Inference and Virtue

In Steve Oswald & Didier Maillat (eds.), Argumentation and Inference: Proceedings of the 2nd European Conference on Argumentation, Fribourg 2017. London: College Publications. pp. 1-9, vol. 2 (2018)
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What are the prospects (if any) for a virtue-theoretic account of inference? This paper compares three options. Firstly, assess each argument individually in terms of the virtues of the participants. Secondly, make the capacity for cogent inference itself a virtue. Thirdly, recapture a standard treatment of cogency by accounting for each of its components in terms of more familiar virtues. The three approaches are contrasted and their strengths and weaknesses assessed.
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