This essay is a review of Ronald Dworkin's recent essay on equality of resources. Many of the ideas discussed by Dworkin have also been examined by economists with, I believe, considerable insight. Unfortunately, economists tend to write for economists, not for philosophers, and their insights are seldom communicated properly to noneconomists. Of course, the same criticism can be levied on philosophers! But perhaps legal theorists are less subject to this criticism. One of the great contributions of Dworkin is that he (...) is very readable; and the quality of his exposition makes these ideas accessible to a wide audience of philosophers, lawyers, and social scientists in general. (shrink)

Rawls's difference principle, according to which social and economic inequalities are justified only if they achieve the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, has been often interpreted as a maximin-principle, in order to make it fit into the frame of welfare economics. Under this interpretation, however, the difference principle is subject to such grave objections, that it can hardly serve as a principle of justice. In order to avoid these difficulties, modifications of the difference principle have been proposed by Sen (...) and Rae. But these proposals don't lead to acceptable resolutions either. As an alternative, a new interpretation of Rawls's difference principle is proposed, which brings out the reasonable core of this principle and, at the same time, repairs the shortcomings of its earlier interpretations. (shrink)

A small set of allocation principles is said to be behind several theories of distributive justice. However, disagreement about the appropriate relationship between these notions remains, so that compromises between principles may generate more agreement. Truncated utilitarianism is a prominent candidate. It demands maximising total wealth subject to a floor level of individual wealth for all people. Based on some well-known distributive notions, we developed a questionnaire setting and confronted student respondents with corresponding allocation problems, where an exogenously given poverty (...) line served as a floor. However, support for allocations resulting from this specific interpretation of truncated utilitarianism remained rather low. This is surprising because the respective solution was close to an equal split of resources, and aspects of efficiency and responsibility were explicitly introduced to promote more general acceptance. We argue that people may either wish to see higher floor levels or are more inequality averse than probably expected. Moreover, high support for an unconditional consideration of the poverty line can be witnessed, even though aspects of responsibility, but not efficiency arguments, display an influence. In general, attitudes with respect to the equality–efficiency trade-off are found to remain heterogeneous, although different equality concerns are prominent. Furthermore, trade-offs are moderated by the responsibility principle. (shrink)