In some cases, the term ‘Responsible Innovation’ has been considered a type of ethical solution to the Collingridge predicament in control of technology development. In this article, I claimed that two different approaches for responsible innovation (i.e. Van den Hoven’s innovation-based approach and Owen’s social-based approach) can be considered as two different dimensions that, while being conflicting, dialectically interact and thus can be useful for solving the problem of Collingridge. For this purpose, I argue that the first approach that resorts (...) to innovations for solving moral dilemmas is successful in rearranging and removing unhelpful (i.e. amoral) obligations, but it is unable to determine useful (i.e. moral) obligations. On the other hand, the second approach believes that Responsible Innovation occurs through social processes and by virtue of concepts such as reflection, deliberation, anticipation, and responsiveness, although is effective in determining useful (i.e. moral) obligations, it cannot remove or rearrange all useless (i.e. amoral) obligations. Although these two approaches are conflicting, the result of each approach is a necessary condition for the other approach, so the problem can only be solved by a dialectical interaction. (shrink)