Trolley cases are widely considered central to the ethics of autonomous vehicles. We caution against this by identifying four problems. Trolley cases, given technical limitations, rest on assumptions that are in tension with one another. Furthermore, trolley cases illuminate only a limited range of ethical issues insofar as they cohere with a certain design framework. Furthermore, trolley cases seem to demand a moral answer when a political answer is called for. Finally, trolley cases might be epistemically problematic in several ways. (...) To put forward a positive proposal, we illustrate how ethical challenges arise from mundane driving situations. We argue that mundane situations are relevant because of the specificity they require and the scale they exhibit. We then illustrate some of the ethical challenges arising from optimizing for safety, balancing safety with other values such as mobility, and adjusting to incentives of legal frameworks. (shrink)

In this paper, the ethical and spiritual aspects of the trolley problem are discussed in connection with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First, I show that the dropping of atomic bombs was a typical example of the events that contained the logic of the trolley problems in their decision-making processes and justifications. Second, I discuss five aspects of “the problem of the trolley problem;” that is to say, “Rarity,” “Inevitability,” “Safety Zone,” “Possibility of Becoming a Victim,” (...) and “Lack of Perspective of the Dead Victims Who Were Deprived of Freedom of Choice,” in detail. Third, I argue that those who talk about the trolley problem are automatically placed in the sphere of the expectation of response on the spiritual level. I hope that my contribution will shed light on the trolley problem from a very different angle, which has not been made by our fellow philosophers. (shrink)

Is evil a distinct moral concept? Or are evil actions just very wrong actions? Some philosophers have argued that evil is a distinct moral concept. These philosophers argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. Other philosophers have suggested that evil is only quantitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. On this view, evil is just very wrong. In this paper I argue that evil is qualitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing. The first part of the paper is critical. I argue that (...) Luke Russell’s attempt to show that evil is only quantitatively distinct from ordinary wrongdoing fails. Russell’s argument fails because it is based on an implausible criterion for determining whether two concepts are qualitatively distinct. I offer a more plausible criterion and argue that based on this criterion evil and wrongdoing are qualitatively distinct. To help make my case, I sketch a theory of evil which makes a genuinely qualitative distinction between evil and wrongdoing. I argue that we cannot characterize evil as just very wrong on plausible conceptions of evil and wrongdoing. I focus on act-consequentialist, Kantian, and contractarian conceptions of wrongdoing. (shrink)

Can there be an objective morality without God? Derek Parfit argues that it can and offers a theory of morality that is neither theistic nor naturalistic. This book provides a critical assessment of Parfit's metaethical theory. Jakobsen identifies some problems in Parfit’s theory – problems concerning moral normativity, the ontological status of morality, and evolutionary influence on our moral beliefs – and argues that theological resources can help solve them. By showing how Parfit’s theory may be improved by the help (...) of theology, Jakobsen demonstrates the relevance of theology in philosophical and metaethical debates and argues that Christian theism offers a better explanation of morality than what Parfit’s non-naturalism does. (shrink)

This paper deals with the core version of the Trolley Problem. In one case many people favor an act which will bring about the death of one person but save five other persons. In another case most people would refuse to “sacrifice” one person in order to save five other lives. Since the two cases seem similar in all relevant respects, we have to explain and justify the diverging verdicts. Since I don’t find current proposals of a solution convincing, I (...) propose an alternative one according to which —but not —violates two forms of equality. I also test the underlying egalitarian principle against other cases. I argue that it offers a good explanation and also a normative justification of our intuitive verdicts about the cases. (shrink)

Do non-human animals have moral standing? Work on this question has focused on choosing the right grounding property (for example, personhood or sentience) while little attention has been paid to the various ways that the connection between grounding properties and moral standing has been explained. In this paper, I address that gap by offering a fresh way to approach the debate over the grounds of moral standing, including a novel taxonomy of positions, and argue that one kind of position, which (...) takes a ‘value-first’ approach, is preferable to the other, which takes an ‘interests-first’ approach. According to value-first accounts, some individuals have moral standing because they have properties that make them valuable. According to interests-first accounts, some individuals have moral standing because they have interests, and any interest must always be taken into account. I argue that we should prefer value-first accounts because they engage directly with the problem the concept of moral standing is employed to solve, and because interests-first accounts cannot meet their explanatory burdens without begging the question against value-first accounts. (shrink)

Myšlenkové experimenty jsou populárním argumentačním nástrojem ve vědě i filosofii. Jejich kritika ze strany naturalistických a experimentálních filosofů vedla k vytvoření deflačních a minimalistických koncepcí, které oslabují epistemickou sílu myšlenkových experimentů a smiřují je s empirismem. Cílem článku je ukázat, že tyto pokusy nepřekonávají hlavní problémy, se kterými se myšlenkové experimenty ve filosofii střetávají. Omezená lidská racionalita a představivost znemožňují experimentátorům řešit nereálné scénáře spolehlivým způsobem. Myšlenkové experimenty se ve filosofii používají jinak než ve vědě, protože ty pravé jsou obvykle (...) neuskutečnitelné a uzavřené vůči možnosti empirické falsifikace. Navíc jsou založeny na vadných analogiích a neoprávněně přenášejí důkazní břemeno. Persvazivní úspěšnost myšlenkových experimentů je velmi nízká, a proto nedokáží přispět k řešení filosofických problémů. Závěrem článku je, že nejběžnější druhy myšlenkových experimentů by měly být odstraněny ze souboru filosofických metod. (shrink)

Kantian socialists at the turn of the twentieth century, as well as contemporary authors seeking a principle with which to condemn capitalism, have turned to Kant’s Formula of the End in Itself. This article assesses the arguments from FEI against capitalism from the perspective of the issues that arise in interpreting and applying Kant’s formula. There are various strategies with which a Kantian might use FEI to condemn conduct that Kant did not use FEI to condemn. The article asks whether (...) any of the existing arguments from FEI employ plausible versions of these strategies to derive a strict duty from that formula’s Never Merely as a Means principle that condemns capitalism. (shrink)

Kant, having identified the formulas of the supreme principle of morality, offers a succinct explanation of their interrelation. What Kant says is, “The above three ways of representing the principle of morality are at bottom only so many formulae of the very same law, and any one of them of itself unites the other two in it.”1 This claim – hereafter the “Unity Claim” – plays the role of the eccentric cousin in the family of Kant’s ethics: although glaringly present, (...) it is little spoken of, but seldom disowned. Most commentators, at any rate, focus their attention on more important matters, such as the content of the individual formulas, the moral psychology, or the deduction of freedom. Such matters are sufficiently absorbing to leave the Unity Claim often passed over without remark. But the Unity Claim should not be ignored. Kant does assert it, which compels us to attempt to find a place for it in his moral theory. It would seem to constrain the interpretation of the other, more momentous issues. How one interprets the content of the categorical imperative, in particular, would seem to be significantly restricted by the Unity Claim; one could not, given the Unity Claim, offer a complete interpretation of any single formula without also at least referring to the other formulas. And, as I shall argue in Part III below, the Unity Claim is no accident. Kant is committed to the Unity Claim by virtue of some basic features of his moral theory. This paper will thus offer what amounts to an extended commentary on the Unity Claim. I shall review the various suggestions of what it might mean, and how it might, or might not, be accommodated within Kant’s moral theory. The structure of this paper will be as such. Part II will examine the two main strategies for including the Unity Claim within Kant’s moral theory, and explain why they are both inadequate. Part III will examine the other main approach to the 2 Unity Claim: giving up on it.. (shrink)

Are computers on the way to acquiring “superintelligence”? Can human deliberation and decision-making be fully simulated by the mechanical execution of AI programmes? On close examination these expectations turn out not to be well-founded, since algorithms do, ultimately, have “heteronomous” characteristics. So-called AI-“autonomy” is a sensor-directed performance automatism, which — compared with the potential for ethical judgment in human “practical reason” — proves to be limited in significant ways. This is shown in some detail with reference to the idea of (...) a “digital humanism”, which was introduced by Julian Nida-Rümelin and Nathalie Weidenfeld, who argue that algorithms are useful “tools”, but emphasise — thus rejecting excessive “post-humanist” ideas about AI — that there exists a crucial difference between human action and its AI-simulation. While Nida-Rümelin/Weidenfeld´s “digital humanism” is, on the one hand, inspired by Kant’s conception of human autonomous self-determination, the concept of “structural rationality” that they advocate is, on the other hand, quite problematic. “Digital humanism”, however, can be improved as I argue — with reference to Barbara Herman’s analysis of “moral judgment” and to Allen Wood’s reflections on “human dignity”. (shrink)

How should autonomous vehicles be programmed to behave in the event of an unavoidable accident in which the only choice open is one between causing different damages or losses to different objects or persons? This paper addresses this ethical question starting from the normative principles elaborated in the law to regulate difficult choices in other emergency scenarios. In particular, the paper offers a rational reconstruction of some major principles and norms embedded in the Anglo-American jurisprudence and case law on the (...) “doctrine of necessity”; and assesses which, if any, of these principles and norms can be utilized to find reasonable guidelines for solving the ethical issue of the regulation of the programming of autonomous vehicles in emergency situations. The paper covers the following topics: the distinction between “justification” and “excuse”, the legal prohibition of intentional killing outside self-defence, the incommensurability of goods, and the legal constrains to the use of lethal force set by normative positions: obligations, responsibility, rights, and authority. For each of these principles and constrains the possible application to the programming of autonomous vehicles is discussed. Based on the analysis, some practical suggestions are offered. (shrink)

Nach Parfit konvergieren die systematisch stärksten Versionen von Kantianismus, Regel-Konsequentialismus und Kontraktualismus in einer Triple Theory. Ich konzentriere mich auf eine der zentralen Schwierigkeiten, Kantianismus und Konsequentialismus zusammenzubringen: die Rolle von Zustimmung, welche ihren deutlichsten Ausdruck in Kants Zweck-an-sich-Formel findet. Ich zeige zunächst, wie die Einführung unparteilicher, nichtmoralischer Gründe, auf der viel Gewicht in Parfits Zustimmungsprinzip liegt, in einigen Fällen die Zweck-an-sich-Formel zu dem intuitiv richtigen Ergebnis führen kann. Anschließend wende ich mich kritisch gegen Parfit. Ich diskutiere zwei Einwände gegen (...) Parfits Zustimmungsprinzip: Das Zustimmungsprinzip ist unterbestimmt und daher nicht relevant für die Fälle, die Kantianismus und Konsequentialismus unterscheiden. Zudem lässt das Zustimmungsprinzip, wie Parfit es versteht, mehr Instrumentalisierung zu, als Parfit selbst bereit ist einzuräumen. (shrink)

In Kantian Consequentialism, David Cummiskey argues that the central ideas of Kant's moral philosophy provide claims about value which, if applied consistently, lead to consequentialist normative principles. While Kant himself was not a consequentialist, Cummiskey thinks he should have been, given his fundamental positions in ethics. I argue that Cummiskey is mistaken. Cummiskey's argument relies on a non-Kantian idea about value, namely that value can be defined, and objects with value identified, conceptually prior to and independent of the choices that (...) a rational agent would make. The contrasting Kantian concept of value is that to possess value is to be the object of of rational choice. Inasmuch as Cummiskey gives no reason to reject the Kantian account of value in favour of his own account, his argument does not establish that Kant's ethics inevitably leads to normative consequentialism. (shrink)

Recently, business organizations have increasingly turned to a novel form of non-monetary incentives—that is, “gamification,” which refers to a motivation technique using video game elements, such as digital points, badges, and friendly competition in non-game contexts like workplaces. The introduction of gamification to the context of human resource management has immediately become embroiled in serious moral debates. Most notable is the accusation that using gamification as a motivation tool, employers exploit workers. This article offers an in-depth analysis of the moral (...) charge of exploitation. This article maintains that there are no clear grounds for believing that gamification of labor is exploitative and that if gamification of labor involves a wrong or vice, it must be something other than exploitation. (shrink)

Ido Geiger's paper ‘What it is the Use of the Universal Law Formula of the Categorical Imperative?’ is part of a growing trend in Kant scholarship, which stresses the significance of the rational competence of ordinary human beings. I argue that this approach needs to take into account that the common agent is an active reasoner who has the means to find out what she ought to do. The purpose of my paper is to show how universality already figures in (...) the active reasoning of pre-theoretical agents in the form of a common universalization test. I present textual evidence for this test, and argue that this conception does not present pre-theoretical moral cognition in an overly intellectualistic or mechanistic way. Finally, I discuss how, on the pre-theoretical level, universalization relates to humanity or a rational agent's special status. Universalization is present to common agents in the form of procedures or questions that we ask ourselves, humanity as an awareness of certain particularly blatant violat.. (shrink)

This paper deals with the core version of the Trolley Problem. In one case many people favor an act which will bring about the death of one person but save five other persons. In another case most people would refuse to “sacrifice” one person in order to save five other lives. Since the two cases seem similar in all relevant respects, we have to explain and justify the diverging verdicts. Since I don’t find current proposals of a solution convincing, I (...) propose an alternative one according to which —but not —violates two forms of equality. I also test the underlying egalitarian principle against other cases. I argue that it offers a good explanation and also a normative justification of our intuitive verdicts about the cases. (shrink)

Gedankenexperimente in der Philosophie zeichnen sich durch ein widersprüchliches Verhältnis aus: Sie werden gleichzeitig häufig genutzt und vielfältig kritisiert. Im Zentrum der Kritik steht dabei das Szenario sowie seine teilweise als absurd wahrgenommenen Details. Als Verteidigungsstrategie der Methode wird daher zum einen versucht, realistische Gedankenexperimente zu bevorzugen, zum anderen, das Argument hinter dem Szenario deutlicher in den Fokus zu rücken. Im Zuge dessen wird jedoch das eigentlich Charakteristische an einem Gedankenexperiment – das Szenario – vernachlässigt. Um die Relevanz des Szenarios (...) zu betonen, soll in diesem Aufsatz ein Blick in die Wissenschaftsforschung geworfen werden. Mithilfe von Überlegungen Ludwik Flecks, Bruno Latours und David Kirbys wird die Bedeutsamkeit von Transformationsprozessen wissenschaftlicher Theorien gezeigt. Mit Veränderungsstrategien wie dem Visualisieren und Generieren von Aufmerksamkeit versuchen Wissenschaftler*innen, ihre Theorien sowohl im Kreis der Kolleg*innen als auch in der breiten Öffentlichkeit zu verbreiten. Wissenschaftskommunikation hat dabei einen epistemologischen Stellenwert für die wissenschaftliche Praxis. Die These, die in diesem Aufsatz vertreten wird, ist, dass Gedankenexperimente hierbei die Funktion von Vermittlungsinstrumenten zwischen den beiden Kreisen der wissenschaftsinternen und -externen Kommunikation einnehmen. Dies soll mit der Analyse eines konkreten Beispiels – dem Geiger-Gedankenexperiment aus der angewandten Ethik – plausibel gemacht werden. Bei der Untersuchung, wie dieses Gedankenexperiment wissenschaftlich bzw. populär dargestellt und diskutiert wird, fällt auf, dass dabei das Szenario im Zentrum der Aufmerksamkeit steht. Die eigentliche Argumentation hingegen wird meist nur aus dem Szenario missverständlich abgeleitet. Aus dieser Analyse lassen sich zwei mögliche Reaktionen ableiten: Zum einen kann sie als Begründung dafür verstanden werden, kritisch mit der Methode Gedankenexperiment umzugehen. Zum anderen – und dies ist die Position, die in diesem Aufsatz starkgemacht werden soll – kann die Beobachtung, dass das absurde Szenario des Geiger-Gedankenexperiments so populär ist, die These untermauern, dass Gedankenexperimente strategisch zur Vermittlung genutzt werden können. Absurde Szenarien können dabei hilfreich sein, weil sie Aufmerksamkeit wecken, in Erinnerung bleiben und zur Diskussion anregen. Insbesondere im Bereich der angewandten Ethik, die interdisziplinär diskutierte Themen behandelt, können Gedankenexperimente genutzt werden, um einen Diskurs zu öffnen und eine gemeinsame Diskussionsbasis zu schaffen. (shrink)

The kantian idea according to which only people can claim respect and only for them can moral rights exist, yet, at the same time, not all human beings are people in this strict prescriptive sense, contains considerable potential of exclusion. From this view, the present article reconstructs the architecture of Kant’s moral philosophy and investigates thescope and the limits of the different proposals of solution based on his theory.