This paper engages with the recent dignity-based argument against hate speech proposed by Jeremy Waldron. It’s claimed that while Waldron makes progress by conceptualising dignity less as an inherent property and more as a civic status which hate speech undermines, his argument is nonetheless subject to the problem that there are many sources of citizens’ dignitary status besides speech. Moreover, insofar as dignity informs the grounds of individuals’ right to free speech, Waldron’s argument leaves us balancing hate speakers’ dignity against (...) the dignity of those whom they attack. I suggest instead that a central part of the harm of hate speech is that it assaults our self-respect. The reasons to respect oneself are moral reasons which can be shared with others, and individuals have moral reasons to respect themselves for their agency, and their entitlements. Free speech is interpreted not as an individual liberty, but as a collective enterprise which serves the interests of speakers and the receivers of speech. I argue that hate speech undermines the self-respect of its targets in both the agency and entitlement dimensions, and claim, moreover, that this is a direct harm which cannot be compensated for by other sources of self-respect. I further argue that hate speakers have no basis to respect themselves qua their hate speech, as self-respect is based on moral reasons. I conclude that self-respect, unlike dignity, is sufficient to explain the harm of hate speech, even though it may not be necessary to explain its wrongness. (shrink)

The dignity approach to racist hate speech regulation maintains that hate speech ought to be regulated because it impugns targets’ dignity and poses a threat to their equal treatment. This approach faces the significant causal challenges of showing that hate speech has the power to erode its targets’ dignity and that regulations can successfully protect that dignity. My aim is to show how a friend of the dignity approach can resolve these challenges. To do so, I borrow insights from the (...) critical legal studies (CLS) approach to hate speech. Specifically, I argue that hate speech can erode its targets’ dignity 1) by constituting an act of discrimination, and 2) by enacting norms that call for treating targeted groups as inferior. Yet while I maintain that the CLS approach offers valuable resources for shoring up the dignity approach, I reject the CLS approach in favor of the dignity approach. (shrink)

I argue that there are strong consequentialist grounds for thinking that hate speech should be legally protected. The protection of hate speech allows those who are hateful to make their beliefs public, thereby exposing prejudices that might otherwise be suppressed to evaluation by other members of society. This greater transparency about prejudices has two social benefits. First, it facilitates social trust by making it easier to discover who holds beliefs that should exclude them from positions of authority, responsibility, and influence. (...) Second, it facilitates efforts to combat hatred by revealing which prejudiced members of society must be persuaded or discredited by those seeking to promote tolerance. (shrink)

In this article, I provide an argument against the idea that public hate-speech events are harmful because they cause a discrete, traceable and harmful change in one’s propositional attitudes. To do so, I identify the essential conceptual architecture of public hate-speech situations, I assess existing arguments for the direct and indirect harm of public hate speech and I propose a novel way to approach public hate-speech situations: a maieutic approach. On this perspective, public hate-speech events do not cause changes in (...) propositional attitudes, but rather, if successful, either such events bring a person’s latent propositional attitudes into clear consciousness, or they play with propositional attitudes speakers and their audience had prior to the public hate-speech situation. (shrink)

Das Funktionieren moderner Demokratien hängt von der Informiertheit der Öffentlichkeit ab. Durch den Erfolg von Fake News und post-faktischer Politik ist die Informiertheit der Öffentlichkeit jedoch in Gefahr, zumal parallele Öffentlichkeiten zunehmend sogenannte alternative analoge und digitale Medienangebote nutzen. In diesem Beitrag untersuchen wir, wie sich Fake News verbreiten und Einfluss auf Öffentlichkeit und Politik gewinnen. Dazu analysieren wir das Zusammenspiel einer Reihe kognitiver Verzerrungen mit der Funktionsweise sozialer Medien sowie die strukturellen Anreize, die der digitalisierte Medienkapitalismus setzt. Beides spielt (...) der Verbreitung von Fake News in die Hände, was einige politische Akteure auszunutzen wissen. Fake News werden in diesem Fall als Propaganda eingesetzt. Wir unterscheiden vier Funktionen von Fake-News-Propaganda: (1) die Täuschung der Öffentlichkeit, (2) die Stärkung von Gruppenidentitäten, (3) die Demonstration von Macht und (4) die Destabilisierung der politischen oder öffentlichen Ordnung. (shrink)

In recent years, several philosophers have argued that statues which are morally tainted ought to be removed from public display. One objection to this claim is the free speech objection: removing the statues constitutes a violation of free speech rights. This objection suffers from two flaws. First, it is rarely articulated to its fullest potential. Second, the free speech objection is largely dismissed by philosophers who support the statues' removal. In this article, I will aim to rectify this situation by (...) providing three different formulations of the free speech objection, based, respectively, on First Amendment jurisprudence, on Mill's consequentialist defense of free speech, and on Susan Dwyer's non‐consequentialist defense of the same. After formulating the three versions of the objection, I will consider them against the alleged duty to remove tainted statues, and argue that even under the strongest formulation of the free speech objection, it does not amount to a defeater to the duty. (shrink)

The paper examines the ethics of truth telling and free speech in Jonathan Rauch’s "The Humanitarian Threat". The central question is this: “Should we suspend the truth to prevent harm?”. Both humanitarians and the anti-humanitarians supply different responses to this question. While the humanitarians supplied a positive answer, Rauch argues that the anti-humanitarian posture of the exponents of liberalism supplied a negative answer. The paper considers the humanitarian argument that puts the welfare of the people above the truth or anything (...) else. Meanwhile, for the anti-humanitarians, the right to speak the truth must be guaranteed at all time. This paper argues that, in practice, the morality of truth telling is not only context bound, it also depends on what the truth is meant to achieve. Thus, the suspension of the truth may be consistent with morality in some medical and sensitive security situations due to the tendency to cause harm. The paper does not argue that the truth be suspended arbitrarily or for mischievous reasons. It only concludes by identifying some practical situations under which suspension of the truth may not be inconsistent with morality. (shrink)

In free speech theory ‘speech’ has to be defined as a special term of art. I argue that much free speech discourse comes with a tacit commitment to a ‘Subtractive Approach’ to defining speech. As an initial default, all communicative acts are assumed to qualify as speech, before exceptions are made to ‘subtract’ those acts that don’t warrant the special legal protections owed to ‘speech’. I examine how different versions of the Subtractive Approach operate, and criticise them in terms of (...) their ability to yield a substantive definition of speech which covers all and only those forms of communicative action that – so our arguments for free speech indicate – really do merit special legal protection. In exploring alternative definitional approaches, I argue that what ultimately compromises definitional adequacy in this arena is a theoretical commitment to the significance of a single unified class of privileged communicative acts. I then propose an approach to free speech theory that eschews this theoretical commitment. (shrink)

The truth-justification is an enduring explanation for valuing free speech. This paper seeks to advance an account of “assertion”, found in speech act theory, that can identify speech which contributes to truth-discovery in a nuanced way. I apply the dialectic theory of assertion which emphasises the language game of giving and asking for reasons to believe things as assertional social practice. In doing so, I consider what “moves” in this game make sense from a truth-discovery perspective, drawing together contemporary and (...) foundational work on assertion in linguistics to fit the normative context of law. Speech act theory is often invoked in current free speech literature to identify regulable speech, but less typically to identify speech that warrants legal protection. I contextualise my theory within this existing legal work and show how the model I advocate for applies across many formulations of the truth-justification to offer comprehensive explanatory and justificatory power. I also explore the potential appeal of alternative theories of assertion and explain why they are a poor fit in comparison to the dialectical account. (shrink)

Hate speech is commonly defined with reference to the legal category of incitement. Laws targeting incitement typically focus on how the speech is expressed rather than its actual content. This has a number of unintended consequences: first, law tends to capture overt or obvious forms of hate speech and not hate speech that takes the form of ‘reasoned’ argument, but which nevertheless, causes as much, if not more harm. Second, the focus on form rather than content leads to categorization errors. (...) Hate speech taking the form of ‘reasoned argument’ is often legally characterized as either political or academic debate, and so is deemed both permissible and justified in societies where free speech principles exist. In this paper, I argue that it is important to identify instances of hate speech as hate speech, no matter how articulately or reasonably the speech is expressed. The danger in mischaracterizing an instance of hate speech by calling it academic or political debate is that it risks normalizing the views and sentiments that are expressed and accepting those views as an important part of our political and academic discourses. With reference to Habermas’ account of ‘distorted communication’, I propose different criteria for defining and understanding hate speech and suggest that there might be good reasons for interpreting the concept of incitement more broadly, so as to include these different kinds of it. (shrink)

This article aims to develop a ground for freedom of speech that combines two justifications – democratic participation and autonomy. First, it is argued that consequentialist justifications, such as discovery of truth and personal development, are far from providing a strong justification for free speech due to their reliance on uncertain empirical validation. Second, it is claimed that a stronger and better ground for free speech can be constructed by articulating two non-consequentialist justifications for free speech – democratic participation and (...) autonomy. This articulation, which I call the double-grounded non-consequentialist justification for free speech, considers autonomy and democratic participation as complementary principles. In this sense, a double-grounded justification engages justification as autonomy and democratic participation in a dialogue in order to provide remedies for the specific weaknesses of these two positions. (shrink)

Hate speech (‘al-jahr bi’-sūʾ min al-qawlin the Qur’anic description) continues to be the subject of contentious debate. Arguably, the notion of “unregulated speech” in the liberal discourse encourages hate speech on the pretext of “defending” the right to freedom of speech. Islam recogniseshuman dignityas the underlying basis of all human rights and freedoms, including the right to freedom of speech. Here arise two core questions. First, is freedom of speech and expression an absolute right or has Islam imposed certainconditionson the (...) human agency while this right is exercised? Second, what do theseconditionsconcerning freedom of speech imply about the regulation of hate speech? I approach these questions by beginning with the introduction ofkaramahprinciple followed by an overview of theoretical conceptualisations of free speech in the Western context. Finally, the Islamic position on the subject is brought forth through the conceptual analysis of relevant Islamic texts. The article draws three conclusions. First, human dignity is the intrinsic condition that surpasses all rights and freedoms. Second, the idea of “unregulated speech” is controversial and has been a reason forharminghuman dignity and making the public discourse inimical to social order. Third, there should be a legal, moral and rational reconciliation between exercising ‘speech limitations’ and ‘free speech’ to ensure sustainable peace and social cohesion. (shrink)

Democratic societies tolerate intolerance, but that obligation finds its limit when the security of its citizens is jeopardized or its institutions of liberty are imperiled. Similarly, universities tolerate intolerance, but that obligation finds its limit when threatened by weaponized intolerance advocates who disenfranchise and denigrate community members and imperil academic norms and professional standards of conduct. Then, just as democratic societies must protect their threatened citizens and safeguard their imperiled institutions of liberty, so universities must protect their threatened community members (...) and safeguard their imperiled norms and standards. I argue for these conclusions by establishing a conflict between what the First Amendment legally permits university community members to express and what the norms of the university and the professional standards that structure academic freedom require from university community members. I argue that given the First Amendment, universities are legally obliged to tolerate even weaponized intolerance in campus public forums even if not in the classroom. I then recommend three responses to weaponized intolerance on campus that are consistent with the First Amendment: denunciation and protest, provision of safe space, and affirmation of academic values, norms, and standards. I reject three frequently encountered responses to weaponized intolerance as inconsistent with the First Amendment: heckler’s vetoes, student speech codes, and speaker bans. And I argue that one response—disruptive protest that falls short of a heckler’s veto—is legally permissible for students and faculty members but is ruled out for faculty members by academic norms and professional standards. (shrink)

The limits on freedom of expression are tested in our democracy when we have to deal with hate speech. A thinker who faced the problem of those limitations was John Stuart Mill, who formulated what has been called “harm principle” in his On Liberty (1859), and according to which the only good reason to interfere with an individual’s liberty is to prevent harm to others. On these grounds, several authors have tried to reconstruct the category of “offense”, in order to (...) forbid varieties of conduct even though they do not cause harm to others. However On Liberty is a remarkable work in defense of liberty, even for those who want to refine their premises introducing elements that justify restrictions on freedom of expression. Certainly the weakness of Mill’s thought, at least one that help us to draw lessons for our democracies, appears only when we notice its flaws in light of a joint reading of On Liberty and Considerations On Representative Government (1861). This task points out an unjustified split between free speech and political participation rights, and one that would exclude certain individuals from citizenship indeed. (shrink)