The provision of intensive care enables the lives of neonates, infants and children to be sustained or extended in circumstances previously regarded as impossible. However, as well as benefits, such care may confer burdens that resultingly frame continuation of certain interventions as futile, conferring more harm than or any, benefit. Subsequently, clinicians and families in the paediatric intensive care unit are often faced with decisions to withdraw, withhold or limit intensive care in order to act in the best interests of (...) the child. An integral consideration in respect of these decisions is that futility is a concept that has to be contextualised for all those involved. Recent high-profile legal cases highlight the professional, clinical, legal and social conflicts that can arise when parents and clinicians have different interpretations of futility. In acknowledging the complexity of these conflicts for clinicians, this paper aims to support a better understanding of futility as an integral concept in such difficult and emotive decisions within professional practice. We utilise the concept of futility to frame how these decisions to withdraw or withhold certain invasive life-prolonging interventions are ethically and legally justifiable, even when they disagree or conflict with parental views. To support clinicians in understanding these decisions, we in part use the familiar bioethical framework of Principlism developed by Beauchamp and Childress. We suggest that understanding legal and ethical analysis of futility ultimately will help clinicians in approaching and reflecting on such decision-making. (shrink)

In the article, Twin pregnancy, fetal reduction and the ‘all or nothing problem’, I argued that there is a moral problem in multifetal pregnancy reduction from a twin to a singleton pregnancy. Drawing on Horton’s original version of the ‘all or nothing problem’, I argued that there are two intuitively plausible claims in 2-to-1 MFPR: aborting both fetuses is morally permissible, aborting only one of the twin fetuses is morally wrong. Yet, with the assumption that one should select permissible choice (...) over impermissible choice, the two claims lead to a counter-intuitive conclusion: the woman ought to abort both fetuses rather than only one. It would be odd to promote such a pro-death view. Begović _et al_ discuss my article and offer insightful criticism, claiming, that there is no ‘all or nothing problem’ present in 2-to-1 MFPR. In this short reply, I respond to some of their criticism. (shrink)

The four thoughtful commentaries on our feature article draw out interesting empirical and normative questions. The aim of our study was to examine the views of a sample of the general public about a set of cases of disputed treatment for severely impaired infants.1 We compared those views with legal determinations that treatment was or was not in the infants’ best interests, and with some published ethical frameworks for decisions. We deliberately did not draw explicit ethical conclusions from our survey (...) findings, both because of the acknowledged limitations of survey methodology, and because survey conclusions cannot, in themselves, yield answers about what the right threshold should be for providing or withholding treatment.2 In this brief response, we are going to address head-on the important ethical question raised within our survey – when life is worth living for an infant. We follow-up on the suggestion of two commentators that the presence or absence of “relational potential” might be ethically important to report in studies of the outcome of severely impaired infants,3 and to whether parental requests for treatment should be supported.4 The notion of “relational potential” was introduced by John Arras in a 1984 commentary.5 Arras was responding to the Baby Doe Regulations and a …. (shrink)

In this article, we explore alternative conflict resolution strategies to assist families and clinicians in cases of intractable dissent in paediatric health care decision-making. We focus on the ethical and legal landscape using cases from the Australian jurisdiction in New South Wales, while referencing some global sentinel cases. We highlight a range of alternative means of addressing conflict, including clinical ethics support, and contrast and contextualise facilitative or interest-based mediation, concluding that legal intervention via the courts can be protracted and (...) distressing and should be a ‘last resort’. We acknowledge many might view this as the current status quo, but we go further to recommend strategies optimal for all parties to recognise early signs of conflict and prevent its harmful escalation. While more empirical research is needed, we contend that interest-based mediation may be a valuable adjunctive method of conflict resolution. If judiciously distinguished from and utilised with clinical ethical support, it can be an effective tool to address dissent and its negative sequelae in paediatric healthcare decision-making. (shrink)

This article critically examines the legal arguments presented on behalf of Charlie Gard’s parents, Connie Yates and Chris Gard, based on a threshold test of significant harm for intervention into the decisions made jointly by holders of parental responsibility. It argues that the legal basis of the argument, from the case of Ashya King, was tenuous. It sought to introduce different categories of cases concerning children’s medical treatment when, despite the inevitable factual distinctions between individual cases, the duty of the (...) judge in all cases to determine the best interests of the child is firmly established by the case law. It argues that the focus should not have been on a threshold for intervention but on whether his parents had established that the therapy they wanted was a viable alternative therapeutic option. In the April hearing, Charlie’s parents relied on the offer of treatment from a US doctor; by July they had an independent panel of international experts supporting their case although by this time the medical evidence was that it was too late for Charlie. One of Charlie’s legacies for future disputes may be that his case highlighted the need for evidence as to whether the treatment parents want for their child is a viable alternative therapeutic option before a court can determine which therapeutic option is in the best interests of the child. (shrink)

BackgroundDecisions about withdrawal of life support for infants have given rise to legal battles between physicians and parents creating intense media attention. It is unclear how we should evaluate when life is no longer worth living for an infant. Public attitudes towards treatment withdrawal and the role of parents in situations of disagreement have not previously been assessed.MethodsAn online survey was conducted with a sample of the UK public to assess public views about the benefit of life in hypothetical cases (...) similar to real cases heard by the UK courts (eg, Charlie Gard, Alfie Evans). We then evaluated these public views in comparison with existing ethical frameworks for decision-making.ResultsOne hundred and thirty participants completed the survey. The majority (94%) agreed that an infant’s life may have no benefit when well-being falls below a critical level. Decisions to withdraw treatment were positively associated with the importance of use of medical resources, the infant’s ability to have emotional relationships, and mental abilities. Up to 50% of participants in each case believed it was permissible to either continueorwithdraw treatment.ConclusionDespite the controversy, our findings indicate that in the most severe cases, most people agree that life is not worth living for a profoundly disabled infant. Our survey found wide acceptance of at least the permissibility of withdrawal of treatment across a range of cases, though also a reluctance to overrule parents’ decisions. These findings may be useful when constructing guidelines for clinical practice. (shrink)

When we applied for the editorship of the JME 7 years ago, we said that we considered the JME to be the most important journal in medicine. The most profound questions that health professionals face are not scientific or technical, but ethical. Our enormous scientific and medical progress already outstrips our capability to provide treatment. Life can be prolonged at enormous cost, sometimes far beyond the point that the individual appears to be gaining a net benefit from that life. Science (...) can tell us how to achieve something, but it cannot tell us whether we should achieve that end—whether it is good. For that, we need ethics. Ethics grows in importance as our technology creates new possibilities. Where there are no options, there are no ethical questions. However, once there are options, there arise pressing questions about whether to pursue them. We require values and principles to decide how to use medicine and science. During the last 7 years, issues like the creation of brain organoids, human non-human chimeras, mitochondrial transfer, gene editing of embryos and in vitro gametogenesis have grown in prominence. These raise deep questions about moral status and how it should be determined, the limits of modification of humans, and what is good in life. As editors of the JME, we are proud of our small contribution to thinking about these challenges. We are grateful to the hard work of our associate editors and administrative staff, but there is still much more to do. During our term as editors, we have published papers from diverse perspectives, on a wide range of topics. We have seen vigorous debate within the pages of the journal and have often sought to deliberately encourage that debate …. (shrink)

Much of the commentary in the wake of the Charlie Gard litigation was aimed at apparent shortcomings of the law. These include concerns about the perceived inability of the law to consider resourcing issues, the vagueness of the best interests test and the delays and costs of having disputes about potentially life-sustaining medical treatment resolved by the courts. These concerns are perennial ones that arise in response to difficult cases. Despite their persistence, we argue that many of these criticisms are (...) unfounded. The first part of this paper sets out the basic legal framework that operates when parents seek potentially life-sustaining treatment that doctors believe is against a child’s best interests, and describes the criticisms of that framework. The second part of the paper suggests an alternative approach that would give decision-making power to parents, and remove doctors’ ability to unilaterally withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment that they regard is futile. This proposal is grounded in several values that we argue should guide these regulatory choices. We also contend that the best interests test is justifiable and since the courts show no sign of departing from it, the focus should be on how to better elucidate the underlying values driving decisions. We discuss the advantages of our proposed approach and how it would address some of the criticisms aimed at the law. Finally, we defend the current role that the judiciary plays, as an independent state-sanctioned process with a precedent-setting function. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to introduce the false hope harms (FHH) argument, as a new concept in healthcare. The FHH argument embodies a conglomerate of specific harms that have not convinced providers to stop endorsing false hope. In this paper, it is submitted that the healthcare profession has an obligation to avoid collaborating or participating in, propagating or augmenting false hope in medicine. Although hope serves important functions—it can be ‘therapeutic’ and important for patients’ ‘self-identity as active agents’— (...) the presentation of false hope along the hope continuum entails a misconstrued balancing act. By not speaking up against unrealistic patient and family requests—including some requests for rights to try, resuscitative efforts in terminally ill patients, or other demands for non-beneficial treatments—healthcare providers precipitate harms, i.e., the FHH. These harms arise on both individual and communal levels and cannot be ignored. The goal of this paper is not to offer a definition of false hope, because the phenomenon of false hope is too complex for any simple definition. Instead, this paper seeks to make four points while outlining the FHH argument: consumer medicine and false hope are connected; providers and patients are very vulnerable in the system of consumer medicine; providers have a responsibility to stand up against false hope; and how the FHH argument could perhaps offer a footing to resist giving in to false hope. (shrink)

It has been debated for quite some time among bioethicists and others whether or not the distinction between therapy and research in healthcare can and should be maintained. This paper tries to clarify what the disagreement is about, and argues that the distinction can be maintained in most, if not all, situations. However, even if it can be maintained, it does not necessarily follow that it should. It is argued here that there are good reasons to maintain the distinction both (...) for the sake of protecting research interests and the sake of patient safety. In addition, recognizing the distinction provides a barrier against unreasonable prioritization between patients. However, there may be situations, such as innovative last-resort treatment, in which regulatory requirements from both therapy and research should be considered. (shrink)

Background There is considerable variation in the functionality of bioethical services in different institutions and countries for children in hospital, despite new challenges due to increasing technology supports for children with serious illness and medical complexity. We aimed to understand how bioethics services address bioethical concerns that are increasingly encountered in paediatric intensive care. Methods A qualitative descriptive design was used to describe clinician’s perspectives on the functionality of clinical bioethics services for paediatric intensive care units. Clinicians who were members (...) of formal or informal clinical bioethics groups, or who were closely involved with the process of working through ethically challenging decisions, were interviewed. Interviews took place online. Resulting transcripts were analysed using thematic analysis. Results From 33 interviews, we identified four themes that described the functionality of bioethics services when a child requires technology to sustain life: striving for consensus; the importance of guidelines; a structure that facilitates a time-sensitive and relevant response; and strong leadership and teamwork. Conclusions Clinical bioethics services have the potential to expand their role due to the challenges brought by advancing medical technology and the increasing options it brings for treatment. Further work is needed to identify where and how bioethics services can evolve and adapt to fully address the needs of the decision-makers in PICU. (shrink)

ObjectiveTo increase knowledge of how doctors perceive futile treatments and scarcity of resources at the end of life. In particular, their perceptions about whether and how resource limitations influence end-of-life decision making. This study builds on previous work that found some doctors include resource limitations in their understanding of the concept of futility.SettingThree tertiary hospitals in metropolitan Brisbane, Australia.DesignQualitative study using in-depth, semistructured, face-to-face interviews. Ninety-six doctors were interviewed in 11 medical specialties. Transcripts of the interviews were analysed using thematic (...) analysis.ResultsDoctors’ perceptions of whether resource limitations were relevant to their practice varied, and doctors were more comfortable with explicit rather than implicit rationing. Several doctors incorporated resource limitations into their definition of futility. For some, availability of resources was one factor of many in assessing futility, secondary to patient considerations, but a few doctors indicated that the concept of futility concealed rationing. Doctors experienced moral distress due to the resource implications of providing futile treatment and the lack of administrative supports for bedside rationing.ConclusionsDoctors’ ability to distinguish between futility and rationing would be enhanced through regulatory support for explicit rationing and strategies to support doctors’ role in rationing at the bedside. Medical policies should address the distinction between resource limitations and futility to promote legitimacy in end-of-life decision making. (shrink)

Existing regulation of end-of-life care is flawed. Problems include poorly-designed laws, policies, ethical codes, training, and funding programs, which often are neither effective nor helpful in guiding decision-making. This leads to adverse outcomes for patients, families, health professionals, and the health system as a whole. A key factor contributing to the harms of current regulation is a siloed approach to regulating end-of-life care. Existing approaches to regulation, and research into how that regulation could be improved, have tended to focus on (...) a single regulatory instrument (e.g., just law or just ethical codes). As a result, there has been a failure to capture holistically the various forces that guide end-of-life care. This article proposes a response to address this, identifying “regulatory space” theory as a candidate to provide the much-needed holistic insight into improving regulation of end-of-life care. The article concludes with practical implications of this approach for regulators and researchers. (shrink)

False hope is costly for individuals, their loved ones, and society. Scholars have defined false hope as one that involves an epistemically unjustified belief. In this paper, I argue that this account of false hope is incomplete and that false hope should be conceptualized in terms of the way in which the agent attends to or focuses on a highly desired but unlikely outcome. I explain how this account better captures the distinctiveness of false hope.

Given the costs of litigation high-profile court cases about withdrawing life-sustaining medical treatment for seriously ill children in England & Wales tend to be followed by discussion about how to avoid similar cases in future. Whilst two proposals, mediation and replacing the best interests standard with a harm threshold, have received broad attention, a proposal to replace the court by a specialist review committee has not been further investigated. This article analyses the effects of a putative replacement of the courts (...) by a specialist review committee using the process enacted by the futility clauses in the Texas Advance Directives Act (TADA) as a model. Under TADA life-sustaining treatment may legally be withdrawn when a review committee deems it futile and no alternative healthcare provider can be identified. The investigation finds that installing a national review committee with the power to decide whether life-sustaining treatment is futile would have reduced the number of court cases about withdrawal thereof in England & Wales to a handful over the last 3 decades. In addition to shorter procedures and costs savings, a national review committee modelled after TADA would have advantages for both clinicians and parents. Advantages for clinicians are more limited exposure to delivery of clinical care that may cause moral distress and less exposure to adverse press and social media content. Advantages for parents are that the process would establish them as ethical decision makers and offer the possibility of a transfer of the care of the child provided an alternative healthcare provider can be found. As such decisions taken by a specialist review committee may be more acceptable for parents than those of the courts. (shrink)