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  1. (1 other version)Actualism.Christopher Menzel - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To understand the thesis of actualism, consider the following example. Imagine a race of beings — call them ‘Aliens’ — that is very different from any life-form that exists anywhere in the universe; different enough, in fact, that no actually existing thing could have been an Alien, any more than a given gorilla could have been a fruitfly. Now, even though there are no Aliens, it seems intuitively the case that there could have been such things. After all, life might (...)
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  • Serious Actualism, Typography, and Incompossible Sentences.Christopher James Masterman - 2023 - Erkenntnis:1-18.
    Serious actualists take it that all properties are existence entailing. I present a simple puzzle about sentence tokens which seems to show that serious actualism is false. I then consider the most promising response to the puzzle. This is the idea that the serious actualist should take ordinary property-talk to contain an implicit existential presupposition. I argue that this approach does not work: it fails to generalise appropriately to all sentence types and tokens. In particular, it fails to capture the (...)
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  • A Radical Relationist Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrea Marchesi - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7509-7534.
    The problem of intentional inexistence arises because the following (alleged) intuitions are mutually conflicting: it seems that sometimes we think about things that do not exist; it seems that intentionality is a relation between a thinker and what such a thinker thinks about; it seems that relations entail the existence of what they relate. In this paper, I argue for what I call a radical relationist solution. First, I contend that the extant arguments for the view that relations entail the (...)
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  • In Defense of the Possibilism–Actualism Distinction.Christopher Menzel - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1971-1997.
    In Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson claims that the possibilism-actualism (P-A) distinction is badly muddled. In its place, he introduces a necessitism-contingentism (N-C) distinction that he claims is free of the confusions that purportedly plague the P-A distinction. In this paper I argue first that the P-A distinction, properly understood, is historically well-grounded and entirely coherent. I then look at the two arguments Williamson levels at the P-A distinction and find them wanting and show, moreover, that, when the N-C (...)
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  • No new argument against the existence requirement.Andrew McCarthy & Ian Phillips - 2006 - Analysis 66 (1):39–44.
    Yagisawa (2005) considers two old arguments against the existence requirement. Both arguments are significantly less appealing than Yagisawa suggests. In particular, the second argument, first given by Kaplan (1989: 498), simply assumes that existence is contingent (§1). Yagisawa’s ‘new’ argument shares this weakness. It also faces a dilemma. Yagisawa must either treat ‘at @’ as a sentential operator occupying the same grammatical position as ‘∼’ or as supplying an extra argument place. In the former case, Yagisawa’s argument faces precisely the (...)
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  • Ground and modality.Alessandro Torza - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (6):563-585.
    The grounding relation is routinely characterized by means of logical postulates. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I show that a subset of those postulates is incompatible with a minimal characterization of metaphysical modality. Then I consider a number of ways for reconciling ground with modality. The simplest and most elegant solution consists in adopting serious actualism, which is best captured within a first-order modal language with predicate abstraction governed by negative free logic. I also explore a number (...)
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  • A New Defence of the Modal Existence Requirement.Ben Caplan - 2007 - Synthese 154 (2):335-343.
    In this paper, I defend the claim that an object can have a property only if it exists from two arguments, both of which turn on how to understand Plantinga’s notion of the α-transform of a property.
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  • Serious actualism.Yannis Stephanou - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):219-250.
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  • Existence Requirement, World-Indexed Properties, and Contingent Apriori.Oleh Bondar - 2022 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 63 (152):297-316.
    RESUMO Este artigo é dedicado ao argumento contra o Requisito de Existência fornecido por Takashi Yagisawa. Argumentamos que o cerne do argumento de Yagisawa – a Forte Iterabilidade – não pode ser inferido pela ideia de contingente a priori (Kripke) e é incompatível com a ideia de @-transformação (Plantinga). Assim, essas ideias, contrariamente a Yagisawa, não podem servir de base metodológica da Forte Iterabilidade. Também argumentamos que a Forte Iterabilidade é incompatível com o Princípio Constitutivo. Finalmente, mostramos que o conceito (...)
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  • God, mind, and logical space: a revisionary approach to divinity.István Aranyosi - 2013 - New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    The book offers a novel approach to the idea of divinity in guise of a philosophical doctrine called 'Logical Pantheism', according to which the only way to establish the existence of God undeniably is by equating God with Logical Space.
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  • Contingentism and fragile worlds.Christopher James Masterman - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Propositional contingentism is the thesis that there might have been propositions which might have not have been something. Serious actualism is the thesis that it is impossible for a property to be exemplified without there being something which exemplifies it. Both are popular. Likewise, the dominant view in the metaphysics of modality is that metaphysical possibility and necessity can be understood – in some sense – in terms of possible worlds, i.e. total ways the world could have been. Here, I (...)
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