This paper tackles the problem of inference in normative systems where norms concerning actions and states of affairs appear together. A deontic logic of actions and states is proposed as a solution. It is made up of two independent deontic logics, namely a deontic logic of action and a deontic logic of states, interlinked by bridging definitions. It is shown at a language and a model level how an agent should look for norms to follow in a concrete situation. It (...) is pointed out that such specific norms are obtained by finding the most specific obligation and the most general prohibition. They are to be derived from all norms applicable to the situation by using the principles of the logic presented in this paper. (shrink)

Certain works in the most recent Polish constitutional law literature suggest that there is acceptance of the principle or the concept of autonomous interpretation of a constitution (autonomy of interpretation of constitutional terms). The Constitutional Tribunal also makes reference to this in numerous rulings. Paradoxically, however, that concept is not very popular in legal theory. It might seem that Polish legal theoreticians and philosophers do not appreciate the concept of interpretation of a constitution devised through practice with the support of (...) constitutional law doctrine. It might, however, mean that opinions on autonomous interpretation of Polish Constitution are nothing more than rhetorical arguments formulated ad hoc not a coherent concept or a theory. This text is an attempt to analyse this concept and its potential in discussions surrounding application of the Polish Constitution. (shrink)