Googled Assertion

Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501 (2017)
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Abstract
Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.
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2017
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Archival date: 2016-12-29
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2016-12-29

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