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Tennant on knowable truth

Ratio 13 (2):99–114 (2000)

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  1. The incarnation and the knowability paradox.Jonathan Kvanvig - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):89 - 105.
    The best defense of the doctrine of the Incarnation implies that traditional Christianity has a special stake in the knowability paradox, a stake not shared by other theistic perspectives or by non-traditional accounts of the Incarnation. Perhaps, this stake is not even shared by antirealism, the view most obviously threatened by the paradox. I argue for these points, concluding that these results put traditional Christianity at a disadvantage compared to other viewpoints, and I close with some comments about the extent (...)
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  • Diamonds are a philosopher's best friends.Heinrich Wansing - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (6):591-612.
    The knowability paradox is an instance of a remarkable reasoning pattern (actually, a pair of such patterns), in the course of which an occurrence of the possibility operator, the diamond, disappears. In the present paper, it is pointed out how the unwanted disappearance of the diamond may be escaped. The emphasis is not laid on a discussion of the contentious premise of the knowability paradox, namely that all truths are possibly known, but on how from this assumption the conclusion is (...)
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  • The limits of neo‐aristotelian plenitude.Joshua Spencer - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):74-92.
    Neo‐Aristotelian Plenitude is the thesis that, necessarily, any property that could be had essentially by something or other is had essentially by something or other if and only if and because it is instantiated; any essentializable property is essentialized iff and because it is instantiated. In this paper, I develop a partial nonmodal characterization of ‘essentializable' and show it cannot be transformed into a full characterization. There are several seemingly insurmountable obstacles that any full characterization of essentializability must overcome. Moreover, (...)
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  • On a New Tentative Solution to Fitch’s Paradox.Alessandro Giordani - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):597-611.
    In a recent paper, Alexander argues that relaxing the requirement that sound knowers know their own soundness might provide a solution to Fitch’s paradox and introduces a suitable axiomatic system where the paradox is avoided. In this paper an analysis of this solution is proposed according to which the effective move for solving the paradox depends on the axiomatic treatment of the ontic modality rather than the limitations imposed on the epistemic one. It is then shown that, once the ontic (...)
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  • La conoscibilità e i suoi limiti.Davide Fassio - unknown
    The thesis includes six essays, each corresponding to a chapter, which have the target of widening the discussion on the limits of knowability through the consideration of some general problematics and the discussion of specific topics. The work is composed of two parts, each of three chapters. In the first part, the discussion is focused on a perspective proper of the philosophy of language. In particular, I consider the discussion on the limits of knowability from the point of view of (...)
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  • Discovering knowability: a semantic analysis.Sergei Artemov & Tudor Protopopescu - 2013 - Synthese 190 (16):3349-3376.
    In this paper, we provide a semantic analysis of the well-known knowability paradox stemming from the Church–Fitch observation that the meaningful knowability principle /all truths are knowable/, when expressed as a bi-modal principle F --> K♢F, yields an unacceptable omniscience property /all truths are known/. We offer an alternative semantic proof of this fact independent of the Church–Fitch argument. This shows that the knowability paradox is not intrinsically related to the Church–Fitch proof, nor to the Moore sentence upon which it (...)
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  • Truth and the enigma of knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.
    Since its disc overy by Fitch, the paradox of knowability has been a thorn in the anti-realist's side. Recently both Dummett and Tennant have sought to relieve the anti-realist by restricting the applicability of the knowability principle -- the principle that all truths are knowable -- which has been viewed as both a cardinal doctrine of anti-realism and the assumption for reductio of Fitch's argument. In this paper it is argued that the paradox of knowability is a peculiarly acute manifestation (...)
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  • Counterfactual knowability revisited.Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Synthese (2):1-15.
    Anti-realism is plagued by Fitch’s paradox: the remarkable result that if one accepts that all truths are knowable, minimal assumptions about the nature of knowledge entail that every truth is known. Dorothy Edgington suggests to address this problem by understanding p is knowable to be a counterfactual claim, but her proposal must contend with a forceful objection by Timothy Williamson. I revisit Edgington’s basic idea and find that Williamson’s objection is obviated by a refined understanding of counterfactual knowability that is (...)
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  • Fitch’s Paradox and Probabilistic Antirealism.Igor Douven - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):149-182.
    Fitch’s paradox shows, from fairly innocent-looking assumptions, that if there are any unknown truths, then there are unknowable truths. This is generally thought to deliver a blow to antirealist positions that imply that all truths are knowable. The present paper argues that a probabilistic version of antirealism escapes Fitch’s result while still offering all that antirealists should care for.
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  • Williamson’s Woes.Neil Tennant - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):9-23.
    This is a reply to Timothy Williamson ’s paper ‘Tennant’s Troubles’. It defends against Williamson ’s objections the anti-realist’s knowability principle based on the author’s ‘local’ restriction strategy involving Cartesian propositions, set out in The Taming of the True. Williamson ’s purported Fitchian reductio, involving the unknown number of books on his table, is analyzed in detail and shown to be fallacious. Williamson ’s attempt to cause problems for the anti-realist by means of a supposed rigid designator generates a contradiction (...)
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  • Introduction to knowability and beyond.Joe Salerno - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):1-8.
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  • Knowability, closure, and anti-realism.Sven Rosenkranz - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (1):59–75.
    In light of the paradox of knowability anti‐realists ought to revise their wholesale equation of truth and knowability, lest they be committed to the absurd conclusion that there are no truths that will never be known. The task accordingly becomes to identify the problematic statements the knowability of whose truth would force that conclusion and to restrict the equation in appropriate ways to all but the problematic statements. This restriction strategy was first implemented by Tennant. However, recently Williamson and Brogaard (...)
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  • Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge.Alexander Paseau - 2008 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (2):153-176.
    Fitch's argument purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. The argument exploits the fact that the knowledge predicate or operator is untyped and may thus apply to sentences containing itself. This article outlines a response to Fitch's argument based on the idea that knowledge is typed. The first part of the article outlines the philosophical motivation for the view, comparing it to the motivation behind typing truth. The second, formal part presents a logic (...)
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  • Distributed Knowability and Fitch’s Paradox.Rafał Palczewski - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (3):455-478.
    Recently predominant forms of anti-realism claim that all truths are knowable. We argue that in a logical explanation of the notion of knowability more attention should be paid to its epistemic part. Especially very useful in such explanation are notions of group knowledge. In this paper we examine mainly the notion of distributed knowability and show its effectiveness in the case of Fitch’s paradox. Proposed approach raised some philosophical questions to which we try to find responses. We also show how (...)
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  • Conceptos de cognoscibilidad.Jan Heylen & Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2023 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 23:287-308.
    Many philosophical discussions hinge on the concept of knowability. For example, there is a blooming literature on the so-called paradox of knowability. How to understand this notion, however? In this paper, we examine several approaches to the notion: the naive approach to take knowability as the possibility to know, the counterfactual approach endorsed by Edgington (1985) and Schlöder (2019) , approaches based on the notion of a capacity or ability to know (Fara 2010, Humphreys 2011), and finally, approaches that make (...)
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  • Ad Hoc Philosophy of Science.Thomas Johansson - 2019 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 50 (2):297-306.
    It has been shown that the concept of ad hocness is ambiguous when applied to natural science. Here, it is established that a similar ambiguity is present also when the concept is applied in a philosophical debate. Neil Tennant’s proposal for solving Fitch’s paradox has been accused for being ad hoc several times, and he has presented several defenses. In this paper, it is established that ad hocness is never defined, although each author uses different notions of the concept. And (...)
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  • Faint-hearted anti-realism and knowability.Robert G. Hudson - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (3):511-523.
    It is often claimed that anti-realists are compelled to reject the inference of the knowability paradox, that there are no unknown truths. I call those anti-realists who feel so compelled ‘faint-hearted’, and argue in turn that anti-realists should affirm this inference, if it is to be consistent. A major part of my strategy in defending anti-realism is to formulate an anti-realist definition of truth according to which a statement is true only if it is verified by someone, at some time. (...)
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  • Paradox Lost.Jon Cogburn - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):195 - 216.
    Frederic Fitch’s celebrated reasoning to the conclusion that all truths are known can be interpreted as a reductio of the claim that all truths are knowable. Given this, nearly all of the proof’s reception has involved canvassing the prospects for some form of verificationism. Unfortunately, debates of this sort discount much of the philosophical import of the proof. In addition to its relevance for verificationism, Fitch’s proof is also an argument for the existence of God, one at least as strong (...)
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  • Knowability Noir: 1945-1963.Joe Salerno - 2008 - In New Essays on the Knowability Paradox. Oxford, England and New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.
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