Googled Assertion

Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Recent work in the philosophy of mind and cognitive science (e.g., Clark and Chalmers 1998; Clark 2010a; Clark 2010b; Palermos 2014) can help to explain why certain kinds of assertions—made on the basis of information stored in our gadgets rather than in biological memory—are properly criticisable in light of misleading implicatures, while others are not.

Author Profiles

Emma C. Gordon
University of Glasgow
J. Adam Carter
University of Glasgow

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-12-29

Downloads
350 (#24,272)

6 months
38 (#26,454)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?