practice I demonstrate how this understanding complements the diversity of our intuitive moral judgements. Consequentially I suggest that this anti-theoretical instrumental approach is in greater accord with the conditions under which such policy planning and decision making is, or will be, made. Furthermore, on the grounds of keeping open the ethical dimensions of medical practice in conditions of uncertainty, i.e. during a pandemic, I suggest that the anti-theoretical instrumental perspective is, ethically, the preferable approach to producing such policies and guidelines. (shrink)

This paper is a critical discussion of Manuel Vargas’ Building Better Beings, focusing on the treatment of desert therein. By means of an analogy between morality and sport, I examine some seemingly peculiar implications of Vargas’ teleological and revisionary account of desert. I also consider some general questions of philosophical methodology provoked by revisionary approaches.

The proliferation of dimensions of appraisal is both welcome and worrying. The preoccupation with sorting out causes may be somewhat otiose. And the ubiquity of emotions in levels of processing raises intriguing problems about the role of language in identifying and triggering emotions and appraisals.

Philosophers interested in what Buddhist ethics has to offer contemporary debates have largely focused on finding distinctively Buddhist reasons to choose to act ethically. But this may be to miss the point. Maria Heim’s recent study illustrates vividly how a very different conception of intention, agency, and ethics emerges from the canonical Pāli texts and the extensive commentaries on these attributed to the fifth-century author Buddhaghosa. She finds in this textual tradition a sophisticated moral anthropology and moral phenomenology, one that (...) focuses not on providing reasons against acting in ways we should not, but instead on providing tools for constructing ourselves such that the question of whether to act in an unwholesome way simply would not occur to us.In the first chapter, Heim engages with the approach to intention and agency found in the Suttas, by bringing in the complex distinctions and textual connections that Buddhaghosa adds to these discussions. To note just one hi .. (shrink)

Some subjectivist views of practical reasons entail that some people, in some cases, lack sufficient reasons to act as morality requires of them. This is often thought to form the basis of an objection to these subjectivist views: ‘the amoralism objection’. This objection has been developed at length by Julia Markovits in her recent book Moral Reason. But Markovits—alongside many other proponents of this objection—does not explicitly consider that her objection is premised on a claim that her opponents deny on (...) first-order grounds, often as part of a socially and politically motivated revisionism about the assessment of agents and their actions. As such, the amoralism objection as she presents it misses its dialectical mark. This has interesting consequences for subjectivism—and the methodology behind it—more generally. (shrink)

Although the role of imagination in moral reasoning is often neglected, recent literature, mostly of pragmatist signature, points to imagination as one of its central elements. In this article we develop some of their arguments by looking at the moral role of imagination in practice, in particular the practice of neonatal intensive care. Drawing on empirical research, we analyze a decision-making process in various stages: delivery, staff meeting, and reflection afterwards. We show how imagination aids medical practitioners demarcating moral categories, (...) tuning their actions, and exploring long-range consequences of decisions. We argue that imagination helps to bring about at least four kinds of integration in the moral decision-making process: personal integration by creating a moral self-image in moments of reflection; social integration by aiding the conciliation of the diverging perspectives of the people involved; temporal integration by facilitating the parties to transcend the present moment and connect past, present, and future; and epistemological integration by helping to combine the various forms of knowledge and experience needed to make moral decisions. Furthermore, we argue that the role of imagination in these moral decision-processes is limited in several significant ways. Rather than being a solution itself, it is merely an aid and cannot replace the decision itself. Finally, there are also limits to the practical relevance of this theoretical reflection. In the end, it is up to care professionals as reflective practitioners to re-imagine the practice of intensive care and make the right decisions with hope and imagination. (shrink)

Este trabajo se propone, como un paso final, el examen del argumento de Carlos Nino a favor de la existencia de una obligación moral de obedecer al derecho producido por un gobierno democrático. Este argumento vendría a mostrar además que la democracia es la única forma de gobierno moralmente legítima. En la idea de Nino ambas cuestiones son equivalentes y una respuesta positiva es considerada necesaria para determinar la posibilidad de justificación de las decisiones de los jueces. La tesis en (...) cuestión se apoya en una compleja concepción acerca de dimensión justificatoria del derecho y su conexión con la moral, como una condición necesaria. Por ello, se revisa las nociones de las que depende esa propuesta de Nino, especialmente las ideas de razón para la acción, justificación, principio moral y norma jurídica y se formula un interrogante acerca del éxito del argumento, si se acepta esa concepción general. This paper attempts to examine Carlos Nino’s argument supporting the existence of a moral obligation to obey the law produced by a democratic government. This argument also goes on to show that democracy is the only morally legitimate form of government. In Nino’s conception, both issues are equivalent, and a positive response is considered necessary to determine the possibility to justify judges’ decisions. The thesis in question rests on a complex conception regarding the law’s justificatory dimension, and its connection with morality as a necessary condition. This is why the notions upon which Nino’s proposal rests are examined, above all the ideas of reason for action, justification, moral principle and legal norm. If we accept this general conception, then we should ask about the success of the argument. (shrink)

An increasingly common complaint about philosophy of religion—especially, though not exclusively, as it is pursued in the “analytic tradition”—is that its preoccupation with questions of rationality and justification in relation to “theism” has deflected attention from the diversity of forms that religious life takes. Among measures proposed for ameliorating this condition has been the deployment of “thick description” that facilitates more richly contextualized understandings of religious phenomena. Endorsing and elaborating this proposal, I provide an overview of different but related notions (...) of thick description before turning to two specific examples, which illustrate the potential for engagement with ethnography to contribute to an expanded conception of philosophy of religion. (shrink)

Uno de los temas de más profundo debate en la filosofía del derecho de los últimos años ha sido el de las maneras en que dar cuenta del fenómeno del desacuerdo entre operadores jurídicos y entre juristas a la hora de desentrañar el contenido del derecho y, por ende, de dar con la respuesta jurídica para controversias particulares. A partir del trabajo de Ronald Dworkin, el tema se ha convertido en un instrumento de intenso análisis crítico del positivismo jurídico y (...) consecuentemente ha generado diversos enfoques que intentan dar cuenta del fenómeno de manera armónica con las tesis positivistas centrales. Uno de estos enfoques, en particular, intenta afrontar este desafío ligando al positivismo con un análisis expresivista del discurso jurídico de primer orden; análisis análogo al que importantes autores abocados a la metaética contemporánea han propuesto para el discurso moral. En el presente trabajo presento los lineamientos centrales de este enfoque iusfilosófico, indagando tanto en algunas de sus virtudes como en algunas de sus mayores dificultades. (shrink)

The central question of this thesis is how one can learn about particular targets by using models of those targets. A widespread assumption is that models have to be representative models in order to foster knowledge about targets. Thus the thesis begins by examining the concept of representation from an epistemic point of view and supports an account of representation that does not distinguish between representation simpliciter and adequate representation. Representation, understood in the sense of a representative model, is regarded (...) as a success term. That is, a representative model is one relatum in a relation of adequate representation (Chapter 2). When a representative model represents a target, it allows users of this model to learn something about the target. It is argued that a representative model has this epistemic function because it shares relevant features with the target. This presupposes a similarity view of representation. Similarity views of representation face serious objections, which will be rebutted (Chapter 3). One way of spelling out a similarity view of representation is to defend an indirect view of representation. In this thesis, which does not argue for an indirect view, it is assumed that the indirect view is a good option, if not the best, for articulating the similarity view. It is demonstrated how such an indirect view can be expanded to account for cases of technological modeling. A case study in bioengineering is used to show that the indirect view of representation must acknowledge a distinction between two directions of fit in relations between vehicles and targets. In this context the notion of design is interpreted as a relation between a vehicle and a target, thereby connecting ideas from philosophy of science with ideas from philosophy of technology (Chapter 4). Fictionalist accounts of models are intended to tackle the issue of the ontology of models. In this thesis, however, two prominent fictionalist accounts are discussed from an epistemological point of view in light of the central question regarding how one can learn about targets by using models. This question is addressed from the standpoint of Waltonian fictionalism. The result of the discussion is that the two discussed Waltonian fictionalist accounts cannot sufficiently answer the question. These accounts are criticized for their inability to deliver a satisfactory epistemology of representation (Chapter 5). Although Waltonian fictionalism is criticized, the present thesis also shows that the foundational theory of Waltonian fictionalism, the theory of make-believe can nevertheless be used to account for the distinction between projections and predictions that is made by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Chapter 6). (shrink)

In this dissertation I set out to address the “scope problem” in Nietzsche scholarship. In the secondary literature, the scope problem is characterized as a problem for Nietzsche, who seems deeply skeptical about nearly every item of his inherited western metaphysical toolkit. If his skepticism about western metaphysics penetrates all dimensions of his thought, how can he motivate a reader to also reject western metaphysics without himself committing to some of it? I stipulate that answering the scope problem means explicating (...) what Nietzsche views as the general source of normativity—it is there that we can understand the resources Nietzsche is committing himself to, and the ones he rejects. I examine Leiter’s solution to this problem, which assigns science as the general source of normativity. However, Leiter’s solution depends on textual pedigree that I argue is inconsistent with the texts themselves. I argue that the normativity of science, instead of being the source of general normativity, represents an order of normativity for Nietzsche—but it is not ordered generally. I look to GS 341 to analyze “eternal recurrence,” and argue that an expression of Nietzsche’s “higher morality” can be located in the passage. Higher morality, I argue, places the general source of normativity in the value the reader places on her life. This account of higher morality solves the scope problem by narrowing it to readers who already accept or embrace the challenge of placing a level of value on their life commensurate with eternal recurrence. (shrink)

My interests lie in consideration of conceptions of authenticity and inauthenticity from the perspective of ethical theories which conceive of the good for man with reference to human nature and concomitant beliefs regarding the most appropriate realisation of human capacities. Here, I find particular interest in the philosophical styles embodied by the existentialist and Lebensphilosophie movements. Such approaches sit outside the traditional frames of reference provided by deontological and utilitarian approaches to ethical reasoning and yet do I shall argue, share (...) significant similarities with ancient aretaic styles of ethics. Here, I take Aristotle to represent those aspects of ethical thought which are quintessentially of this period of intellectual history. I find not merely points of comparison but a fruitful way in which to re-examine the thought of thinkers such as Nietzsche, Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre with reference to styles of ethical enquiry which place primacy upon an objective conception of happiness which centres upon the appropriate realisation of human capacity understood with reference to Aristotle's Function Argument. I argue that phenomenological analysis shares a conception of self-perspicuity in which the agent reflects upon the full contents of their conscious experience. By this means, certain self-delusions which impede entry into the ethical life, may be removed. Additionally, whilst Aristotle's 'non-law' conception of ethics shares with existentialist thought an understanding of the human situation and its normative concerns in isolation from dualistic and theistic metaphysical speculation, such philosophy is still able to provide clear and objective ethical standards - standards often lacking within existentialism. For instance, whilst Nietzsche's pronouncement of the 'death of God' signals the death also of Christian morality, we find that such philosophy is not without normative implications and in fact can be derived to a large degree from assent towards a radical and more severe ethical self-discipline. Indeed, central certainly to the thought of Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre is an understanding of the role of self-deception in the human condition. Here a useful distinction may be made between those types of self-deception which may be understood as structural that is to say which are representative of an essential characteristic of human being at the abstract level - and those types of self-deception which may be described as 'motivated' or 'psychological' which relate to more specific types of self-deceptive engagement. I believe it is useful to examine both Nietzsche, Heidegger and Sartre through the lens of such interpretation, I find for instance that it is of use to examine the early Sartre as having a purely structural interpretation of bad faith (described by Jeanson as 'natural' bad-faith) whilst moving towards a psychological account in his later work, an account which has more specific moral implications with the possibility of 'willed conversion' to authenticity (Santoni). Additionally with Nietzsche, we also find a similar distinction between a self-deception which is in some sense preconditional and a motivational account of self-deception in which the agent infused with ressentiment falsifies reality in favour of subjective needs which are ultimately destructive of life-enhancement. In this sense the vicious individual can be said to have achieved merely a false optimum, and moreover, false from an objective standpoint. (shrink)

The Aristotelian Society’s Virtual Issue is a free, online publication, made publically available on the Aristotelian Society website. Each volume is theme-based, collecting together papers from the archives of the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society and the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume that address the chosen theme. This year's Virtual Issue includes a selection of papers from across the Society’s fourteen decades, each accompanied by a specially commissioned present-day response. The aim of the volume is to aid reflection (...) on how to go about doing moral and political philosophy, by bringing together papers that bear on their epistemology and methodology. In some cases this involves pieces whose declared focus is on one of those areas, as is the case with Margaret MacDonald’s 1941 essay ‘The Language of Political Theory’ and Mary Midgley’s 1974 article ‘The Neutrality of the Moral Philosopher’. In other cases the editor, Ben Colburn, selected papers whose primary focus is elsewhere, but which include some interesting epistemological or methodological reflections or implications along the way. The contributions from our present-day commentators vary similarly in how far their explicit attention is methodological. Nevertheless, there is throughout a concern on how to ‘be an honest reasoner’, to borrow a phrase from the late Dudley Knowles. (shrink)