Public discussions of ethical issues related to the biotechnology industry tend to treat "biotechnology" as a single, undifferentiated technology. Similarly, the pros and cons associated with this entire sector tend to get lumped together, such that individuals and groups often situate themselves as either "pro-" or "anti-" biotechnology as a whole. But different biotechnologies and their particular application context pose very different challenges for ethical corporate decision-making. Even within a single product category, different specialty products can pose strikingly different ethical (...) challenges. In this paper, we focus on the single over-arching category of "genetic testing" and compare tests for disease susceptibility and drug response. We highlight the diversity of ethical challenges - grouped under the broad categories of "truth in advertising" and "protecting intellectual property" - raised by the commercialization and marketing of these technologies. By examining social and technical differences between genetic tests, and the associated corporate ethics challenges posed by their commercialization, our intent is to contribute to the nascent business ethics literature examining issues raised by the development and marketing of genetic tests. (shrink)

In this paper, I provide an epistemic evaluation of the harms that result from the widespread marketing of direct-to-consumer (DTC) genetic tests. While genetic tests are a valuable accessory diagnostic tool when ordered by a medical practitioner, there are different implications when they are sold directly to consumers. I aim to show that there are both epistemic and non-epistemic harms associated with the widespread commoditization of DTC genetic tests. I argue that the epistemic harms produced by DTC genetic tests have (...) been disregarded in discussions on the topic. Drawing on the notion of contributory epistemic injustices, I highlight two pertinent epistemic harms: (1) a failure to uptake an individual’s articulations about their identity and (2) the presiding reductionist framework dismisses useful hermeneutical resources. I then propose ways to mitigate these harms. (shrink)

It has been suggested that focusing on procedures when setting priorities for health care avoids the conflicts that arise when attempting to agree on principles. A prominent example of this approach is “accountability for reasonableness.” We will argue that the same problem arises with procedural accounts; reasonable people will disagree about central elements in the process. We consider the procedural condition of appeal process and three examples of conflicts over coverage decisions: a patients’ rights law in Norway, health technologies coverage (...) recommendations in the UK, and care withheld by HMOs in the US. In each case a process is at the center of controversy, illustrating the difficulties in establishing procedures that are widely accepted as legitimate. Further work must be done in developing procedural frameworks. (shrink)