How should we deal with social diversity if we conceive it as cultural diversity? Appeals to cultural relativism and to the collective good of diversity provide inadequate answers. Taking cultural diversity seriously requires that we respond to it fairly or justly and that, in turn, requires an approach that is impartial (or neutral) amongst cultures. Claims of impartiality are often thought peculiarly implausible when applied to cultural diversity, but an impartialist approach is in fact peculiarly appropriate to that form of (...) diversity. The issue is not whether we can be impartial, but whether we are ready to accept the implications of describing a diversity as ?cultural? and, if we are, what form our impartiality should take. Attempts to avoid claims of impartiality by dealing with diversity through deliberative processes are misguided since those processes must embody commitments to impartiality if their outcomes are to be just. (shrink)

James Tully's account of a ?post?imperial constitutionalism?, in his book Strange Multiplicity, wrongly rejects the ideal of impartiality in modern political theory. Pace Tully, this paper argues for a conception of impartiality called ?justice as provisionality?. This is demonstrated by explaining the concept of a ?contrastive hard case?. These cases, exemplified both by indigenous peoples? struggles for recognition and ?traditional? justifications for violence against women, centrally involve conflicts over the cultural interpretation of value. The paper argues that the just adjudication (...) of these cases depends on understanding two different senses of the term ?provisionality?. These demonstrate that the post?imperial state can give impartial reasons for the rights of parties to ?contrastive? claims in a way that integrates the concerns of both feminists and cultural pluralists. The two senses of provisionality are: first, that consequent upon historical injustice, the post?imperial state should recognize the legitimacy of citizens? partial reasons for their actions and practices; and hence, should recognise that the domain of public, impartial reason is always provisional and incomplete. Second, our capacities for reason are dependent on public and nonpublic provision, protection and care. This is because diverse inequalities and injustices could prevent vulnerable people, in some cases women, from acting according to reasons at all. (shrink)

Cet article examine la place du concept d’impartialité dans les théories délibératives de la démocratie. C’est à partir de certaines critiques féministes que sont discutés deux défis lancés à la théorie délibérative et qui sont étroitement liés : le premier porte essentiellement sur le critère du raisonnable et l’idée d’offre de raisons ; le second concerne les circonstances sociales et politiques contingentes dans lesquelles les perspectives des groupes marginalisés peuvent influencer le jugement des autres citoyens. Certains des changements qui devraient (...) être apportés à la théorie délibérative afin qu’elle puisse tenir compte de ces préoccupations sont ensuite proposés. Finalement, les implications de tels changements pour nos notions plus générales de vertu et de responsabilité de la citoyenneté sont examinées.This article examines the place of the concept of impartiality in theories of deliberative democracy. Drawing on and extending recent feminist critiques of deliberative democracy, it explores two interrelated challenges to deliberative theory, one focused on the standard of reasonableness and the idea of reason-giving and the other on the contingent social and political circumstances under which marginalized-groups perspectives may sway the judgment of other citizens. Finally, some of the changes required of deliberative theory to address these concerns are discussed, and the implications of these changes for our more general notions of the virtues and responsibilities of citizenship are explored. (shrink)

Given the immense mobilizing power possessed by the rhetoric of nationalism, as well as the many resources which can be tapped by groups which successfully establish national claims, it is not surprising that we have recently seen such a resurgence in nationalist discourse. One of the things which may surprise us, however, is the growing breadth in thetypesof groups which now launch such claims. No longer is the discourse of nationalism limited to use by ethnic groups and territorial populations. Recently (...) it has come to be deployed by groups which we would normally tend to look upon as social movements. There has been a growing realization of the way in which constituencies such as Blacks, gays and lesbians, Chicano/as, and so on, make up distinct peoples, with cultures, public institutions, dialects, tastes, and social practices that set them off from the people or peoples around them. (shrink)