Scientific Realism (SR) has three crucial aspects: 1) the centrality of the concept of truth, 2) the idea that success is a reliable indicator of truth, and 3) the idea that the Inference to the Best Explanation is a reliable inference rule. It will be outlined how some realists try to overcome the difficulties which arise in justifying such crucial aspects relying on an adaptationist view of evolutionism, and why such attempts are inadequate. Finally, we will briefly sketch some of (...) the main difficulties the realist has to face in defending those crucial aspects, and how such difficulties are deeply related: they derive from the inability of SR to satisfyingly avoid the sceptical challenge of the criterion of truth. Indeed, SR seems not to be able to fill the so-called ‘epistemic gap’ (Sankey 2008). In fact, the epistemic gap cannot be filled in no way other than obtaining a criterion of truth, but such a criterion cannot be obtained if the epistemic gap obtains. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to argue for a new version of ‘inference-to-the-best-explanation’ scientific realism, which I characterize as Best Theory Realism or ‘BTR’. On BTR, the realist needs only to embrace a commitment to the truth or approximate truth of the best theories in a field, those which are unique in satisfying the highest standards of empirical success in a mature field with many successful but falsified predecessors. I argue that taking our best theories to be true is (...) justified because it provides the best explanation of the predictive success of their predecessors and their own special success. Against standard and especially structural realism, I argue against the claim that the best explanations of the success of theories is provided by identifying their true components, such as structural relations between unobservable, which are preserved across theory change. In particular, I criticize Ladyman's and Carrier’s structural account of the success of phlogiston theory, and Worrall's well-known structural account of the success of Fresnel’s theory of light. I argue that these accounts tacitly assume the truth of our best theories, which in any case provides a better explanation of these theories’ success than the structural account. Structural realism is now defended as the only version of realism that is able to surmount the pessimistic meta-induction and the general problem that successful theories involve ontological claims concerning unobservable entities that are abandoned and falsified in theory-change. I argue that Best Theory Realism can overcome the pessimistic meta-induction and this general problem posed by theory-change. Our best theories possess a characteristic which sharply distinguishes them from their successful but false predecessors. Furthermore ‘inference-to-the-best-explanation’ confirmation can establish the truth of our best theories and thus trumps the pessimistic inductive reasoning which is supposed to show that even our best theories are most likely false in their claims concerning unobservable entities and processes. (shrink)

A central aim for philosophers of science has been to understand scientific theory change, or more specifically the rationality of theory change. Philosophers and historians of science have suggested that not only theories but also scientific methods and standards of rational inquiry have changed through the history of science. The topic here is methodological change, and what kind of theory of rational methodological change is appropriate. The modest ambition of this paper is to discuss in what ways results in formal (...) theories of belief revision can throw light on the question of what an appropriate theory of methodological change would look like. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the position that the aim of science is to advance on truth and increase knowledge about observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world which we inhabit. This book articulates and defends that position. In presenting a clear formulation and addressing the major arguments for scientific realism Sankey appeals to philosophers beyond the community of, typically Anglo-American, analytic philosophers of science to appreciate and understand the doctrine. The book emphasizes the epistemological aspects of scientific realism and contains (...) an original solution to the problem of induction that rests on an appeal to the principle of uniformity of nature. (shrink)

There are two chief tasks which confront the philosophy of scientific method. The first task is to specify the methodology which serves as the objective ground for scientific theory appraisal and acceptance. The second task is to explain how application of this methodology leads to advance toward the aim(s) of science. In other words, the goal of the theory of method is to provide an integrated explanation of both rational scientific theory choice and scientific progress.

In a recent exchange, John Worrall and Larry Laudan have debated the merits of the model of rational scientific change proposed by Laudan in his book Science and Values. On the model advocated by Laudan, rational change may take place at the level of scientific theory and methodology, as well as at the level of the epistemic aims of science. Moreover, the rationality of a change which occurs at any one of these three levels may be dependent on considerations at (...) the remaining levels. Yet, in spite of the avowedly anti-relativistic motivation of Laudan's model, Worrall criticizes Laudan for irrevocably relativizing scientific rationality to historically variant methodological standards. (shrink)

It is surely obvious that medicine, like any other rational activity, must be based on evidence. The interest is in the details: how exactly are the general principles of the logic of evidence to be applied in medicine? Focussing on the development, and current claims of the ‘Evidence-Based Medicine’ movement, this article raises a number of difficulties with the rationales that have been supplied in particular for the ‘evidence hierarchy’ and for the very special role within that hierarchy of randomized (...) controlled trials (and meta-analyses of the results of randomized controlled trials). The point is not at all to question the application of a scientific approach to evidence in medicine, but, on the contrary, to indicate a number of areas where philosophers of science can contribute to a proper implementation of exactly that scientific-evidential approach. (shrink)

Philosophers of science are divided over the interpretations of scientific normativity. Larry Laudan defends a sort of goal-directed rules for scientific methodology. In contrast, Gerard Doppelt thinks methodological rules are a mixed batch of rules in that some are goal-oriented hypothetical rules and others are goal-independent categorical rules. David Resnik thinks that the debate between them is at a standstill now. He further thinks there are certain rules, such as the rule of consistency which is goal independent. However, he proposes (...) a holistic understanding of the scientific methodology. Taking a thread from Resnik, the present paper also advocates a holistic understanding of the scientific methodology. Given that many scientific practices deal with systems, the focus will be given to the systems by assuming each as a constellation of methodological norms. By taking each system as a set of mutually supportive methodological rules whose instrumental values underwrite the coherence relation among them, the paper aims to provide what could be a viable holistic epistemological account that can explain scientific normativity at work in a scientific system. The paper will lay down specific holistic criteria for understanding the scientific methodology. They will be used to show how a holistic account could satisfactorily account for the success of the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) experiment in discovering the Higgs boson and how the holistic account can account for the instrumental error behind the apparent faster-than-light neutrino anomaly of the Oscillation Project with Emulsion-t Racking Apparatus (OPERA) experiments respectively. (shrink)

Based on the material in the Lakatos Archive, this paper reconstructs, and then re-assesses, Lakatos’ epistemological project by placing it in the context of the debate on the role of reason in the history of science, and of the justification of rationality as a normative notion. It is claimed that Lakatos’ most fruitful ideas come from a peculiar philosophical combination of Hegelian historicism and Popperian fallibilism. The original tension, however, cannot be ultimately resolved. As a consequence, the problems that Lakatos (...) has to deal with in his attempt to justify a set of genuinely epistemological canons of scientific rationality that are not reducible to psychology or sociology of knowledge stand as a warning for any normative philosophy of science that takes history at its face value.Author Keywords: Lakatos; History; Method; Rationality. (shrink)

This paper explores the relationship between scepticism and epistemic relativism in the context of recent history and philosophy of science. More specifically, it seeks to show that significant treatments of epistemic relativism by influential figures in the history and philosophy of science draw upon the Pyrrhonian problem of the criterion. The paper begins with a presentation of the problem of the criterion as it occurs in the work of Sextus Empiricus. It is then shown that significant treatments of epistemic relativism (...) in recent history and philosophy of science (critical rationalism, historical philosophy of science and the strong programme) draw upon the problem of the criterion. It is briefly suggested that a particularist response to the problem of the criterion may be put to good use against epistemic relativism. (shrink)

Some think that issues to do with scientific method are last century's stale debate; Popper was an advocate of methodology, but Kuhn, Feyerabend, and others are alleged to have brought the debate about its status to an end. The papers in this volume show that issues in methodology are still very much alive. Some of the papers reinvestigate issues in the debate over methodology, while others set out new ways in which the debate has developed in the last decade. The (...) book will be of interest to philosophers and scientists alike in the reassessment it provides of earlier debates about method and current directions of research. (shrink)

In order to understand consciousness one would benefit from developing a more eclectic intellectual style. Consciousness is, as proposed by almost everyone except the stubborn reductionists, a truly mysterious concept. Its study and dissection merits a multidisciplinary approach. Waving this multidisciplinary flag has positively enlarged the discussion and neurologists, psychiatrists, mathematicians, and so on, have moved to the philosophy of mind arena, first with caution and now with a more powerful voice. Identifying what we mean by consciousness is a first (...) step even when we want to deny its existence. The link between consciousness and some other mental activity is a logical next step and there is abundant literature doing this, but not all of them differentiate among associated yet different phenomena. (shrink)

Philosophers of science are divided over the interpretations of scientific normativity. Larry Laudan defends a sort of goal-directed rules for scientific methodology. In contrast, Gerard Doppelt thinks methodological rules are a mixed batch of rules in that some are goal-oriented hypothetical rules and others are goal-independent categorical rules. David Resnik thinks that the debate between them is at a standstill now. He further thinks there are certain rules, such as the rule of consistency which is goal independent. However, he proposes (...) a holistic understanding of the scientific methodology. Taking a thread from Resnik, the present paper also advocates a holistic understanding of the scientific methodology. Given that many scientific practices deal with systems, the focus will be given to the systems by assuming each as a constellation of methodological norms. By taking each system as a set of mutually supportive methodological rules whose instrumental values underwrite the coherence relation among them, the paper aims to provide what could be a viable holistic epistemological account that can explain scientific normativity at work in a scientific system. The paper will lay down specific holistic criteria for understanding the scientific methodology. They will be used to show how a holistic account could satisfactorily account for the success of the Compact Muon Solenoid (CMS) experiment in discovering the Higgs boson and how the holistic account can account for the instrumental error behind the apparent faster-than-light neutrino anomaly of the Oscillation Project with Emulsion-t Racking Apparatus (OPERA) experiments respectively. (shrink)

Alternatives in the History of Science. The paper deals with the function of the scientist's subjective activity in the research process. This will be discussed at the background of the discourse between distant action and narrow action theories of electromagnetism in 19th century physics. The analysis shows in which high degree the protagonists of these theories regarded this situation consciously as a bifurcation in the development of their science. This article describes then how the history of science values the case. (...) The result of this valuation is dependent on the different philosophical points of view. Finally we point out some desiderata for the further discussion on methodology of science that would be the consequence of the acknowledgement of real bifurcations in scientific thought. (shrink)

Uno de los mayores desafíos que enfrenta el realismo científico es la tesis de la inconmensurabilidad. Consideramos, empero, que la teoría descriptiva causal de la referencia puede determinar si hay alguna continuidad referencial en un cambio de teoría y, específicamente, en qué circunstancias se daría. Tras caracterizarla brevemente, la someteremos a prueba mediante un análisis de caso, a saber, las diferentes caracterizaciones de ‘órbita’ en la astronomía antigua. Ello supone dilucidar cuáles son las propiedades fundamentales por las cuales la órbita (...) ejerce su función. La continuidad referencial se podrá establecer si constatamos que las descripciones causales nucleares de las distintas nociones de órbita, son equivalentes. Este estudio de caso, además, constituye una oportunidad para ahondar en la reflexión: ¿sirve el descriptivismo causal como argumento a favor del realismo científico? ¿Es factible aplicarlo? ¿Cuál es su alcance? Estas y otras preguntas se suscitan a partir del análisis propuesto. (shrink)

Scientific Ontology: Integrating Naturalized Metaphysics and Voluntarist Epistemology, Anjan Chakravartty (2017) New York: Oxford University Press, 296 pp., ISBN 978 0 19065 145 9, h/bk, £53.00.

Philosophers use historical case studies to support wide-ranging claims about science. This practice is often criticized as problematic. In this paper we suggest that the function of case studies can be understood and justified by analogy to a well-established practice in biology: the investigation of model organisms. We argue that inferences based on case studies are no more problematic than inferences from model organisms to larger classes of organisms in biology. We demonstrate our view in detail by reference to a (...) case study with a long history: Semmelweis’s discovery of the cause of childbed fever. (shrink)

Abstract This paper attempts to clarify the debate between those philosophers who hold that the development of science is governed by objective standards of rationality and those sociologists of science who deny this. In particular it focuses on the debate over the ?symmetry thesis?. Bloor and Barnes argue that a properly scientific approach to science itself demands that an investigator should seek the same general type of explanation for all decisions and actions by past scientists, quite independently of whether or (...) not she or he happens to agree with those decisions or approve those actions as ?correct? or ?rational?. I try to improve on previous treatments of the ?rationalist? position (by Lakatos, Laudan, Newton?Smith and Brown) and clarify the exact asymmetries to which the ?rationalist? is, and is not, committed. (shrink)

Se discute el análisis de M. Williams de la Concepción de la Fundamentación Previa de la justificación epistémica –una concepción supuestamente detrás del trilema de Agripa– y se le contrasta con la Concepción del Desafío por Defecto – la concepción alternativa de la justificación epistémica propugnada por Williams. Se argumenta que los privilegios epistémicos predeterminados de la CDD son un eufemismo para estipulaciones epistémicamente arbitrarias, asimismo se argumenta que mientras el CFP puede conducir a paradojas escépticas, la CDD conduce a (...) un pancriticismo paradójico y que cuál de estas dos paradojas preferir es un asunto de gusto o temperamento. Finalmente se arguye que la CDD no es ni una adecuada descripción de nuestra práctica filosófica, ni tampoco de nuestra práctica epistémica cotidiana. Se concluye entonces que la CFP es la concepción superior, aun si pudiese conducir al escepticismo pirrónico. Concluimos argumentando abiertamente en favor de un tipo de dogmatismo no epistémico con implicaciones pirrónicas para las presuposiciones absolutas de la ciencia Estas consecuencias, sin embargo, no tienen por qué ser incompatibles con la investigación científica. (shrink)

I defend a realist commitment to the truth of our most empirically successful current scientific theories—on the ground that it provides the best explanation of their success and the success of their falsified predecessors. I argue that this Best Current Theory Realism (BCTR) is superior to preservative realism (PR) and the structural realism (SR). I show that PR and SR rest on the implausible assumption that the success of outdated theories requires the realist to hold that these theories possessed truthful (...) components. PR is undone by the fact that past theories succeeded even though their ontological claims about unobservables are false. SR backpeddles to argue that the realist is only committed to the truth about the structure of relations implied by the outdated theory, in order to explain its success. I argue that the structural component of theories is too bare-bones thin to explain the predictive/explanatory success of outdated theories. I conclude that BCTR can meet these objections to PR and SR, and also overcome the pessimistic meta-induction. (shrink)

Selective realist projects have made significant improvements over the last two decades. Judging by the literature, however, antirealist quarters seem little impressed with the results. Section I considers the selectivist case and its perceived shortcomings. One shortcoming is that selectivist offerings are nuanced in ways that deprive them of features that—according to many—cannot be absent from any realism “worth having”. Section II considers eight features widely required of realist positions, none of them honored by selectivist projects. Modulo those requirements, even (...) if selectivists managed to clear other shortcomings of their project selectivism would still not be a position worth considering. Next the historical background and present credentials of the requirements in question are examined. All are found to rest on myths and confusions about science and knowledge. If this is correct, realists and antirealists should reject the requirements. (shrink)

La búsqueda de justificación epistémica para los presupuestos metodológicos y axiológicos más básicos de la ciencia ha de enfrentarse al trilema de Agrippa. Se argumenta que la regresión al infinito -aun si esta regresión es solo potencial- y la circularidad no son las mejores alternativas del trilema y que el mejor disyunto es un dogmatismo minimalista, siendo uno de sus dogmas el siguiente condicional: Si nuestros presupuestos metodológicos y axiológicos más básicos de carácter científico fuesen los correctos, entonces las teorías (...) científicas seleccionadas por estos presupuestos serían probable, o aproximadamente, verdaderas. The search of epistemic justification for the most basic methodological and axiological presuppositions of science has to deal with Agrippa's trilemma.It is argued that infinite regress - even if it is only a potential regress - and circularity are not the best alternatives of the trilemma and that the best disjunct is a minimalist dogmatism, with the following conditional, as one of its dogmas: If our most basic methodological and axiological scientific presuppositions were the correct ones, then the scientific theories selected by these presuppositions would be the probably, or the approximately, true ones. (shrink)

In april 1872, with the caisson at a depth of seventy-odd feet and still no bedrock, two men died. The strain for Roebling was nearly unbearable, as his wife later said. On May 18, a third man died, and that same day Roebling made the most difficult and courageous decision of the project. Staking everything — the success of the bridge, his reputation, his career - he ordered a halt. The New York tower, he had concluded, could stand where it (...) was, at a depth of 78 feet 6 inches, not on bedrock, but on “hardpack” sand. From examinations of the strata he had determined to his own satisfaction that no movement had occured at the level since the time of deposit millions of years in the geologic past; so, he said, it was “good enough to found upon”. (shrink)

The topic of this study is to what extent standards of rational inquiry can be rationally criticized and revised. It is argued that it is rational to treat all such standards as open to criticism and revision. Arguments to the effect that we are fallible with regard to all standards of rational inquiry are presented. Standards cannot be ultimately justified and with certainty established either as adequate or as inescapable presuppositions. Apel's attempt to give ultimate justifications of certain moral and (...) logical rules is examined and criticized. Special attention is given to our fallibility with regard to logical inference rules. The idea that certain logical rules cannot be put into question because any critical argument presupposes them is criticized. It has been claimed that there must be some basic standards which are such that they cannot be rationally evaluated and hence are rationally unrevisable. This is called "the unrevisability thesis". Related to this thesis is the normative policy according to which rationality requires that some standards be treated as unrevisable, the unrevisability policy. Two arguments that have been used to defend the unrevisability thesis and policy are examined and criticized. The conclusion is that we are not forced to accept either the thesis or the policy. The negation of the unrevisability policy is the revisability policy, according to which it is rational to treat all standards as open to rational criticism and revision. Objections that have been directed against the revisability policy are discussed and criticized. According to the objections, the revisability policy leads to rationality relativism. These objections are refuted, and it is argued that it is, on the contrary, rational to adopt the revisability policy and treat all standards of rational inquiry as criticizable and revisable. It is proposed that the rational change of standards should be viewed as a bootstrap process. General features of a bootstrap view of rational change of standards are presented, and it is argued that it is impossible to formulate a real theory of bootstrapping. Two models of standard change are presented and discussed: Laudan's reticulated model of scientific rationality and Briskman's bootstrap theory. It is claimed that in spite of defects and limitations, these models contribute to a richer understanding of bootstrapping. The fallibility and revisability of standards of rational inquiry have consequences for how the normativity of rationality should be understood. The book ends with an account of how the rationality of cognitive actions is related to the idea of the adequacy of standards. A distinction between absolute and standard-relative rationality is made, and it is argued that what an inquiring agent rationally ought to do coincides with what it is standard-relatively rational for him to do. It is shown that this view of rationality of inquiry is nevertheless inconsistent with rationality relativism, and that it is compatible with an objectivistic view of rationality. (shrink)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Hawaii at Manoa, 1991.

In the methodology of scientific research programs (MSRP) there are important features on the problem of prediction, especially regarding novel facts. In his approach, Imre Lakatos proposed three different levels on prediction: aim, process, and assessment. Chapter 5 pays attention to the characterization of prediction in the methodology of research programs. Thus, it takes into account several features: (1) its pragmatic characterization, (2) the logical perspective as a proposition, (3) the epistemological component, (4) its role in the appraisal of research (...) programs, and (5) its place as a value for scientific research. -/- The notion of “novel facts” is highly relevant in his conception, where several aspects are involved: the directions of novel facts, the different kinds of novelty, and the transition from six possible options of “novel facts” to four choices. Thereafter, the prediction of novel facts as the criterion of appraisal is considered. On the one hand, this requires analyzing the theoretical, empirical, and heuristic possibilities of appraisal; and, on the other, whether there is an overemphasis on the role of prediction in methodology of scientific research programs. As a consequence, there is an analysis of Lakatos’ criterion of appraisal in MSRP and economics. (shrink)

Doppelt (1986,1990), Siegel (1990), and Rosenberg (1996) argue that the pivotal feature of Laudan's normative naturalism, namely his axiology, lacks a naturalistic foundation. In this paper I show that this objection turns on a misunderstanding of Laudan's use of the term 'naturalism'. Specifically, I argue that there are two important senses of naturalism running through Laudan's work. Once these two strands are made explicit, the objection raised by Doppelt and others simply disappears.