The concept of downward causation is frequently used in an explanatory capacity in biology to account for certain regularities and processes. Some philosophers, however, argue that downward causation is metaphysically incoherent, providing three main objections. Underlying these objections is the assumption that entities are connected by compositional hierarchies of levels of organization. In this paper, I introduce the notions of weak and strong compositional relations using examples from evolutionary developmental biology. I argue that downward causation becomes unproblematic if we use (...) features of interventionist theories of causation to explain the causal relations between levels. I show that an interventionist account of downward causation successfully responds to the three central objections to downward causation in the philosophical literature and I clarify the explanatory usefulness of the concept in biology. As such, this paper provides an epistemic solution to demystify downward causation in the context of scientific practice. The solution proposed is compatible with how biologists seem to use a concept of downward causation fruitfully in their work. (shrink)

The role of reciprocal causation in Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES) is controversial. Proponents of EES argue that reciprocal causation is a key innovation, underpinning the necessity of EES. Conversely, critics of the EES maintain that Standard Evolutionary Theory (SET) adequately encompasses the concept of reciprocal causation, challenging the need for EES. This skepticism is rooted in two primary critiques. First, the mischaracterization of causal dynamics within SET by EES advocates leads to a misrepresentation of SET. Second, the oversight of how (...) SET incorporates and acknowledges instances of reciprocal causation leads to claims about the empirical inaptness of SET. As a result, the debate has reached an impasse, with limited progress towards a constructive examination of reciprocal causation’s significance to evolutionary explanations. This paper introduces the scope argument, which examines reciprocal causation through timescales and grain of explanations. This approach revitalizes the debate in two ways. First, reframing the debate in terms of scope clarifies the role of reciprocal causation by allowing research programs to specify targets of explanation. Second, the elements of scope (timescales and grain) elucidate the epistemic advantage of reciprocal causation in the respective research programs in question. (shrink)