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The Thread of Life

Philosophical Quarterly 37 (146):114-116 (1984)

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  1. The child in time: Temporal concepts and self-consciousness in the development of episodic memory.Teresa McCormack & Christoph Hoerl - 2001 - In Chris Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. pp. 203-227.
    Investigates the roles of temporal concepts and self-consciousness in the development of episodic memory. According to some theorists, types of long-term memory differ primarily in the degree to which they involve or are associated with self-consciousness (although there may be no substantial differences in the kind of event information that they deliver). However, a known difficulty with this view is that it is not obvious what motivates introducing self-consciousness as the decisive factor in distinguishing between types of memory and what (...)
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  • (1 other version)Transparency and Imagining Seeing.Fabian Dorsch - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (3):173-200.
    In his paper, The Transparency of Experience, M.G.F. Martin has put forward a well- known – though not always equally well understood – argument for the disjunctivist, and against the intentional, approach to perceptual experiences. In this article, I intend to do four things: (i) to present the details of Martin’s complex argument; (ii) to defend its soundness against orthodox intentionalism; (iii) to show how Martin’s argument speaks as much in favour of experiential intentionalism as it speaks in favour of (...)
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  • IV—Empathy and First-Personal Imagining.Rae Langton - 2019 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 119 (1):77-104.
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  • The Phenomenal Separateness of Self: Udayana on Body and Agency.Chakravathi Ram-Prasad - 2011 - Asian Philosophy 21 (3):323-340.
    Classical Indian debates about ātman—self—concern a minimal or core entity rather than richer notions of personal identity. These debates recognise that there is phenomenal unity across time; but is a core self required to explain it? Contemporary phenomenologists foreground the importance of a phenomenally unitary self, and Udayana's position is interpreted in this context as a classical Indian approach to this issue. Udayana seems to dismiss the body as the candidate for phenomenal identity in a way similar to some Western (...)
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  • Neo-lockeanism and circularity.Scott Campbell - 2001 - Philosophia 28 (1-4):477-489.
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  • Will it be me? Identity, concern and perspective.Patrick Stokes - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):206-226.
    (2013). Will it be me? Identity, concern and perspective. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 206-226.
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  • (1 other version)On the 'hyperinsulation' and 'transparency' of imaginery situations.Jérome Pelletier - 2007 - In María José Frápolli (ed.), Saying, meaning and referring: essays on François Recanati's philosophy of language. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    I make a few comments concerning the way Recanati analyses imaginary situations in two realms : : the realm of the fictional and the realm of the ascription of beliefs.
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  • Analogical Uses of the First Person Pronoun: a Difficulty in Philosophical Semantics.Jérôme Pelletier - unknown
    Analogical counterfactuals such as “If I were you, I would do so and so...” create a puzzle for philosophical semantics. Whereas the ‘received view' in philosophical semantics has it that the first person pronoun always refers to its utterer, one may wonder whether this is still the case when the first person pronoun is embedded in analogical counterfactuals such as “If I were you, I would stay away from me”. I suggest that the intelligibility of lies in the fact that (...)
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