Since early times, Plato’s ideas have been assumed as universal entities as opposed to the particulars. More exact analysis of Plato’s terminology, however, shows the contrary. There is no term for “universal” and “particular” in his terminology at all, and he rather uses the words “whole” [کل] and “part” [جزء], which, considering their similitude to “universal” [کلی] and “particular” [جزئی], have been extremely mistaken for the two latter. These terms are developed in the middle Dialogues being closely related with the (...) controversial issue of ideas. Plato regards each idea as one and simple; however, Parmenides’ criticisms urge him to reconstruct his views. To resolve this problem, he makes use of the term “whole” which implicates a middle state between the One and the multitude in the hierarchy of unity. There is nothing absolutely simple and with the exception of the One, all things include parts. In a sense, however, the idea can be considered as one, for although it includes parts, it cannot be reduced to them and so it is somehow independent of them. Such a kind of unity, lying inferior to the absolute One and higher than the multitudes, is called the whole and belongs to the ideas. Every idea is a whole and possesses the highest possible unity after the One. So “wholeness” is almost a synonym for unity or a second unity. It is not the case that the wholeness appertains to ideas, but the particulars also participate in it. (shrink)