El presente texto es una guía para una primera lectura de los Los fundamentos de la aritmética de Gottlob Frege para estudiantes del grado de Filosofía. -/- No pretende hacer ninguna aportación a la investigación sobre Frege sino ofrecer los instrumentos para hacer una primera lectura mediante la recopilación y la ordenación de los textos relevantes de los estudiosos de Frege, especialmente de la literatura en inglés. En la mayor parte de los casos, las referencias a otros autores (Autorfecha) preceden (...) a una traducción de los escritos referidos así como una unificación de la terminología, el recorte de lo no relevante y el añadido de las explicaciones pertinentes para hacer el texto accesible a un estudiante del grado de Filosofía. En el caso de que la cita justifique una afirmación que no se desarrolla, se verá precedida por la palabra "ver" dentro del paréntesis de la referencia. El texto usado para las citas de Los fundamentos de la aritmética es la traducción de Ulises Moulines dado que el que esto escribe no sabe alemán. La guía no supone más matemáticas que las que se estudian en los cursos anteriores a la universidad. Sin embargo, es recomendable haber hecho un curso elemental de lógica matemática y teoría de conjuntos. La razón fundamental es que la formalización de ciertas proposiciones permite aclarar extremos que se hacen muy enojosos sin esos instrumentos. (shrink)

Debunking arguments against both moral and mathematical realism have been pressed, based on the claim that our moral and mathematical beliefs are insensitive to the moral/mathematical facts. In the mathematical case, I argue that the role of Hume’s Principle as a conceptual truth speaks against the debunkers’ claim that it is intelligible to imagine the facts about numbers being otherwise while our evolved responses remain the same. Analogously, I argue, the conceptual supervenience of the moral on the natural speaks presents (...) a difficulty for the debunker’s claim that, had the moral facts been otherwise, our evolved moral beliefs would have remained the same. (shrink)

Philosophers have probably been organizing conferences since at least the time of Plato’s academy (Barnes, 1998). More recently, philosophers have brought some of their conferences online (e.g., Brown, 2009; Buckner, Byrd, Rushing, & Schwenkler, 2017; Calzavarini & Viola, 2018; Nadelhoffer, 2006). However, the adoption of online conferences is limited. One might wonder if scholars prefer traditional conferences for their ability to provide goods that online conferences cannot. While this may be true, online conferences outshine traditional conferences in various ways, and (...) at a significantly lower cost. By considering the costs and benefits of both conference models, we may find reasons to prefer online to traditional conferences in some circumstances. This paper shares the methods, quantitative results, and qualitative results of the Minds Online conferences of 2015, 2016, and 2017. The evidence suggests that the online conference model can help scholars better understand their profession, share the workload of conference organizing, increase representation for underrepresented groups, increase accessibility to attendees, decrease monetary costs for everyone involved, sustain conference activity during states of emergency, and reduce their carbon footprint. So, the advantages of traditional conferences might be outweighed by their higher costs after all. (shrink)

This article proposes a four-layer semantic structure for common nouns. Each layer matches up with a semantic entity of a certain type in Montague’s intensional semantics. It is argued that a common noun denotes a sense and a concept, which are functions. For any given context, the sense of a term determines its extensions and the concept denoted by the term specifies its intensions. Intensions are treated as sets of senses. The membership relation between a sense and an intension is (...) a soft kind and is expressed in the form of a generic sentence. Such a layered structure explains various “degrees of publicity” of a language. The result we present clarifies the confusions existing in the ordinary understanding of “sense,” “intension,” and “concept.” It also has promising applications in interpreting metaphors and revealing the relationship between generics and metaphors. (shrink)

An influential tradition holds that thoughts are public: different thinkers share many of their thoughts, and the same applies to a single subject at different times. This ‘publicity principle’ has recently come under attack. Arguments by Mark Crimmins, Richard Heck and Brian Loar seem to show that publicity is inconsistent with the widely accepted principle that someone who is ignorant or mistaken about certain identity facts will have distinct thoughts about the relevant object—for instance, the astronomer who does not know (...) that Hesperus is Phosphorus will have two distinct thoughts Hesperus is bright and Phosphorus is bright. In this paper, I argue that publicity can be defended if we adopt a relational account on which thoughts are individuated by their mutual relations. I then go on to develop a specific relational theory—the ‘linking account’—and contrast it with other relational views. (shrink)

While there has been significant philosophical debate on whether nonlinguistic animals can possess conceptual capabilities, less time has been devoted to considering 'talking' animals, such as parrots. When they are discussed, their capabilities are often downplayed as mere mimicry. The most explicit philosophical example of this can be seen in Brandom's frequent comparisons of parrots and thermostats. Brandom argues that because parrots (like thermostats) cannot grasp the implicit inferential connections between concepts, their vocal articulations do not actually have any conceptual (...) content. In contrast, I argue that Pepperberg's work with Alex (and other African grey parrots) provides evidence that the vocal articulations of at least some parrots have conceptual content. Using Frege's insight that numbers assert something about a concept, I argue that Alex's ability to answer the question "How many?" depended upon a prior grasp of conceptual content. Developing this claim, I argue that Alex's arithmetical abilities show that he was capable of using numbers as both concepts and objects. Frege's theoretical insight and Pepperberg's empirical work provide reason to reconsider the capabilities of parrots, as well as what sorts of tasks provide evidence for conceptual content. (shrink)

This study examines the notion of antinomy, or unavoidable contradiction, in the work of Pavel Florensky. Many Russian philosophers of the Silver Age shared a common conviction which is yet to receive sufficient attention in critical literature, either in Russia or abroad. This is namely a philosophical and theological dependence on unavoidable contradiction, paradox, or antinomy. The history of antinomy and its Russian reception is introduced here before a new framework for understanding Russian antinomism is defended. This is namely the (...) anticipation of ‘vertical’ antinomies in ‘horizontal’ antinomies. Here, by ‘horizontal’ we suppose an unavoidable contradiction of reason or philosophical reflection, and by ‘vertical’ an unavoidable contradiction of revelation, faith, or a self-contradictory dogma. The study aims to demonstrate that Florensky fails to provide a satisfactory anticipation of vertical antinomies. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish a phenomenological mathematical intuitionism that is based on fundamental phenomenological-epistemological principles. According to this intuitionism, mathematical intuitions are sui generis mental states, namely experiences that exhibit a distinctive phenomenal character. The focus is on two questions: what does it mean to undergo a mathematical intuition and what role do mathematical intuitions play in mathematical reasoning? While I crucially draw on Husserlian principles and adopt ideas we find in phenomenologically minded mathematicians such as (...) Hermann Weyl and Kurt Gödel, the overall objective is systematic in nature: to offer a plausible approach towards mathematics. (shrink)

Bertrand Russell in his essay On Denoting [1905] presented a theory of description developed in response to the one proposed by Gottlob Frege in his paper Über Sinn und Bedeutung [1892]. The aim of our work will be to show that Russell underestimated Frege three times over in presenting the latter’s work: in relation to the Gray’s Elegy argument, to the Ferdinand argument, and to puzzles discussed by Russell. First, we will discuss two claims of Russell’s which do not do (...) justice to Frege: that we speak of a sense by means of quotation marks, and that all Frege does to cope with phrases that might denote nothing is define an arbitrary object as their reference. Second, we will show that Russell omitted the fact that Frege’s theory provided some answers for the puzzles presented by Russell in his essay. (shrink)

Bu metnin gayesi, dil felsefesi, mantık ve ontoloji alanlarında ortak olarak karşılaşılan boş adlar problemini ele almaktır. Metinde, çağdaş semantik kuramlarının ve dil felsefesinin ortaya çıkışında önemli rolü olan J. S. Mill’in özel adlar üzerine düşüncelerinden başlanarak, analitik felsefenin temelini atan, köşe taşları diyebileceğimiz G. Frege ve B. Russell’ın semantik kuramlarına değinilecektir. Daha sonra, kendi dil felsefesi pozisyonunu bu iki isimin eleştirisi üzerinden kurgulayan S. Kripke’nin, bu isimlere karşı olan argümanları incelenecektir. Metinde, bu incelemeyi gerçekleştirdikten sonra, S. Kripke ve B. (...) Russell’ın dil felsefesinde savundukları pozisyonlar ile onların ortaya koydukları mantık modellerinin arasındaki ilişki ele alınacaktır. Nihai olarak, dil felsefesi, mantık ve ontolojinin sınırlarının ne kadar iç içe geçmiş olduğu, ismi geçen filozofların dil felsefesindeki kuramlarının ontolojik çıktıları incelenerek ortaya konulacaktır. (shrink)

We argue that the extant evidence for Stoic logic provides all the elements required for a variable-free theory of multiple generality, including a number of remarkably modern features that straddle logic and semantics, such as the understanding of one- and two-place predicates as functions, the canonical formulation of universals as quantified conditionals, a straightforward relation between elements of propositional and first-order logic, and the roles of anaphora and rigid order in the regimented sentences that express multiply general propositions. We consider (...) and reinterpret some ancient texts that have been neglected in the context of Stoic universal and existential propositions and offer new explanations of some puzzling features in Stoic logic. Our results confirm that Stoic logic surpasses Aristotle’s with regard to multiple generality, and are a reminder that focusing on multiple generality through the lens of Frege-inspired variable-binding quantifier theory may hamper our understanding and appreciation of pre-Fregean theories of multiple generality. (shrink)

كان «فريجه» – على حد تعبير «دامت» – من أوائل من أدركوا أن نظرية المعنى، أو فلسفة اللغة، هي جزءٌ اساسي من الفلسفة ترتكز عليه كافة الأجزاء الاخرى؛ فإلى جانب دراساته التأسيسية الرائدة في الرياضيات والمنطق، كان يُؤسس ايضًا لفلسفة اللغة ببعض المقالات التي فاقت في تاثيرها وشهرتها تاثير وشهرة معظم أعماله الرياضية الأخرى، دون إقلال من شان هذه الأخيرة وريادتها. وهذه الدراسة بمثابة قراءة تحليلية – نقدية لمقاله الأكثر أهمية في هذا الصدد «في المعنى والإشارة»، مشفوعة بترجمة إلى العربية (...) للجزء الأكبر والاهم منه. (shrink)