This article explores the theme of the 2021 ALTER conference “norms questioned by disability,” by proposing a parallel with the process of questioning norms carried out by gender studies. After a contextualization of the role of norms in sociology and the link between the interrogation of norms and collective mobilizations, two examples of this approach are identified and illustrated by comparing gender studies and disability studies: naming the unthought (e.g. evidence of hierarchy, evidence of bicategorization), and specifying a presumed neutral (...) (by demonstrating the situated character of norms, concepts or characteristics associated with a dominant group and previously perceived as neutral or universal). Using examples from the fields of work, organizations and politics, similarities are pointed out between the modes of reasoning of the two fields of study. If disability studies have been able to benefit from a certain number of analytical achievements of gender studies, they can reciprocally offer new approaches for the latter, notably around the issue of constructivism. (shrink)

Dependency functions as a keyword in care theory. However, care theorists have spelled out the ontological and moral ramifications of dependency in different and often conflicting ways. In this article, I argue that conceptual disputes about dependency betray a fundamental discordance among authors, rooted in the empirical premises of their arguments. Hence, although authors appear to share a vocabulary of dependency, they are not writing about quite the same phenomenon. I seek to elucidate these differences by teasing out and comparing (...) different conceptions of dependency found in the literature. Borrowing a phrase from Eva Kittay, I trace four “paradigm cases” of dependency: the infant, the physically disabled person, the profoundly intellectually disabled person, and the refugee. These paradigm cases serve as the empirical touchstone from which theorists extract their conceptions of dependency. Each paradigm case, moreover, permits a particular ethical sensibility toward care. How we understand and value dependency thus seems to determine how we understand and value care, and vice versa. In this way, I contend, our normative orientation toward care might influence what sorts of dependency we see—and, by extension, which forms of dependency we fail to notice. (shrink)