Despite its long period of dominance, the details of associationism as developed by the British Empiricists in the 18th and 19th centuries are often ignored or forgotten today. Perhaps as a result, modern understandings of Empiricist associationism are often oversimplified. In fact, there is no single core view that can be viewed as definitional, or even weaker, as characteristic, of the tradition. The actual views of associationists in this tradition are much more diverse than any such view would allow, even (...) on fundamental aspects of the concept of association. This paper presents some of the most striking theoretical diversity and most significant discussions within the Empiricist associationist tradition. Recognizing this diversity, Empiricist associationism is best viewed as a project with shared questions and methods rather than a shared substantive theory of mind. This discussion can inform our understanding of the historical tradition, and also inform our current use of association and associationism. The concept of association is more flexible than it is often treated, and even its basic nature and function remain up for debate. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that knowledge of emotions essentially depends on introspecting the phenomenology of emotional experiences, and that introspection of emotional experiences is a process by stages, where the most fundamental stage is a non-classificatory introspective state, i.e., one that does not depend on the subject’s classifying the introspected emotion as an instance of any experience type. We call such a non-classificatory kind of introspection primitive introspection. Our main goal is to show that, although not sufficient, primitive introspection (...) is a necessary ground to acquire knowledge of emotions. Our main argument is phenomenological: by examining a variety of examples, we suggest that an accurate analysis of the introspective process through which one comes to know, or refines one’s knowledge of, one’s current emotion requires that one primitively introspects it. (shrink)

Throughout his career, Wundt recognized Völkerpsychologie (VP) as (at first) ancillary to experimental psychology or (later) as its required complement. New scholarship from around 1979 highlighted this fact while claiming to correct a picture of Wundt as a pure associationist, attributed to Boring’s History of Experimental Psychology, by instead emphasizing apperception in Wundt’s scheme (sec. 2). The criticisms of Boring, summarized by Blumenthal in 1980, overshot the mark. Boring’s Wundt was no pure associationist. Both Boring and the seventy-niner historians emphasized (...) psychic activity in Wundt. Section 3 considers Wundt’s endorsements of mental chemistry, elements, association, and psychological explanation via combinations of elements. Section 4 follows Wundt’s changing conceptions of VP; looks into the relations between VP and experiment, especially as regards “higher” mental processes; examines the (sometimes cooperative) interactions between individual (including experimental) psychology and VP; and considers how method, not type of mental process, distinguishes the two branches of psychology. Finally, section 5 acknowledges Wundt’s unification of VP and individual psychology and concludes that although he objected to the Würzburgers’ experimental methods in treating higher mental processes, he did not generally exclude the latter from experimental investigation, contrary to the seventy-niner narrative, which has been widely adopted. (shrink)

Within the discipline of psychology, the conventional history outlines the development of two fundamental approaches to the scientific study of emotion—“basic emotion” and “appraisal” traditions. In this article, we outline the development of a third approach to emotion that exists in the psychological literature—the “psychological constructionist” tradition. In the process, we discuss a number of works that have virtually disappeared from the citation trail in psychological discussions of emotion. We also correct some misconceptions about early sources, such as work by (...) Darwin and James. Taken together, these three contributions make for a fuller and more accurate account of ideas about emotion during the century stretching from 1855 to just before 1960. (shrink)

In various guises (usually referred to as the “basic emotion” or “discrete emotion” approach), scientists and philosophers have long argued that certain categories of emotion are natural kinds. In a recent paper, Colombetti (2009) proposed yet another natural kind account, and in so doing, characterized and critiqued psychological constructionist approaches to emotion, including our own Conceptual Act Model. In this commentary, we briefly address three topics raised by Columbetti. First, we correct several common misperceptions about the discrete emotion approach to (...) emotion. Second, we discuss misconceptions of our Conceptual Act Model. Finally, we briefly comment on Columbetti's Dynamical Discrete Emotion model. (shrink)

Using artificial emotions helps in making human-robot interaction more personalised, natural, and so more likeable. In the case of humanoid robots with constrained facial expression, the literature concentrates on the expression of emotions by using other nonverbal interaction channels. When using multi-modal communication, indeed, it is important to understand the effect of the combination of such non-verbal cues, while the majority of the works addressed only the role of single channels in the human recognition performance. Here, we present an attempt (...) to analyse the effect of the combination of different animations expressing the same emotion or different ones. Results show that when an emotion is successfully expressed using a single channel, the combination of this channel with other animations, that may have lower recognition rates, appears to be less communicative. (shrink)

Using artificial emotions helps in making human-robot interaction more personalised, natural, and so more likeable. In the case of humanoid robots with constrained facial expression, the literature concentrates on the expression of emotions by using other nonverbal interaction channels. When using multi-modal communication, indeed, it is important to understand the effect of the combination of such non-verbal cues, while the majority of the works addressed only the role of single channels in the human recognition performance. Here, we present an attempt (...) to analyse the effect of the combination of different animations expressing the same emotion or different ones. Results show that when an emotion is successfully expressed using a single channel, the combination of this channel with other animations, that may have lower recognition rates, appears to be less communicative. (shrink)

In Nyāya philosophy, a special kind of extraordinary sensory connection is admitted named jñānalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti or jñānalakṣaṇa sannikarṣa. It is held that sometimes our sense-organ can be connected to such an object which is not amenable to the operating sense-organ. In such cases, cognition (jñāna) plays the role of sensory connection and connects the content of itself to the operating sense-organ. The paradigmatic example of jñānalakṣaṇa perception is to ‘see’ fragrant sandal through visual sense from non-smellable distance. This hypothesis of (...) jñānalakṣaṇa has been criticized by the opponents being considered as counterintuitive, mysterious and theoretically overloaded. This paper tries to demystify the notion. It shows that although it seems to be metaphysically mysterious phenomenon at first sight, it is not so at all. The paper explores the psychological process involved in this sensory connection. The hypothesis is shown to have sufficient explanatory power, because the Naiyāyikas have used this hypothesis to explain five different epistemic situations. Hence, this paper argues that it is not a theoretical overload. The opponents counter-argue that all those five cognitive situations can be explained without admitting jñānalakṣaṇa. Moreover, if we admit jñānalakṣaṇa, then a particular kind of inference will become redundant. The paper answers all those objections and defends the hypothesis. The second part of the paper presents an empirical evidence in support of the hypothesis. The arguments leveled against the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa can be contested on the ground that they try to disprove something which is supported on experimental ground. Experiments represent universally acceptable objective facts supported by experience—denying which amounts to anubhavavirodha, which philosophers would want to avoid. Hence, supporting jñānalakṣaṇa on the ground of scientific experiments can be considered as a philosophical stand. Now, there is a clinically recognized and neurophysiologically proved condition, called synaesthesia, where stimulation of a particular sensory modality automatically and involuntarily activates a different sensory modality simultaneously without a direct stimulation of the second modality. As for example, when a sound → colour synaesthete listens to a particular tone such as C-sharp, she visualizes particular colour, such as blue, in her mind’s eye; for a grapheme → colour synaesthete a particular number or alphabet is always tinged with a particular colour. This paper shows that the cognitive process involved in synaesthesia lends support to the hypothesis of jñānalakṣaṇa pratyāsatti. It has been proved through several experiments that it is a genuine perceptual phenomenon and is not a confabulation of memory. There are several alternative theories which explain the phenomenon neurophysiologically. The paper discusses the most popular one: the cross-activation hypothesis. There are two major objections against the project of comparing jñānalakṣaṇa with synaesthesia. First, synaesthesia is a neurological condition present in a few numbers of people whereas jñānalakṣaṇa is claimed to be universal phenomenon. Second, syneasthesia is a sensory experience whereas jñānalakṣaṇa involves application of concepts. The paper answers these questions. Firstly, multimodal processing in the brain is a universal phenomenon; secondly, there is a form of synaesthesia where top-down processing is involved. In those cases, concepts play important role for having synaesthetic experience. (shrink)

Despite the compelling subjective experience of executive self-control, we argue that ‘consciousness’ contains no top-down control processes. We propose that ‘consciousness’ involves no executive, causal or controlling relationship with any of the familiar psychological processes conventionally attributed to it. In our view all psychological processing and psychological products are non-conscious. In particular, we argue that all ‘contents of consciousness’ are generated by and within non-conscious brain systems in the form of a continuous self-referential personal narrative that is not directed or (...) influenced in any way by the ‘experience of consciousness’. This continuously updated personal narrative arises from selective ‘internal broadcasting’ of outputs from non-conscious executive systems that have access to all forms of cognitive processing, sensory information and motor control. The personal narrative provides information for storage in autobiographical memory and is underpinned by constructs of self and agency, also created in non-conscious systems. The experience of consciousness, is seen as a passive accompaniment to the non-conscious processes of internal broadcasting and the creation of the personal narrative. In this sense personal awareness is analogous to the rainbow which accompanies physical processes in the atmosphere but exerts no influence over them. Though at an individual level it is an end-product created by non-conscious executive systems, the personal narrative serves the powerful evolutionary function of enabling individuals to communicate (externally broadcast) the contents of internal broadcasting. This in turn allows the recipients to generate potentially adaptive strategies, such as predicting the behavior of others and underlies the development of social and cultural structures, that promote species survival. Consequently, it is the capacity to communicate to others the contents of the personal narrative that confers an evolutionary advantage – not the experience of consciousness (personal awareness) itself. (shrink)

Historians of psychology are aware that, at its beginning, psychology had a choice with respect to the type of science it was going to be. It could be a content type psychology using the experimental method as proposed by Wundt or a basic empirical psychology founded on acts of consciousness explicated through critical analyses and careful descriptions of psychological phenomena as proposed by Brentano. As noted by Boring, because content was palpable and acts seemed elusive, Wundt’s experimental psychology prevailed. But (...) Watson believed that, as they were themselves still difficult to detect, the content of conscious processes were not sufficiently palpable. So, he advocated using behavior as the basis for experimental psychology. Yet palpability is essential for the experimental method, not for studying consciousness. Intentionality is the essence of consciousness, but it is not palpable, though detectable. In the teens and twenties of the 19th Century some German psychologists developed a type of bipartite psychology that included both acts and content, but their work remained isolated. (shrink)

Central issues in philosophy of architecture include foundational matters regarding the nature of: (1) architecture as an artform, design medium, or other product or practice; (2) architectural objects—what sorts of things they are; how they differ from other sorts of objects; and how we define the range of such objects; (3) special architectural properties, like the standard trio of structural integrity (firmitas), beauty, and utility—or space, light, and form; and ways they might be special to architecture; (4) architectural types—how to (...) consider abstract groups of architectural objects and their instances; (5) meaning and other language-like phenomena in architecture and its objects; (6) formation of and warrant for our basic grasp, and considered judgment, of architectural objects; and (7) social and moral features of architectural objects and architectural practice. Yet other questions engage applied philosophical concerns regarding architecture, such as the character of architectural notation; intellectual property rights; and client-architect obligations. A far-reaching philosophy of architecture extends beyond even a broadly aesthetics-based assessment, to include considerations of ethics, social and political philosophy, and philosophical reflections on psychology and the behavioral sciences. The aesthetics of architecture, by itself, spans traditional issues mooted in philosophy of art, as well as aesthetics of the everyday, and environmental aesthetics. Such traditional issues include the nature of the work; the possibility of classes, kinds, or types in the domain; the character and roles of representation, intentionality, and expression; and the warranted foundations for criticism. The ethics of architecture also addresses traditional issues, including delineation of rights, responsibilities, the good, virtues, and justice in architectural milieus. Still other aspects of philosophy of architecture concern social and technological characteristics. (shrink)

This article is devoted to the description of the experience associated with listening to a sound. In the first part, we describe the method we used to gather descriptions of auditory experience and to analyse these descriptions. This work of explicitation and analysis has enabled us to identify a threefold generic structure of this experience, depending on whether the attention of the subject is directed towards the event which is at the source of the sound, the sound in itself, considered (...) independently from its source, the felt sound. In the second part of the article, we describe this structure. The third part is devoted to a discussion of these results and the paths they open up in various fields of theoretical and applied research. (shrink)