The Nature of Reasoning

What does logic tells us how about we ought to reason? If P entails Q, and you believe P, should you believe Q? There seem to be cases where you should not, for example, if you have evidence against Q, or the inference is not worth making. So we need a theory telling us when an inference ought to be made, and when not. I will argue that we should embed the issue in an independently motivated contextualist semantics for ‘ought’. (...) With the contextualist machinery in hand we can give a theory of when inferences should be made and when not. (shrink)

Tyler Burge first introduced his distinction between epistemic entitlement and epistemic justification in ‘Content Preservation’ in 1993. He has since deployed the distinction in over twenty papers, changing his formulation around 2009. His distinction and its basis, however, is not well understood in the literature. This chapter distinguishes two uses of ‘entitlement’ in Burge, and then focuses on his distinction between justification and entitlement, two forms of warrant, where warrants consists in the exercise of a reliable belief-forming competence. Since he (...) draws the distinction in terms of reasons, this chapter brings his account of reasons altogether in one place. The chapter introduces a decision-procedure for classifying warrants as justifications or entitlements. The distinction between justification and entitlement is not the same as the inferential vs. non-inferential distinction. The chapter distinguishes inference from processing, thinking, reasoning, and critically reasoning. Burge’s new formulation of the distinction was driven by the recognition of non-accessible modular reasons. Three kinds of access are distinguished. (shrink)

Unconscious logical inference seems to rely on the syntactic structures of mental representations (Quilty-Dunn & Mandelbaum 2018). Other transitions, such as transitions using iconic representations and associative transitions, are harder to assimilate to syntax-based theories. Here we tackle these difficulties head on in the interest of a fuller taxonomy of mental transitions. Along the way we discuss how icons can be compositional without having constituent structure, and expand and defend the “symmetry condition” on Associationism (the idea that associative links and (...) transitions are perfectly symmetric). In the end, we show how a BIT (“bare inferential transition”) theory can cohabitate with these other non-inferential mental transitions. (shrink)

This chapter argues that epistemic uses of the imagination are a sui generis form of reasoning. The argument proceeds in two steps. First, there are imaginings which instantiate the epistemic structure of reasoning. Second, reasoning with imagination is not reducible to reasoning with doxastic states. Thus, the epistemic role of the imagination is that it is a distinctive way of reasoning out what follows from our prior evidence. This view has a number of important implications for the epistemology of the (...) imagination. For one thing, it clarifies the epistemic role of widely invoked “constraints” on the imagination. For another, it highlights important and underappreciated disanalogies between how perceptual experiences and imaginings justify beliefs. Ultimately, the view that we can reason with imagination offers an illuminating and theoretically fruitful framework through which to understand the epistemic structure of the imagination. (shrink)

We present a framework for epistemic logic, modeling the logical aspects of System 1 and System 2 cognitive processes, as per dual process theories of reasoning. The framework combines non-normal worlds semantics with the techniques of Dynamic Epistemic Logic. It models non-logically-omniscient, but moderately rational agents: their System 1 makes fast sense of incoming information by integrating it on the basis of their background knowledge and beliefs. Their System 2 allows them to slowly, step-wise unpack some of the logical consequences (...) of such knowledge and beliefs, by paying a cognitive cost. The framework is applied to three instances of limited rationality, widely discussed in cognitive psychology: Stereotypical Thinking, the Framing Effect, and the Anchoring Effect. (shrink)

I accomplish two things in this paper. I explain the motivation for including experimental research in philosophical projects on epistemic reasons and the basing relation. And I present the first experimental contributions to these projects. The results from two experiments advance our understanding of the ordinary concepts of reasons and basing and set the stage for further research on the topics. More specifically, the results support a causal theory of the basing relation, according to which reasons are causes, and a (...) dualist theory of epistemic reasons, according to which reasons include both psychological and non-psychological items. (shrink)

Argument mapping is a way of diagramming the logical structure of an argument to explicitly and concisely represent reasoning. The use of argument mapping in critical thinking instruction has increased dramatically in recent decades. This paper overviews the innovation and provides a procedural approach for new teaches wanting to use argument mapping in the classroom. A brief history of argument mapping is provided at the end of this paper.

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim-directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning’s aim-directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule-following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary (...) dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology. (shrink)

Cognitive scientists used to deem reasoning either as a higher cognitive process based on the manipulation of abstract rules or as a higher cognitive process that is stochastic rather than involving abstract rules. I maintain that these different perspectives are closely intertwined with a theoretical and methodological endorsement of either cognitivism or connectionism. Cognitivism and connectionism represent two prevailing and opposed paradigms in cognitive science. I aim to extoll the virtues of connectionist models of enthymematic reasoning by the following means: (...) (1) via the phenomenon of creative enthymeme, viz. the inference where one cannot even articulate the missing premise, I introduce a connectionist mechanism of pattern recognition as underlying expertise; (2) via Gestalt switch or Gestalt click, I demonstrate how differences in pattern recognition of an expert and a novice can be construed as qualitatively different and not merely a matter of faster reasoning. (shrink)

Virtue theories have lately enjoyed a modest vogue in the study of argumentation, echoing the success of more far-reaching programmes in ethics and epistemology. Virtue theories of argumentation (VTA) comprise several conceptually distinct projects, including the provision of normative foundations for argument evaluation and a renewed focus on the character of good arguers. Perhaps the boldest of these is the pursuit of the fully satisfying argument, the argument that contributes to human flourishing. This project has an independently developed epistemic analogue: (...) eudaimonistic virtue epistemology. Both projects stress the importance of widening the range of cognitive goals beyond, respectively, cogency and knowledge; both projects emphasize social factors, the right sort of community being indispensable for the cultivation of the intellectual virtues necessary to each project. This paper proposes a unification of the two projects by arguing that the intellectual good life sought by eudaimonistic virtue epistemologists is best realized through the articulation of an account of argumentation that contributes to human flourishing. (shrink)

According to a traditional picture, perception and belief have starkly different epistemic roles. Beliefs have epistemic statuses as justified or unjustified, depending on how they are formed and maintained. In contrast, perceptions are “unjustified justifiers.” Core cognition is a set of mental systems that stand at the border of perception and belief, and has been extensively studied in developmental psychology. Core cognition's borderline states do not fit neatly into the traditional epistemic picture. What is the epistemic role of these states? (...) Focusing on the core object system, the author argues that core object representations have epistemic statuses like beliefs do, despite their many prototypically perceptual features. First, the author argues that it is a sufficient condition on a mental state's having an epistemic status as justified or unjustified that the state is based on reasons. Then the author argues that core object representations are based on reasons, through an examination of both experimental results and key markers of the basing relation. The scope of mental states that are subject to epistemic evaluation as justified or unjustified is not restricted to beliefs. (shrink)

Jeśli można mówić o modzie w badaniach naukowych, to semantyka jest od prawie wieku niewątpliwie jedną z bardziej modnych dziedzin w nauce. Badają ją nie tylko logicy i filozofowie języka, lecz także kulturoznawcy, antropologowie, filologowie, kognitywiści czy informatycy. Niniejszy artykuł ma na celu zbadanie roli, jaką odgrywa semantyka w teorii argumentacji, a dokładniej — zarysowanie pewnego modelu argumentacji, który modyfikuje znaczenia terminów dla celów argumentacyjnych. Najpierw przedstawię kilka przykładowych argumentów semantycznych, analizując każdy z nich na tyle, aby wydobyć pewne subtelności (...) potrzebne do zbudowania modelu argumentu semantycznego. W ten sposób pokażę, jak nomen omen znaczący wpływ na argumentację ma znaczenie słów, a także na ile sposobów może ono wpływać na przebieg argumentacji. Na samym końcu zarysuję definicję argumentu semantycznego, która może wytyczyć kierunek dalszych badań nad semantyką w teorii argumentacji. (shrink)

Es mi afirmación que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que presenta prominentemente aquí describe más o menos con precisión, o al menos sirve como heurística para, cómo pensamos y nos comportamos, y por lo tanto no abarca simplemente filosofía y psicología, sino todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo veo, incluye tanto el Sistema Linguístico deliberativo consciente (...) 2 como las acciones o reflejos inconscientes automatizados del Sistema 1 automatizado. -/- Proporciono una encuesta crítica de algunos de los principales hallazgos de dos de los estudiantes más eminentes de comportamiento de los tiempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle, sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein -que todos los problemas verdaderamente "filosóficos" son los mismos—confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y por lo tanto todas las soluciones son las mismas— mirando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que sus condiciones de verdad (Condiciones de Satisfacción o COS) son claras. El problema básico es que uno puede decir cualquier cosa, pero no se puede significar (indicar COS claro para) cualquier expresión arbitraria y significado sólo es posible en un contexto muy específico. Analizo varios escritos por y sobre ellos desde la perspectiva moderna de los dos sistemas de pensamiento (popularizados como 'pensar rápido, pensar lento'), empleando una nueva tabla de intencionalidad y nueva nomenclatura de sistemas duales. Demuestro que esta es una heurística poderosa para describir el comportamiento. -/- Por lo tanto, todo comportamiento está íntimamente conectado si uno toma el punto de vista correcto. La Ilusión Fenomenológica (olvido a nuestro Sistema automatizado 1) es universal y se extiende no sólo a lo largo de la filosofía, sino a lo largo de la vida. Estoy seguro de que Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg y el Papa serían incrédulos si se les dijera que sufren del mismo problema que Hegel, Husserl y Heidegger, (o que difieren sólo en grado de los adictos a las drogas y el sexo en estar motivados por la estimulación de sus cortices frontales por la entrega de dopamina (y más de 100 otros productos químicos) a través del tegmentum ventral y el núcleo accumbens),pero es claramente cierto. Mientras que los fenomenólogos sólo desperdiciaron mucho el tiempo de la gente, están desperdiciando la tierra y el futuro de sus descendientes. (shrink)

Avant de commenter le livre, je vous propose des commentaires sur Wittgenstein et Searle et la structure logique de la rationalité. Les essais ici sont pour la plupart déjà publiés au cours de la dernière décennie (bien que certains ont été mis à jour), avec un élément non publié, et rien ici ne viendra comme une surprise pour ceux qui ont suivi son travail. Comme W, il est considéré comme le meilleur philosophe standup de son temps et son travail écrit (...) est solide comme un rocher et révolutionnaire tout au long. Cependant, son incapacité à prendre le W plus tard assez au sérieux conduit à quelques erreurs et confusions. Juste quelques exemples: sur p7, il note deux fois que notre certitude sur les faits de base est due à l’importance écrasante de la raison à l’appui de nos revendications, mais W a montré définitivement dans «Sur la certitude» qu’il n’y a aucune possibilité de douter de la véritable seule structure axiomatique de notre système 1 perceptions, souvenirs et pensées, car il est lui-même la base du jugement et ne peut pas lui-même être jugé. Dans la première phrase sur p8, il nous dit que la certitude est révisable, mais ce genre de «certitude», que nous pourrions appeler Certainty2, est le résultat de l’extension de notre certitude axiomatique et non révisible (Certitude1) par l’expérience et est tout à fait différent car il est proposé (vrai ou faux). C’est bien sûr un exemple classique de la « bataille contre l’envoûtement de notre intelligence par la langue » dont W a démontré maintes et maintes fois. Un mot- deux (ou plusieurs) utilisations distinctes. Son dernier chapitre "L’unité de la proposition" (précédemment inédit) bénéficierait également grandement de la lecture de W "On Certainty" ou les deux livres de DMS sur OC (voir mes commentaires) car ils font clairement la différence entre les phrases vraies seulement décrivant S1 et les propositions vraies ou fausses décrivant S2. Cela me semble comme une approche bien supérieure à S de prendre S1 perceptions comme propositionnelle car ils ne deviennent T ou F après que l’on commence à penser à eux dans S2. Cependant, son point que les propositions permettent des déclarations de vérité réelle ou potentielle et de fausseté, du passé et du futur et de la fantaisie, et donc fournir une énorme avancée sur la société pré ou protolinguistique, est convaincante. Comme il l’affirme : « Une proposition est tout ce qui peut déterminer une condition de satisfaction... et une condition de satisfaction... est que tel ou tel est le cas. Ou, il faut ajouter, qui pourrait être ou aurait pu être ou pourrait être imaginé pour être le cas. Dans l’ensemble, PNC est un bon résumé des nombreuses avancées substantielles sur Wittgenstein résultant du demi-siècle de travail de S, mais à mon avis, W est toujours inégalé une fois que vous saisissez ce qu’il dit. Idéalement, ils devraient être lus ensemble: Searle pour la prose et les généralisations clairement cohérentes, illustrés par les exemples perspicaces de W et les aphorismes brillants. Si j’étais beaucoup plus jeune, j’écrirais un livre faisant exactement cela. Ceux qui souhaitent un cadre complet à jour pour le comportement humain de la vue moderne de deuxemssyst peuvent consulter mon livre 'The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle' 2nd ed (2019). Ceux qui s’intéressent à plus de mes écrits peuvent voir «Talking Monkeys --Philosophie, Psychologie, Science, Religion et Politique sur une planète condamnée --Articles et revues 2006-2019 3e ed (2019) et Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019) et autres. (shrink)

There has been little overt discussion of the experimental philosophy of logic or mathematics. So it may be tempting to assume that application of the methods of experimental philosophy to these areas is impractical or unavailing. This assumption is undercut by three trends in recent research: a renewed interest in historical antecedents of experimental philosophy in philosophical logic; a “practice turn” in the philosophies of mathematics and logic; and philosophical interest in a substantial body of work in adjacent disciplines, such (...) as the psychology of reasoning and mathematics education. This introduction offers a snapshot of each trend and addresses how they intersect with some of the standard criticisms of experimental philosophy. It also briefly summarizes the specific contribution of the other chapters of this book. (shrink)

According to McHugh and Way reasoning is a person-level attitude revision that is regulated by its constitutive aim of getting fitting attitudes. They claim that this account offers an explanation of what is wrong with reasoning in ways one believes to be bad and that this explanation is an alternative to an explanation that appeals to the so-called Taking Condition. I argue that their explanation is unsatisfying.

The paper offers an account of inference. The account underwrites the idea that inference requires that the reasoner takes her premises to support her conclusion. I reject views according to which such ‘takings’ are intuitions or beliefs. I sketch an alternative view on which inferring consists in attaching what I call ‘inferential force’ to a structured collection of contents.

Some believe that all arguments make an implicit “inference claim” that the conclusion is inferable from the premises (e.g., Bermejo-Luque, Grennan, the Groarkes, Hitchcock, Scriven). I try to show that this is confused. An act of arguing arises because an inference can be attributed to us, not a meta-level “inference claim” that would make the argument self-referential and regressive. I develop six (other) possible explanations of the popularity of the doctrine that similarly identify confusions.

I argue that inference can tolerate forms of self-ignorance and that these cases of inference undermine canonical models of inference on which inferrers have to appreciate (or purport to appreciate) the support provided by the premises for the conclusion. I propose an alternative model of inference that belongs to a family of rational responses in which the subject cannot pinpoint exactly what she is responding to or why, where this kind of self-ignorance does nothing to undermine the intelligence of the (...) response. (shrink)

According to an increasingly popular epistemological view, people need outright beliefs in addition to credences to simplify their reasoning. Outright beliefs simplify reasoning by allowing thinkers to ignore small error probabilities. What is outright believed can change between contexts. It has been claimed that thinkers manage shifts in their outright beliefs and credences across contexts by an updating procedure resembling conditionalization, which I call pseudo-conditionalization (PC). But conditionalization is notoriously complicated. The claim that thinkers manage their beliefs via PC is (...) thus in tension with the view that the function of beliefs is to simplify our reasoning. I propose to resolve this puzzle by rejecting the view that thinkers employ PC. Based on this solution, I furthermore argue for a descriptive and a normative claim. The descriptive claim is that the available strategies for managing beliefs and credences across contexts that are compatible with the simplifying function of outright beliefs can generate synchronic and diachronic incoherence in a thinker’s attitudes. Moreover, I argue that the view of outright belief as a simplifying heuristic is incompatible with the view that there are ideal norms of coherence or consistency governing outright beliefs that are too complicated for human thinkers to comply with. (shrink)

Mi afirmación es que la tabla de intencionalidad (racionalidad, mente, pensamiento, lenguaje, personalidad, etc.) que se presenta aquí describe de forma prominente más o menos precisa, o al menos sirve como una heurística para, cómo pensamos y comportamos, y por lo que abarca no meramente filosofía y psicología, pero todo lo demás (historia, literatura, matemáticas, política, etc.). Tenga en cuenta especialmente que la intencionalidad y la racionalidad como yo (junto con Searle, Wittgenstein y otros) lo ve, incluye tanto deliberativo consciente (...) Lingüística Sistema 2 y automático inconsciente prelingüística Sistema 1 acciones o reflejos. -/- I proporcionar un estudio crítico de algunos de los principales hallazgos de dos de los estudiantes más eminentes del comportamiento de los tiempos modernos, Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle, sobre la estructura lógica de la intencionalidad (mente, lenguaje, comportamiento), tomando como punto de partida el descubrimiento fundamental de Wittgenstein-que todos los problemas verdaderamente ' filosóficos ' son los mismos-confusiones sobre cómo usar el lenguaje en un contexto particular, y así todas las soluciones son las mismas, observando cómo se puede utilizar el lenguaje en el contexto en cuestión para que sus condiciones de verdad (condiciones de satisfacción o COS) sean claras. El problema básico es que uno puede decir cualquier cosa menos que uno no puede significar (el estado claro COS para) cualquier enunciado arbitrario y significado es solamente posible en un contexto muy específico. Analizo varios escritos por y sobre ellos desde el Moderno perspectiva de los dos sistemas de pensamiento (popularizado como ' pensar rápido, pensar lento '), empleando un nuevo cuadro de intencionalidad y nueva nomenclatura de sistemas duales. Muestro que se trata de una heurística de gran alcance para describir el comportamiento. -/- Por lo tanto, todos comportamiento está íntimamente conectado si uno toma el punto de vista correcto. La ilusión fenomenológica (olvido de nuestro sistema automatizado 1) es universal y se extiende no sólo a través de la filosofía, sino a lo largo de la vida. Estoy seguro de que Chomsky, Obama, Zuckerberg y el Papa serían incrédulos si se les dijera que sufren del mismo problema que Hegel, Husserl y Heidegger, (o que difieren sólo en grado de drogas y adictos sexuales en ser motivados por la estimulación de sus las corteces frontales por la entrega de dopamina (y más de 100 otros productos químicos) a través del tegmentum ventral y el núcleo Accumbens), pero es claramente cierto. Mientras que los fenomenólogos sólo desperdiciaron un montón de tiempo de la gente, están desperdiciando la tierra y el futuro de su descendiente. (shrink)

This book is the result of Searle's stay in the Munster University Philosophy Dept in 2009 and all the papers except his introductory one and his final response are from persons associated with Munster. However, all the papers were written or revised later and so are one of the most up to date looks at his views available as of mid-2013. S has in my view made more fundamental contributions to higher order descriptive psychology (philosophy) than anyone since Wittgenstein (W), (...) and has been writing world class material for over 50 years. He is also (like W before him) regarded as the best standup philosopher alive and has taught and lectured worldwide. He is also one of the clearest and most careful writers in the field, so one would think that every philosopher writing an article on his work would have an up to date and accurate understanding of his ideas. Unfortunately, this book shows that this is far from true. All the 11 articles make major mistakes regarding his views and regarding what he (and I) would regard as an accurate description of behavior. -/- Searle's obliviousness (which he shares with most philosophers) to the modern two systems framework, and to the full implications of W’s “radical” epistemology, as stated most dramatically in his last work ‘On Certainty’, is most unfortunate (as I have noted in many reviews). It was Wittgenstein who did the first and best job of describing the two systems (though nobody else has noticed) and OC represents a major event in intellectual history. Not only is Searle unaware of the fact that his framework is a straightforward continuation of W, but everyone else is too, which accounts for the lack of any significant reference to W in this book. As usual one also notes no apparent acquaintance with Evolutionary Psychology, which can enlighten all discussions of behavior by providing the real ultimate evolutionary and biological explanations rather than the superficial proximate cultural ones. -/- However, his comment on p212 is right on the money—the ultimate explanation (or as W insists the description) can only be a naturalized one which describes how mind, will, self, intention work and cannot meaningfully eliminate them as ‘real’ phenomena. Recall Searle’s famous review of Dennett’s ‘Conscious Explained’ entitled “Consciousness explained away”. And this makes it all the more bizarre that Searle should repeatedly state that we don’t know for sure if we have free will and that we have to ‘postulate’ a self (p218-219). -/- As he notes “The neuro-biological processes and the mental phenomena are the same event, described at different levels” and “How can conscious intentions cause bodily movement? …How can the hammer move the nail in virtue of being solid? …If you analyze what solidity is causally…if you analyze what intention-in-action is causally, you see analogously there is no philosophical problem left over.” -/- Also, I would state “The heart of my argument is that our linguistic practices, as commonly understood, presuppose a reality that exists independently of our representations.” (p223) as “Our life shows a world that does not depend on our existence and cannot be intelligibly challenged.” -/- This book is valuable principally as a recent synopsis of the work of one the greatest philosophers of recent times. But there is also value in analyzing his responses to the many basic confusions manifested in the articles by others. Since this review, I have written many articles extending the framework of the logical structure of rationality and commenting in depth on Searle and Wittgenstein which are all readily available on the net. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019) and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Antes de comentar sobre el libro, ofrezco comentarios sobre Wittgenstein y Searle y la estructura lógica de la racionalidad. Los ensayos aquí son en su mayoría ya publicados durante la última década (aunque algunos han sido actualizados), junto con un artículo inédito, y nada aquí vendrá como una sorpresa para aquellos que han mantenido su trabajo. Al igual que W, es considerado como el mejor filósofo de su tiempo y su obra escrita es sólida como una roca y pionera en (...) todo. Sin embargo, su fracaso para tomar la W más tarde lo suficientemente seriamente conduce a algunos errores y confusiones. Sólo algunos ejemplos: en P7, dos veces señala que nuestra certeza sobre los hechos básicos se debe al peso abrumador de la razón que respalda nuestras afirmaciones, pero W demostró definitivamente en ' on certidumbre ' que no hay posibilidad de dudar de la verdadera estructura axiomática de nuestro sistema 1 percepciones, memorias y pensamientos, ya que es en sí la base para el juicio y no puede ser juzgado. En la primera frase del P8 nos dice que la certeza es revisable, pero este tipo de ' certeza ', que podríamos llamar Certainty2, es el resultado de extender nuestra certeza axiomática y no revisable (Certainty1) a través de la experiencia y es completamente diferente, ya que es proposicional (verdadero o falso). Este es, por supuesto, un ejemplo clásico de la "batalla contra la hechizamiento de nuestra inteligencia por el lenguaje" que W demostró una y otra vez. Una palabra-dos (o muchos) usos distintos. Su último capítulo "la unidad de la Proposición" (anteriormente inédito) también se beneficiaría en gran medida de la lectura de W "en la certeza" o de los dos libros de DMS sobre OC (ver mis comentarios), ya que hacen claro la diferencia entre verdaderas sólo frases que describen S1 y verdadero o falso proposiciones que describen S2. Esto me parece un enfoque muy superior a S tomando percepciones S1 como proposicional ya que sólo se convierten en T o F después de que uno comienza a pensar en ellos en S2. Sin embargo, su punto de que las proposiciones permiten declaraciones de la verdad y la falsedad real o potencial, del pasado y del futuro y de la fantasía, y por lo tanto proporcionar un gran avance sobre la sociedad pre o protolingüística, es convincente. Como dice, "una proposición es cualquier cosa que pueda determinar una condición de satisfacción... y una condición de satisfacción... es que tal y tal es el caso. " O, uno necesita agregar, que podría ser o podría haber sido o podría ser imaginado para ser el caso. En general, PNC es un buen Resumen de los muchos avances sustanciales sobre Wittgenstein resultantes del medio siglo de trabajo de S, pero en mi opinión, W todavía es inigualable una vez que se comprende lo que está diciendo. Idealmente, deben leerse juntos: Searle para la clara prosa y generalizaciones coherentes, ilustradas con los ejemplos perspicaces de W y aforismos brillantes. Si yo fuera mucho más joven escribiría un libro haciendo exactamente eso. Aquellos que deseen un marco completo hasta la fecha para el comportamiento humano de la moderna dos sistemas punto de vista puede consultar mi libro 'La estructura lógica de la filosofía, la psicología, la mente y lenguaje En Ludwig Wittgenstein y John Searle ' 2nd ED (2019). Los interesados en más de mis escritos pueden ver 'Monos parlantes--filosofía, psicología, ciencia, religión y política en un planeta condenado--artículos y reseñas 2006-2019 3rd ED (2019) y delirios utópicos suicidas en el 21St Century 4TH Ed (2019) y otras. (shrink)

Electrical brain activity modulation in terms of changes in its intensity and spatial distribution is a function of age and task demand. However, the dynamics of brain modulation is unknown when it depends on external factors such as training. The aim of this research is to verify the effect of deductive reasoning training on the modulation in the brain activity of healthy younger and older adults ( (mean age of 21 ± 3.39) and (mean age of 68.92 ± 5.72)). The (...) analysis reveals the benefits of training, showing that it lowers cerebral activation while increasing the number of correct responses in the trained reasoning task (). The brain source generators were identified by time-averaging low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) current density images. In both groups, a bilateral overactivation associated with the task and not with age was identified. However, while the profile of bilateral activation in younger adults was symmetrical in anterior areas, in the older ones, the profile was located asymmetrically in anterior and posterior areas. Consequently, bilaterality may be a marker of how the brain adapts to maintain cognitive function in demanding tasks in both age groups. However, the differential bilateral locations across age groups indicate that the tendency to brain modulation is determined by age. (shrink)

Pronpongo una nueva manera de concebir la aceptación de proposiciones y su relación con la creencia y la inferencia. Argumento además que adoptar esta propuesta nos permite resolver de manera relativamente sencilla algunas paradojas aparentemente tan disímbolas cómo la del prefacio, la lotería y el sorites. Según esta propuesta, el error detrás de la paradoja sorítica es pensar que quién cree que hay una línea divisoria entre lo que cae dentro de la extensión de un término y lo que cae (...) fuera de él debe creer también de algún lugar que ahí se encuentra dicha línea divisoria. Espero convencerlos de que no es así, y que por lo tanto, nuestros juicios de sentido común no nos llevan a ninguna contradicción. (shrink)

If there is content that we reason on, cognitive content, it is in the head and accessible to reasoning mechanisms. This paper discusses the phenomenal theory of cognitive content, according to which cognitive contents are the contents of phenomenal consciousness. I begin by distinguishing cognitive content from the closely associated notion of narrow content. I then argue, drawing on prior work, that the phenomenal theory can plausibly account for the cognitive contents of many relatively simple mental states. My main focus (...) in this paper is the question whether the phenomenal theory can account for the apparently abstract and complex cognitive contents of "high-level" thoughts. It might seem dubious that the theory can account for such cognitive contents, because cognitive phenomenology is too scarce and too thin. However, I argue there are in fact few abstract or complex cognitive contents, so the phenomenal theory's predictions are correct. This position explains some apparently irrational behavior that is otherwise hard to explain, and it makes sense of the central role of inner speech and other forms of consciousness in reasoning. (shrink)

This textbook is not a textbook in the traditional sense. Here, what we have attempted is compile a set of assignments and exercise that may be used in critical thinking courses. To that end, we have tried to make these assignments as diverse as possible while leaving flexibility in their application within the classroom. Of course these assignments and exercises could certainly be used in other classes as well. Our view is that critical thinking courses work best when they are (...) presented as skills based learning opportunities. We hope that these assignments speak to that desire and can foster the kinds of critical thinking skills that are both engaging and fun Please feel free to contact us with comments and suggestions. We will strive to correct errors when pointed out, add necessary material, and make other additional and needed changes as they arise. Please check back for the most up to date version. Rebeka Ferreira and Anthony Ferrucci. (shrink)

We are pleased to publish this WSIA edition of Trudy’s Govier’s seminal volume, Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation. Originally published in 1987 by Foris Publications, this was a pioneering work that played a major role in establishing argumentation theory as a discipline. Today, it is as relevant to the field as when it first appeared, with discussions of questions and issues that remain central to the study of argument. It has defined the main approaches to many of those issues (...) and guided the ways in which we might respond to them. From this foundation, it sets the stage for further investigations and emerging research. This is a second edition of the book that is corrected and updated by the author, with new prefaces to each chapter. (shrink)

Reasoning is a certain kind of attitude-revision. What kind? The aim of this paper is to introduce and defend a new answer to this question, based on the idea that reasoning is a goodness-fixing kind. Our central claim is that reasoning is a functional kind: it has a constitutive point or aim that fixes the standards for good reasoning. We claim, further, that this aim is to get fitting attitudes. We start by considering recent accounts of reasoning due to Ralph (...) Wedgwood and John Broome, and argue that, while these accounts contain important insights, they are not satisfactory: Wedgwood’s rules out too much, and Broome’s too little. We then introduce and defend our alternative account, discuss some of its implications and attractions, and, finally, consider objections. (shrink)

Over four decades, research and policy have created layers of understandings in the quest for "good" corporate governance. The corporate excesses of the 1970s sparked a search for market mechanisms and disclosure to empower shareholders. The UK-focused problems of the 1990s prompted board-centric, structural approaches, while the fall of Enron and many other companies in the early 2000s heightened emphasis on director independence and professionalism. With the financial crisis of 2007–09, however, came a turn in some policy approaches and in (...) academic literature seeking a different way forward. This paper explores those four phases and the discourse each develops and then links each to assumptions about accountability and cognition. After the financial crisis came pointers in policy and practice away from narrow, rationalist prescriptions and toward what the philosopher Stephen Toulmin calls "reasonableness". Acknowledging that heightens awareness of complexity and interdependence in corporate governance practice. The paper then articulates a research agenda concerning what "reasonably" good corporate governance might entail. (shrink)

I argue against the skeptical epistemological view exemplified by the Groarkes that “all theories of informal argument must face the regress problem.” It is true that in our theoretical representations of reasoning, infinite regresses of self-justification regularly and inadvertently arise with respect to each of the RSA criteria for argument cogency (the premises are to be relevant, sufficient, and acceptable). But they arise needlessly, by confusing an RSA criterion with argument content, usually premise material.

ABSTRACTThis paper provides a naturalistic account of inference. We posit that the core of inference is constituted by bare inferential transitions, transitions between discursive mental representations guided by rules built into the architecture of cognitive systems. In further developing the concept of BITs, we provide an account of what Boghossian [2014] calls ‘taking’—that is, the appreciation of the rule that guides an inferential transition. We argue that BITs are sufficient for implicit taking, and then, to analyse explicit taking, we posit (...) rich inferential transitions, which are transitions that the subject is disposed to endorse. (shrink)

Hay doble pulsión en el centro de la discusión del razonamiento deductivo. Una conduce aparentemente a la abstracción y dominios arbitrarios, mientras que la otra conduce a la concreción y la dependencia del contenido. El objetivo de esta investigación es diseñar, aplicar y validar un instrumento de evaluación que nos permita corroborar si el razonamiento deductivo maneja reglas lógicas o contenidos. La muestra de estudio se compuso de 80 participantes (edad 18-77 años). El test consta de 60 ítems categorizados en: (...) formalidad, integrabilidad, complejidad y modalidad. Los resultados ponen de manifiesto la fiabilidad del test de razonamiento deductivo con un alpha de Cronbach. 775 y con un índice de validación. 850 para el índice de inteligencia no verbal (INV) del RIAS. Cómo conclusión inferimos que el razonador deductivo no dispone de un cuerpo preciso de reglas generales deductivas, sino que usa colecciones de reglas heurísticas cada vez menos abstractas. (shrink)

At the heart of John Broome’s research program in the philosophy of normativity is a distinction between reasons, on one hand, and requirements of rationality, on the other. I am a friend of Broome’s view that this distinction is deep and important, and that neither notion can be analyzed in terms of the other. However, I also think there are major challenges that this view is yet to meet. In the first part of the paper, I’ll raise four such challenges, (...) and programmatically indicate how I think such challenges might be headed off. In the second part of the paper, I’ll discuss a third normative notion that Broome is interested in: that of (rules of) correct reasoning. On Broome’s view, correct reasoning is closely tied to requirements of rationality. More particularly, every rule of correct reasoning corresponds to a “basing permission”, which states that it’s rationally permissible to base one attitude on one or more other attitudes. I’ll argue that this proposal can’t be made to work. If I’m right, this suggests that the same kind of pulling-apart that Broome has effected so persuasively with respect to reasons and requirements of rationality needs to be effected again to separate rules of correct reasoning from both of those other categories. (shrink)

How do mental states come to be about something other than their own operations, and thus to serve as ground for effective action? This papers argues that causation in the mental domain should be understood to function on principles of intelligibility (that is, on principles which make it perfectly intelligible for intentions to have a causal role in initiating behavior) rather than on principles of mechanism (that is, on principles which explain how causation works in the physical domain). The paper (...) considers Dharmakīrti’s kāryānumāna argument (that is, the argument that an inference is sound only when one infers from the effect to the cause and not vice versa), and proposes a naturalized account of reasons. On this account, careful scrutiny of the effect can provide a basis for ascertaining the unique causal totality that is its source, but only for reasoning that is context‐specific. (shrink)

Although in some contexts the notions of an ordinary argument’s presumption, assumption, and presupposition appear to merge into the one concept of an implicit premise, there are important differences between these three notions. It is argued that assumption and presupposition, but not presumption, are basic logical notions. A presupposition of an argument is best understood as pertaining to a propositional element (a premise or the conclusion) e of the argument, such that the presupposition is a necessary condition for the truth (...) of e or for a term in e to have a referent. In contrast, an assumption of an argument pertains to the argument as a whole in that it is integral to the reasoning or inferential structure of the argument. A logical assumption of an argument is essentially a proposition that must be true in order for the argument aside from that proposition to be fully cogent. Nothing that is both comparable and distinguishing can be said about presumptions of arguments. Rather, presumptions of arguments are distinctively conventional; they are introduced through conventional rules (e.g., those that concern how to treat promises). So not all assumptions and not all presuppositions of arguments are presumptions of those arguments, although all presumptions of arguments are either assumptions or presuppositions of those arguments. This account avoids making the (monological) notion of presumption vacuous and dissolving the distinction between assumption and presumption, which is a vulnerability of alternative views such as Hansen’s and Bermejo-Luque’s, as is shown. (shrink)

Materialism, reductionism, behaviorism, functionalism, dynamic systems theory and computationalism are popular views, but they were shown by Wittgenstein to be incoherent. The study of behavior encompasses all of human life but behavior is largely automatic and unconscious and even the conscious part, mostly expressed in language (which Wittgenstein equates with the mind), is not perspicuous, so it is critical to have a framework which Searle calls the Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR) and I call the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order (...) Thought (DPHOT). After summarizing the framework worked out by Wittgenstein and Searle, as extended by modern reasoning research, I comment on this first book in a trilogy on Human Nature by the leading authority on Wittgenstein. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016). For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 662p (2016). -/- All of my papers and books have now been published in revised versions both in ebooks and in printed books. -/- Talking Monkeys: Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071HVC7YP. -/- The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle--Articles and Reviews 2006-2016 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B071P1RP1B. -/- Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st century: Philosophy, Human Nature and the Collapse of Civilization - Articles and Reviews 2006-2017 (2017) https://www.amazon.com/dp/B0711R5LGX . (shrink)

I object to Markos Valaris’s thesis that reasoning requires a belief that your conclusion follows from your premisses. My counter-examples highlight the important but neglected role of suppositional reasoning in the basis of so much of what we know.

The new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning draws on Bayesian formal frameworks, and some advocates of the new paradigm think of these formal frameworks as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference. I argue that Bayesian theories should not be seen as providing a computational-level theory of rational human inference, where by “Bayesian theories” I mean theories that claim that all rational credal states are probabilistically coherent and that rational adjustments of degrees of belief in the light of (...) new evidence must be in accordance with some sort of conditionalization. The problems with the view I am criticizing can best be seen when we look at chains of inferences, rather than single-step inferences. Chains of inferences have been neglected almost entirely within the new paradigm. (shrink)

A cursory glance at the list of Nobel Laureates for Economics is sufficient to confirm Stanovich’s description of the project to evaluate human rationality as seminal. Herbert Simon, Reinhard Selten, John Nash, Daniel Kahneman, and others, were awarded their prizes less for their work in economics, per se, than for their work on rationality, as such. Although philosophical works have for millennia attempted to describe, explicate and evaluate individual and collective aspects of rationality, new impetus was brought to this endeavor (...) over the last century as mathematical logic along with the social and behavioral sciences emerged. Yet more recently, over the last several decades, propelled by the emergence of artificial intelligence, cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, neuropsychology, and related fields, even more sophisticated approaches to the study of rationality have emerged. (shrink)

The overwhelming majority of those who theorize about implicit biases posit that these biases are caused by some sort of association. However, what exactly this claim amounts to is rarely specified. In this paper, I distinguish between different understandings of association, and I argue that the crucial senses of association for elucidating implicit bias are the cognitive structure and mental process senses. A hypothesis is subsequently derived: if associations really underpin implicit biases, then implicit biases should be modulated by counterconditioning (...) or extinction but should not be modulated by rational argumentation or logical interventions. This hypothesis is false; implicit biases are not predicated on any associative structures or associative processes but instead arise because of unconscious propositionally structured beliefs. I conclude by discussing how the case study of implicit bias illuminates problems with popular dual-process models of cognitive architecture. (shrink)

According to Paul Boghossian and others, inference is subject to the taking condition: it necessarily involves the thinker taking his premises to support his conclusion, and drawing the conclusion because of that fact. Boghossian argues that this condition vindicates the idea that inference is an expression of agency, and that it has several other important implications too. However, we argue in this paper that the taking condition should be rejected. The condition gives rise to several serious prima facie problems and (...) the reasons which have been offered in favour of it fail to convince. (shrink)

Davidson and Husserl both arrived independently at a startling conclusion: that we need to interact with others in order to acquire the concept of objectivity, or to realize that the world we are in exists independently of us. Here I discuss both of their arguments, and argue that there are problems with each. However, I then I argue that each thinker provided us with one key insight that can be combined to provide a more compelling argument for the claim. Finally (...) I discuss some recent work in developmental psychology that may lend support to the view that emerges. (shrink)

This paper considers whether universally—for all (known) rational beings—an argument scheme or pattern can go from being cogent (well-reasoned) to fallacious. This question has previously received little attention, despite the centrality of the concepts of cogency, scheme, and fallaciousness. I argue that cogency has vanished in this way for the following scheme, a common type of impersonal means-end reasoning: X is needed as a basic necessity or protection of human lives, therefore, X ought to be secured if possible. As it (...) stands (with no further elaboration), this scheme is committed to the assumption that the greater the number of human lives, the better. Although this assumption may have been indisputable previously, it is clearly disputable now. It is a fallacy or non sequitur to make a clearly disputable assumption without providing any justification. Although this topic raises critical issues for practically every discipline, my primary focus is on logical (as opposed to empirical or ethical) aspects of the case, and on implications for practical and theoretical logic. I conclude that the profile of vanishing cogency of the scheme may be unique and is determined by a peculiar combination of contingent universality and changing conditions. (shrink)

I provide a critical survey of some of the major findings of Wittgenstein and Searle on the logical structure of intentionality(mind, language, behavior), taking as my starting point Wittgenstein’s fundamental discovery –that all truly ‘philosophical’ problems are the same—confusions about how to use language in a particular context, and so all solutions are the same—looking at how language can be used in the context at issue so that its truth conditions (Conditions of Satisfaction or COS) are clear. The basic problem (...) is that one can say anything but one cannot mean (state clear COS for) any arbitrary utterance and meaning is only possible in a very specific context. I begin with ‘On Certainty’ and continue the analysis of recent writings by and about them from the perspective of the two systems of thought, employing a new table of intentionality and new dual systems nomenclature. -/- Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view may consult my book ‘The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein and John Searle’ 2nd ed (2019). Those interested in more of my writings may see ‘Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), and Suicidal Utopian Delusions in the 21st Century 4th ed (2019). (shrink)

Some philosophers have recently argued that there are no diachronic norms of epistemic rationality, that is, that there are no norms regarding how you should change your attitudes over time. I argue that this is wrong on the grounds that there are norms governing reasoning.

When and why does it matter whether we can give an explicit justification for what we believe? This paper examines these questions in the light of recent empirical work on the social functions served by our capacity to reason, in particular, Mercier and Sperber’s argumentative theory of reasoning.

Este artículo muestra la conexión entre heurísticas sociales y deliberación. En lugar de caracterizar las heurísticas según disciplinas o campos, aquí se proyectan sobre nuestros enclaves deliberativos. La autora sostiene que el empleo de heurísticas sociales orienta el flujo de la información y la participación en las distintas fases deliberativas, y es necesario analizarlas para establecer indicadores con los que medir grados de deliberación. Esta hipótesis da lugar a una visión pluralista sobre la función social de las heurísticas entendidas como (...) caja de herramientas con nuevos instrumentos y utilidades sociales. Según dicha perspectiva, habría que integrar este tipo de razonamiento en un plan de acción más amplio que explicara en qué sentido las heurísticas son recursos que producen conocimiento, al tiempo que un tipo de conocimiento ya producido. (shrink)