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  1. The Stability of Philosophical Intuitions: Failed Replications of Swain et al.Adrian Ziółkowski - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):328-346.
    In their widely cited article, Swain et al. report data that, purportedly, demonstrates instability of folk epistemic intuitions regarding the famous Truetemp case authored by Keith Lehrer. What they found is a typical example of priming, where presenting one stimulus before presenting another stimulus affects the way the latter is perceived or evaluated. In their experiment, laypersons were less likely to attribute knowledge in the Truetemp case when they first read a scenario describing a clear case of knowledge, and more (...)
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  • The Calibration Challenge to Philosophical Intuitions.Paul O. Irikefe - forthcoming - Synthese.
    To several critics of the philosophical method of cases—Robert Cummins, Jonathan Weinberg and his colleagues, and Avner Baz—the fact that philosophical intuitions cannot be calibrated means that we cannot rule out the skeptical hypothesis that the outcome of our theorizing based on these intuitions is deeply distorted by our cognitive artifacts. Moreover, they take this hypothesis to license the negative conclusion that we are unable to have much of the armchair knowledge we typically attribute to ourselves when philosophizing based on (...)
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  • (1 other version)Folk Knowledge Attributions and the Protagonist Projection Hypothesis.Adrian Ziółkowski - 2021 - In Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy, vol 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 5-29.
    A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that folk knowledge attribution practices regarding some epistemological thought experiments differ significantly from the consensus found in the philosophical literature. More specifically, laypersons are likely to ascribe knowledge in the so-called Authentic Evidence Gettier-style cases, while most philosophers deny knowledge in these cases. The intuitions shared by philosophers are often used as evidence in favor (or against) certain philosophical analyses of the notion of knowledge. However, the fact that these intuitions are not universal, (...)
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  • The Method of Cases’ Feet of Clay.Edouard Machery - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):335-343.
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  • Thinking Off Your Feet: Reply to My Critics.Michael Strevens - 2022 - Analysis 82 (2):343-353.
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  • (1 other version)Folk Knowledge Attributions and the Protagonist Projection Hypothesis.Adrian Ziółkowski - 2022 - In Tania Lombrozo, Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe (eds.), Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy Volume 4. Oxford University Press. pp. 5-29.
    A growing body of empirical evidence suggests that folk knowledge attribution practices regarding some epistemological thought experiments differ significantly from the consensus found in the philosophical literature. More specifically, laypersons are likely to ascribe knowledge in the so-called Authentic Evidence Gettier-style cases, while most philosophers deny knowledge in these cases. The intuitions shared by philosophers are often used as evidence in favor (or against) certain philosophical analyses of the notion of knowledge. However, the fact that these intuitions are not universal, (...)
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