The child in time: Temporal concepts and self-consciousness in the development of episodic memory

In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. pp. 203-227 (2001)
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Abstract
Investigates the roles of temporal concepts and self-consciousness in the development of episodic memory. According to some theorists, types of long-term memory differ primarily in the degree to which they involve or are associated with self-consciousness (although there may be no substantial differences in the kind of event information that they deliver). However, a known difficulty with this view is that it is not obvious what motivates introducing self-consciousness as the decisive factor in distinguishing between types of memory and what role it is supposed to play in remembering. The authors argue that distinctions between different kinds of memory should be made initially on the basis of the ways in which they represent events. In particular, it is proposed that the way in which remembered events are located in time provides an important criterion for distinguishing between different types of memory. According to this view, if there is a link between memory development and self-consciousness, it is because some temporal concepts emerge developmentally only once certain self-conscious abilities are in place
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The Episodicity of Memory.Perrin, D. & Rousset, S.
On Being Stuck in Time.Hoerl, Christoph

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