This paper argues that phenomenal consciousness is what makes an entity a welfare subject. I develop a variety of motivations for this view, and then defend it from objections concerning death, non-conscious entities that have interests (such as plants), and conscious entities that necessarily have welfare level zero. I also explain how my theory of welfare subjects relates to experientialist and anti-experientialist theories of welfare goods.

Of all the risks we face in life, ranging from unemployment to old age, early death is among the most tragic and yet most neglected by modern states. Liberal egalitarians might find it easy to dismiss social insurance against early death, but I argue they should not. Early in this paper, I explain why social insurance should include the risk of premature death by replying to four common criticisms. What follows is a case for a novel form of insurance that (...) is more liberal and egalitarian across ages than the status quo. More specifically, I show that granting storable pensions in all life stages - youth, middle and old age - promotes liberty and reduces lifetime inequality. Writers on age group and longevity justice often overlook the extent to which liberal lifetime equality can supply insightful arguments against inequality across ages. These call for a policy that gives each age group the freedom to draw a storable pension. I call that policy "freetirement". (shrink)

On what grounds could life be made worth living given its abundant suffering? Friedrich Nietzsche was one among many who attempted to answer this question. This book attempts to disentangle Nietzsche's various critiques of pessimism, elucidating how familiar Nietzschean themes ought to be assessed against this philosophical backdrop.

Despite being increasingly available to us all, retirement pensions remain unequally distributed: between rich and poor, young and old, men and women, and possibly different generations. As this topic receives little attention in moral and political philosophy, the articles in this thesis aim to deliver an original account of justice in retirement pensions along liberal egalitarian lines. The first part defends retirement pensions as a distribution of free time. It shows that including free time in the list of goods that (...) liberal egalitarians prioritise is plausible and avoids problems that would otherwise arise with other candidates, most notably leisure. Retirement as free time is an essential feature of liberal egalitarian societies by (re)distributing the means to pursue any life project, and especially valuable for the poor who work and contribute the longest. The second part makes a case for 'libertirement', a proposal to increase the freedom to enjoy free time across life, as a matter of justice between those who live long and those who die early. Specifically, I propose adding reverse pensions and sabbaticals on top of old-age retirement. Besides showing the importance of longevity for age-group justice, I also draw implications for distributing unconditional basic income and income taxes across life, which I suggest may offer alternative paths to libertirement. Finally, the third part discusses the cases of pension inequality between genders and generations, pushing us to refine our account further. I conclude that there is often a mismatch between liberal egalitarian justice and the design of retirement schemes. The solution is often but not always to reform these systems. Sometimes, we have reasons to revise our very own principles of justice. (shrink)

In the science of consciousness, it’s oftentimes assumed that some creatures (or mental states) are more conscious than others. But in recent years, a number of philosophers have argued that the notion of degrees of consciousness is conceptually confused. This paper (1) argues that the most prominent objections to degrees of consciousness are unsustainable, (2) examines the semantics of ‘more conscious than’ expressions, (3) develops an analysis of what it is for a degreed property to count as degrees of consciousness, (...) and (4) applies the analysis to various theories of consciousness. I argue that whether consciousness comes in degrees ultimately depends on which theory of consciousness turns out to be correct. But I also argue that most theories of consciousness entail that consciousness comes in degrees. (shrink)

Many philosophers accept both of the following claims: (1) consciousness matters morally, and (2) species membership doesn’t matter morally. In other words, many reject speciesism but accept what we might call 'sentientism'. But do the reasons against speciesism yield analogous reasons against sentientism, just as the reasons against racism and sexism are thought to yield analogous reasons against speciesism? This paper argues that speciesism is disanalogous to sentientism (as well as racism and sexism). I make a case for the following (...) asymmetry: (a) some non-humans clearly have interests, but (b) no non-conscious entities clearly have interests. This asymmetry, I argue, renders sentientism resistant to the standard argument against speciesism. (shrink)

At profesjonsutøvere er ansvarlige og har ansvar knyttet til arbeidet de utfører, tar vi nærmest for gitt. Mitt sikte med denne artikkelen er å gi et innspill til nærere drøfting av hvordan det profesjonelle ansvaret kan forstås. I nyere profesjonsetiske kodekser knyttes ansvar først og fremst til konsekvenser av handlinger. Det innebærer at den profesjonelles ansvar forutsetter at det kan trekkes en linje fra en handlings konsekvens til den handlende. I komplekse organisasjoner kan imidlertid rekonstruksjon av veien fra konsekvens av (...) handling tilbake til den handlende vise seg vanskelig. Alternativt kan ansvar knyttes til spørsmål om handlingens samsvar med regler og prosedyrer. En slik tilnærming benevnes gjerne som «accountability». Disse to ulike tilnærmingene til ansvar har det til felles at det er handlingen som er i fokus – handlingens regelsamsvar eller dens konsekvenser, ikke en individuell dimensjon knyttet til den handlende som person. Den profesjonelle som selvstendig, tenkende og vurderende person blir perifer. Til videre drøfting av dette trekker jeg veksler på Hannah Arendts tenkning om ansvar. «To-i-én-dialog» og «tenkning» er sentrale elementer, og jeg vil peke på hennes bidrag som en mulig vei til en utdypet forståelse av det profesjonelle ansvarets individuelle dimensjon.Nøkkelord: profesjonelt ansvar, handlingens konsekvenser, accountability, to-i-én-dialog, tenkningEnglish summary: Individual responsibility and shallowness in professional workIt is almost taken for granted that professionals are responsible for the work they do. The scope of this article is to contribute to an evaluation of how we can understand this professional responsibility. Modern professional–ethical codes tie responsibility primarily to the consequences of acts. Thus the responsibility of a professional assumes that a connection can be drawn between the consequences of an act to the person who acted. However, in complex organizational structures, it can be difficult to find the path from consequence to actor. Another option is to look at responsibility as the product of an action's compliance with rules and procedures. Such an approach is often called «accountability». What these two different approaches to responsibility have in common is the focus on an action. It is the consequences of acts or compliance of rules that matter rather than the individual who performs the act. The idea of a professional as an autonomous, thinking and evaluating person becomes peripheral. The individual dimension of responsibility involves that the professional's responsibility goes beyond adherence to rules and procedures and what follows from tracking acts and consequences. I use Hannah Arendt's thoughts on the responsibility to facilitate further debate on this topic. A «two-in-one» dialogue and «thinking» are core elements in this, and I will point to her contribution as a possible path to a more in-depth understanding of the individual dimension of professional responsibility. (shrink)