Thomas Pogge claims "that, by shaping and enforcing the social conditions that foreseeably and avoidably cause the monumental suffering of global poverty, we are harming the global poor ... or, to put it more descriptively, we are active participants in the largest, though not the gravest, crime against humanity ever committed." In other words, he claims that by upholding certain international arrangements we are violating our strong negative duties not to harm, and not just some positive duties to help. I (...) shall argue that even if Pogge were correct in claiming that certain rich states or at least the rich states collectively violate certain negative duties towards the poor and harm the poor, he is far too hasty in concluding that "we," the citizens of those states, are thus harming the global poor or violating our negative duties towards them. In fact, his conclusion can be shown to be wrong not least of all in the light of some of his own assumptions about collective responsibility, the enforceability of human rights, and terrorism. In addition, I will also argue that his view that we share responsibility for the acts of our political "representatives," who allegedly act "on our behalf," is unwarranted. (shrink)

The paper deals with the conditions of the possible renewal of the “Constitutio libertatis” project on the basis of the 20th-century experience. The global political conflict, resulted in severe intellectual confrontation, produced the split of philosophy into two isolated movements: the “continental” and the “analytical” movements, each promoting its own logic of thinking. The paper shows the influence of this fundamental philosophical schism on the key versions of the contemporary political philosophy. A new formulation for the main political problem emerges (...) pointing to the mutual untranslatability of the languages of freedom and of justice. The two languages are traceable to the two competing philosophical logics, those of difference and of representation. The notion of “form of life”, used politically by Plato and analyzed logically by Wittgenstein in his Philosophical Investigations, is introduced as a conceptual basis for a new political theory that should solve the main political problem. Finally, some basic propositions are discussed, that should be observed in trying to resume the project of the “Constitutio libertatis”. It is shown that the negative definition of the concept of freedom must be abandoned. Freedom has a certain logical form, but it does not logically imply that various forms of life, with their liberties expressed through various logical forms, inevitably come into mutual conflict. The foundation of the “Constitutio libertatis” is based on the autonomous “forms of life” and is justly distributed throughout a complex non-Cartesian texture of political reality. (shrink)

The distinctness of each person’s life and experience is an important consideration in dominant accounts of how democratic institutions should distribute basic rights and liberties. Drawing on recent social movements, philosophers like Iris Marion Young, Miranda Fricker, and Axel Honneth have nonetheless drawn attention to the distinctive claims and challenges that plurality and difference entrain in democratic societies by analysing how the dominant discourses on rights and justice tend to elide, obscure, or reify the lived experiences of individuals belonging to (...) disadvantaged and oppressed groups. In this essay, I offer an independent justification for why we should take such lived experiences seriously. I show how the lived experiences of disadvantaged and oppressed individuals can be a resource for deep and meaningful social change. I propose a distinctive kind of social change in which the disadvantaged and oppressed themselves drive the process of transformation whereby they change the oppressive frames of difference relating to their race, class, sex, or ability. I call this kind ‘organic social change’. I also show that organic social change is distinctively important in that the disadvantaged and oppressed get to enact an empowering mode of cooperation that harnesses their singularities when they are the ones driving the process of their own and one another’s transformations. (shrink)